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ABSTRACT 
 
Market-based pricing for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) may be less remunerative or 
uncertain for exporters in the evolving market. The possibility of rent-maximizing could 
encourage them to collude through an influence mechanism. This book examined the 
feasibility of Uniform Pricing (UP) or Volume Control (VC) in the Atlantic Basin and 
analyzed the consequences of such a development on LNG trade. So far, no existing 
model specifically considers the sustainability and effects of an LNG exporters’ cartel. 
Neither has any research on the application of uniform pricing in international gas trade 
been undertaken. This work filled this gap through the Atlantic Basin LNG Trade Model. By 
fitting the historical data and iterating the objective function with the same number of 
random samples (using Palisade software), a probability distribution of market share, price 
and revenue outcomes were generated. From these distributions of outcomes, the most 
probable scenario for each exporter was extracted and subsequently, contextualized. 
  
The exercise reveals a significant change in revenue and market share favourable to a few 
countries – Algeria, Nigeria, and Qatar. Qatar (or perhaps Algeria) is the key country which 
could lead any such price/volume setting process. However, unless the UP/VC induced-
price is low enough to undercut the cost of developing shale gas, the mechanisms are 
unsustainable in North America. In Europe, the UK is similar to the US, while Spain and 
possibly France could be amenable to UP and VC. To some extent, UP is present in the 
Pacific Basin (PB) as Japanese Crude Cocktail (JCC) - but not as a “producer price 
policy”. However, with the globalization of LNG trade, it is not possible to separate the two 
geographical and commercial parts of the global LNG market. It is therefore, likely that 
LNG exporters could determine price in some markets by adopting UP and VC, while 
indirectly influencing other markets. Meanwhile, there are sufficient grounds for further 
research in this regard.  
 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
Man’s overwhelming dependence on carbon fuels makes their affordability and 
sustainability, vis-à-vis climate change a great concern.1 Energy demand 
patterns are gradually responding to environmental concerns, as well as, new 
technologies. So far gas2 has become the chosen clean-burning fuel used for 
space heating, generating electricity and fuelling industries - varying from 
plastics and petrochemicals to fertilizer production.  
 
As the bridge3 to hydrogen fuel cells, it is powering many bus fleets and could 
reduce CO2 emissions by 40%.4 Due to increased consumption, natural gas has 
become one of the primary sources of energy globally (see Figure 1.1). 
Consequently, international trade in gas increased by 5.2% annually from 2000 
to 20055 and by 3% in 2008.6 While it may be unrealistic to predict the potential 
effects of the current economic crunch on gas production and consumption, a 
trend is foreseeable and “production capacity would be there to meet demand”.7 
By 2005 global gas production had more than doubled the 1970 volume due to 
increased demand.8 However, it is trade in the form of Liquefied Natural Gas 
that has contributed immensely to the increase in cross border gas trade.  
 
From a rigid set of trades in a relatively limited number of countries, 
predominantly in the Pacific Basin, LNG trade has grown. In most regions, 
efforts to solve problems with traditional sources of gas supply have made LNG 
                                                 
1 Odell, P; Why Carbon Fuels will dominate the 21st Century’s Global Energy Economy, 2004. 
2 Gas, in this book, covers both Pipeline and Liquefied Natural Gas (unless when explicitly 
distinguished). Natural Gas simply means Pipeline gas. 
3 Gas has the highest hydrogen content of all fossil fuels.   
4 According to the US DOE, Natural Gas Vehicles emit 40% less CO2 than gasoline-powered cars. 
5 IEA, Natural Gas Market Review 2006: Towards a global gas market. Page 31, (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2006). 
6 CEDIGAZ, 2008 natural Gas Year in Review, Press Release, May, 2009 
7 Sandrea, I., What is next for the oil and gas industry? OEF, February 2009. 
8 Victor et’al, (ed.s) Natural gas and geopolitics: from 1970 to 2040, 2006. 
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a valuable option.9 For instance, OECD countries accounted for 87.62% of total 
LNG volumes traded in 2007.10 Consequently, LNG trade grew11 from 6% of 
international gas trade12 in 1970 to 29% in 2007.13  
 
Figure 1.1 World Primary Energy Consumption (1982-2009 Mtoe)14 
 
 
Historically, the pace of LNG trade growth, relative to global gas demand and 
trade, is evident in Table 1.1 overleaf. At different times between 1995 and 2005 
LNG’s growth rate doubled the growth rate of gas demand.15 From 2004 to 
2008, LNG trade has grown steadily – 6% per annum – while pipeline gas trade 
has grown at 3.3% per annum.16 However, in 2008, as a share of international 
gas trade, pipeline gas trade rose by 4.2% while LNG fell to 24.2% from 25%.17 
 
                                                 
9 The trend in various countries or Basins has been different. Therefore, to adequately set the scene for the 
study, Chapter Two also shows the role of natural gas in global energy balances and specifically, in the 
Atlantic Basin countries.  
10 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2008  
11 The history of how LNG trade has evolved in Europe, North America and the Pacific Basin is presented in 
Chapter Two. 
12 Chabrelie, M., LNG: A Commodity in the Making, PANORAMA 2006  
13 B.P., Statistical Review of World Energy, June, 2010. 
14 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2008 
15 This has been the case and even more so in the years 1997 to 2007.  
16 CEDIGAZ, 2008 natural Gas Year in Review, Press Release, May, 2009 
17 Ibid 
Coal 
Gas 
Hydroelectricity 
Nuclear 
Gas 
Oil 
Coal 
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LNG trade grew steadily in the first 25 years (as Figure 1.2 shows), but faster in 
the Pacific Basin and slower in the Atlantic Basin. 
 
Figure 1.2 Growth in Gas Trade18 
 
 
However, in the last fifteen years the situation has been changing: LNG trade 
has grown more rapidly in the Atlantic than in the Pacific. In addition, contract 
flexibility, delivery swaps, short-term/spot transactions in LNG trade have 
soared: the volume of swapped LNG increased from 0.42Bn m3 in 2005 to 9.5Bn 
m3 in 2007, while spot LNG transactions now account for 15%19 of total LNG 
trade.20  
 
Table 1.1 Percentage change21 in Gas Trade globally relative to demand 
(1995-2008) 
Global growth rate in: 1995 2000 2005 2008 
Gas demand 2.5% 4.8% 2.3% 2.5% 
Gas trade 4.1% 8.6% 6.4% 4.0%  
Pipeline gas trade 11.5% 8% 6.4% 4.2% 
LNG Trade  3.9% 10.3% 6.4% -0.5%22 
Source: Extracted by author from BP Statistical Review of World Energy; US EIA and CEDIGAZ 
                                                 
18 GIIGNL, The LNG industry, 2008 
19 As at February 2009, this figure was triple the share in 2000. 
20 Wietfeld, A, and Fenzl, N., LNG Trading: Overview and Challenges. OEF, February 2009. 
21 Growth here refers to percentage change in volume of gas traded/consumed in one year over the preceding 
year. So, growth is relative and could be due to either a significant increase (in volume) during a particular 
year (t) or a low volume in the previous year (t-1) or a combination of both factors. 
22 This is in sharp contrast with an average increase of 7.8% per annum from 1982 to 2007 – according to 
CEDIGAZ, 2008 natural Gas Year in Review. Press Release, May, 2009. 
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Among other factors, the LNG boom has also been due to: 
 Stranded gas becoming economically viable as a result of better price incentives  
 Fall in costs23 due to technological innovations 
 Liberalization of gas and electricity markets in North America and Europe 
 Change in supply situation of USA and the UK, as well as, favourable regulatory 
developments24 and the need for diversity of supply  
 
These factors have significantly affected gas demand but, more important is their 
effect on the supply market. The market is changing with more players in different 
segments of the LNG supply chain and some concentration of suppliers is expected 
given the present trend. For instance, huge investments in supply infrastructure 
have been made in the Middle East and Africa. Based on existing projects, Qatar 
and Nigeria would be the largest producers of LNG in the world by 2015 with 98bn 
m3 and 45bn m3 capacity respectively.25 From the Pacific Basin (as Table 1.2 
shows), the demand centre for LNG is projected to move to the Atlantic Basin26 with 
potential increase in imports.27  
 
Table 1.2 Growth in Gas demand and LNG Trade:  
Atlantic vs Pacific (1995-2008 in Bcm) 
Growth in Gas demand 1995 2000 2005 2008 
Atlantic Basin 
- Europe (EU) 
- North America28 
Pacific Basin (Asia Pacific) 
 
6.9% 
4.1% 
4.8% 
 
3.6% 
5.1% 
7.8% 
 
2.0% 
-1.2% 
7.8% 
 
1.6% 
1.3% 
5.9% 
Growth in LNG Trade  
Atlantic Basin 
- Europe  
- USA 
Pacific Basin 
 
 
9.1% 
-64.7% 
3.9% 
 
 
18.9% 
36.5% 
6.4% 
 
 
18.9% 
-3.2% 
3.2% 
 
 
3.7% 
-54.4% 
5.4% 
Growth in Pipeline gas trade 
Atlantic Basin 
- Europe 
- USA 
Pacific Basin 
 
 
12% 
9.6% 
26.4% 
 
 
8% 
5.8% 
0% 
 
 
7.5% 
2.1% 
1.7% 
 
 
5.0% 
-4.1% 
-1.4% 
Source: Extracted by author from BP Statistical Review of World Energy; US EIA and CEDIGAZ 
 
                                                 
23 The reduction in cost along the value chain ended in 2004 and subsequently the trend has been reversed 
due to construction capacity constraint and rising cost of raw materials (especially Steel). 
24 Specific regulatory regimes and incentives for LNG in different countries are discussed in Chapter Two.  
25 Wietfeld, A, and Fenzl, N., LNG Trading: Overview and Challenges. OEF, February 2009. 
26 This is one of the reasons for focusing the research on the Atlantic Basin LNG market. Other reasons are 
stated in section 1.5 below.  
27 Tables 2.1 and 2.2 (in Chapter Two) present a more detailed picture of how the top five LNG exporters 
and have changed since 1995. 
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The widespread adoption of LNG is creating changes that portend newer 
challenges for gas (especially LNG) trade. Moreover, as trade develops, the pricing 
mechanism will evolve.29 Apparently, the intermittent de-linking of gas prices from 
oil observed in some markets and evolution of spot LNG trade would bring 
additional issues30. 
 
Initially, the industry was more concerned with finding a market. Now the market is 
readily available (as Figure 1.3 shows) and its dynamic structure has been shifting 
risks,31 although the implications for suppliers were not obvious during the era of 
high oil and gas prices. Effects of the changing risk profile could become more 
evident, however, in a low price dispensation.  
 
Figure 1.3 International spread of LNG trade  
 
 
Source:   IEA, 2007 
   
Given the long-term nature of gas investments and capital intensive nature of the 
industry (due to high asset specificity), producers would be interested in protecting 
their interests - especially during the periods of low gas prices. It is possible that the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
28 North America includes the United States, Canada and Mexico. 
29 L’Hegaret et’al, International Market Integration for Natural Gas: A Cointegration Analysis of Prices in 
Europe, North America & Japan, 17, The Energy Journal (2003).    
30 Like regular spot LNG auctions on an electronic platform. See Frisch, M., LNG market may soon see 
emergence of regular auctions for spot cargoes, LNG Journal, April, 2008.  
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importance of LNG32 would influence the rent-sharing mechanism between 
exporters and importers. Considering the diversity of suppliers and differences in 
their interests, could this lead to a group that influences the LNG market? If yes, 
then how? Could the existing suppliers desire or push for price indexation that 
reflects various changes in market fundamentals and trade? This is the main focus 
of this work. 
 
1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Market data indicates that gas prices, in liberalized markets, are more volatile than 
oil price.33 A reason for this is the lack of a unified pricing structure for natural gas 
globally.34 Gas price volatility could also be attributed to relaxation of take-or-pay 
and destination clauses; focus on short-term contracts, supply-demand 
mismatches, capacity constraint, and the security of supply concerns.  
 
Vivienne Cox35 rightly asserts that a growing number of discontinuities are obvious 
across the principal markets and the entire “gas industry is at cross-roads”36. 
Jensen concluded that the nature of LNG trade in the future would be determined 
by answering the questions: “How will prices be determined?” and “What are the 
new risks and rewards that flow from the de-integration of the LNG chain?”  
 
Hallouche opines, and rightly, that “netback pricing37 is less relevant for LNG and 
the quest for new pricing systems for LNG will become an issue of importance”38. 
Victor et ‘al further assert that robust LNG trading requires “more standardized 
pricing mechanisms”39. Shook and Jaffe focused on “the potential for increased 
                                                                                                                                                                  
31 Aissaoui, A., Market risks in a changing LNG World: Exploring alternative mitigation strategies for 
MENA Project. Vol. 49, No.44, MEES, 30th October 2006. 
32 Essentially, LNG market has expanded due to increased natural gas demand; security of supply concerns, 
as well as, climate change issues and market deregulation.  
33 Mazighi A., Some risks related to the Short-Term Trading of Natural Gas, Page 233, Paragraph 2, OPEC 
Review; September 2004. 
34 Wagbara, O., To what extent is a liquid LNG Hub, in the Middle East, feasible? Paper presented at the 
Middle East Gas Summit (MEGAS), Qatar, 2008. 
35 Vivienne Cox is the Chief Executive, Gas, Power and Renewable Energy at British Petroleum. 
36 Cox V., Great Gas Projects need Great Gas Markets – What does the future hold? Speech at the Gastech 
Conference, Bilbao, March 14, 2005. 
37 Netback Pricing is the most widely used approach for International LNG price determination in the 
Atlantic Basin. 
38 Hallouche, H., The Gas Exporting Countries Forum: Is it really a Gas OPEC in the making? NG 13, 
OIES, June 2006 
39 Victor, D.G; et’al, Natural Gas and Geopolitics: From 1970 to 2040, P.14, (2006). 
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standardization, commoditization and globalization” of LNG trade. Their brief 
discussion of pricing in Atlantic Basin LNG trade, however, predicts increased 
flexibility and market linked pricing.40 Focusing on the Pacific Basin, Miyamoto and 
Ishiguro questioned the rationale behind the continued pricing of LNG imports 
based on the JCC.41 They described the current pricing regime as irrational and 
suggested a transition to netback market value based on competing fuels.42  
 
These opinions clearly provoke other questions that are fundamental to resource 
rent and market determination. Although today’s gas pricing situation is unfavorable 
to both producers and consumers, some producers contend that it provides unfair 
revenue from their gas. Perhaps, the latter argument offers justification for taking 
action to unify and stabilize gas prices. This assertion is reinforced by the common 
desire of producer-groups to maintain a minimum price level above which prices are 
allowed to fluctuate.43 The foregoing portends market influence through price-fixing 
or volume control. 
 
One means by which gas exporters could exert influence on the gas markets is 
through LNG. Specifically, by applying a model contract pricing system, exporters 
may be able to unify LNG pricing, upstream in the regional markets. This book 
posits that a group of LNG exporting countries could begin to fix LNG contract 
prices by using a preferred reference price (Henry Hub) as basis for indexation or 
uniformly adopting a minimum absolute price level ($x). Such a cartel could 
establish the price, while consumers determine quantity through the market. It could 
reasonably determine a high revenue-generating price/volume using a reliable 
demand-supply model. Alternatively, exporters could opt to defend a price band 
through quantity control depending on the existing market (demand) scenario. 
 
                                                 
40 Shook, B. and Jaffe, A.M., Developments in Atlantic Basin LNG: Implications for Japan, Working Paper  
41 Miyamoto, A., and Ishiguro, C., A new paradigm for Natural Gas pricing in Asia: A perspective on Market 
Value, NG 28, OIES, February 2009. 
42 They argue that the netback market value (NMV) approach is: more rational; beneficial for the expansion 
of gas markets; necessary to achieve price differentiation due to the varying energy usage in each country. 
Apparently, NMV is effective only to the extent that the price(s) of competing fuel(s) is competitively 
determined. In other words, because LNG has become a global commodity, it is irrational to determine LNG 
netbacks (prices) on the basis of non-transparent prices (or prices that are not as transparently determined as 
crude oil prices).   
43 Alhajji A.F. and Huettner D. OPEC and other Commodity cartels: a comparison. Page 1155, Paragraph 2, 
28 Energy Policy, (2000) 
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A similar effect is achievable by controlling the quantity, but at present exporters 
lack spare liquefaction capacity. In a low price situation, LNG supply quotas may be 
issued in proportion to existing contracts, liquefaction capacity, as well as, gas 
reserves. Quantitative ceilings may be placed on exports also. The initiation of 
liquefaction projects with un-contracted capacity is evidence that this is an option. 
Although creating spare capacity seems uneconomical, it is possible since over 
20% of global liquefaction capacity remains uncontracted. Another option could be 
to determine supply route(s) and/or the volume that goes to a particular destination. 
This may be achieved by allocating markets to particular exporters on a long-term 
basis. Given the above alternatives, there then arises the question of feasibility. 
 
Does the economics of LNG permit price-setting by exporting countries? Given their 
potential leverage, could LNG exporters collude to influence trade by altering price 
determination patterns in the Atlantic Market? Could they uniformly adopt a new 
LNG pricing regime? How would a uniform price regime operate in a fragmented 
global market where competing fuels exist and market dynamics differ? What could 
be the implications for LNG trade if such a uniform pricing mechanism is 
developed?   
 
Meanwhile, the following would have to be determined: the vital but uncertain role of 
a price leader; key members of the group; and the most feasible option. This book 
seeks to answer some of the above questions in addition to other objectives spelt 
out below.  
 
1.3 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
Starting from the premise of a hypothetical LNG exporters’ organization the author 
assumes that LNG trade could be influenced. This assumption is based on 
arguments and postulations in the existing literature. For instance, Bobrow and 
Kudrle opined that cartels “are mostly feasible where they are least needed - where 
there are few sellers with high concentration”.44 Meanwhile, Desta discussed the 
legal premise of natural resources cartels within WTO rules.45 In this regard, Yergin 
                                                 
44 Bobrow, D.B. and Kudrle, R.T., Theory, Policy, and Resource Cartels, pp. 3-56, Vol. 20, No. 1, The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, March 1976. 
45 Desta, M. G., OPEC, the WTO, Regionalism and Unilateralism, in 3, Journal of World Trade, Vol. 37, 
(2003) 
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asserts that “an association of LNG exporters is likely and, indeed, already in the 
making”46.  
 
Principally, the book is concerned with the potential for an organization of LNG 
exporters - Organization of Atlantic LNG Exporting Countries (OALEC)47 - to 
develop and impose a price concept48or control export volumes in Atlantic LNG 
trade. The work considers the hypothetical case of an LNG Export Organization 
developing a mechanism49 to influence LNG prices. The book examines the 
feasibility or otherwise of a Uniform LNG Pricing Scheme or Volume Control; and 
analyzes the consequences of such a development on LNG trade.  
 
In this regard, specifically: 
 the suggestion that gas exporting organisation, such as the GECF, might 
take such action is hypothetical (rather than actual); 
 the price mechanism that the organisation might develop and implement has 
been devised by this author (and not based on any actual proposal). 
 
1.4 RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY 
The study is relevant since the success of climate change policies will be 
significantly affected by the extent to which gas markets become integrated. 
Besides, the strategic nature of gas raises issues of redistribution of leverage in the 
global political economy from energy importers to exporters (either acting alone or 
in a group). Understanding the practical application of a uniform pricing formula 
would, therefore, enable energy analysts to appreciate and predict any cartel 
behaviour accurately. The primary research question and the outcome of this work, 
however, are not dependent on whether the Forum persists and successfully 
develops/implements any price influencing scheme.   
 
Furthermore, the book is a pertinent investigation resulting from the gas cartel 
question as LNG becomes increasingly accepted amid the greater risk of market 
                                                 
46 Kalicki, J. and Goldwyn, D. (Eds.) Energy and Security: Toward a new Foreign Policy Strategy, 2005  
47 For the purpose of this Book, the organization would include exporting countries that are major players in 
the Atlantic Basin – Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, as well as, Trinidad and Tobago. 
48 The Pricing concept is proposed in Chapter Three and applied in Chapter Four. 
49 Either a price or volume influence mechanism but with the ultimate aim of keeping Price(s) higher than it 
would have been. 
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manipulation. Previously, the prices of gas gave a wrong indication of its value,50 
but now demand is becoming fairly price inelastic, as consumers are ready to pay 
for its energy content and added characteristics. Therefore, it is a relevant study of 
LNG cartels and pricing systems which remains under researched51 relative to 
many studies that focus on LNG technologies and their possible consequences52.   
Focusing on the developments in the fast growing LNG market, the study is 
pertinent as resource assertiveness gradually spreads among petroleum-rich 
countries. It is a pre-emptive effort to determine the possible LNG pricing approach 
adoptable by exporters or group of exporters. This book can be appreciated more in 
terms of its future relevance.  
 
1.5 METHODOLOGY, SCOPE AND STRUCTURE 
According to Bobrow and Kudrle,53 no single perspective54 comprehensively covers 
the relevant issues of an intergovernmental resource cartel. The Research 
Methodology, therefore, is a combination of quantitative and descriptive methods 
based on the theories of cartels, exhaustible resources and collective action. The 
following sub-sections describe the approach, structure and scope of the book.  
 
1.5.1 Approach 
To set the stage for the quantitative approach, a description of Atlantic Basin LNG 
trade is undertaken. In the same vein, theories of exhaustible resources, 
substitution and cost are applied to evaluate the principles of pricing in international 
gas trade as background for proposing a uniform pricing regime55.  
 
Subsequently, in a quantitative approach, a uniform price formula56 and a volume 
control mechanism are generated, simulated and iterated in a Spreadsheet Model 
                                                 
50 Banks, F. E; A perspective on natural gas, in Paragraph 2, on Page 16, November/December OPEC 
Bulletin, 2003. 
51 A clear indication of this fact is provided through the Literature Review below. 
52 Victor, D.G; et’al, Natural Gas and Geopolitics: From 1970 to 2040. Page 15, (2006) 
53 Bobrow, D.B. and Kudrle, R.T., Theory, Policy, and Resource Cartels, pp. 3-56, Vol. 20, No. 1, The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, March 1976. 
54 The five basic perspectives for the analysis of resource cartels which they considered are: the theory of 
cartels; the theory of depletable resources; coalition theory; internal politics approach and the theory of 
collective action.   
55 This consists of proposed pricing concepts that could be adopted by an organisation of LNG exporting 
countries. 
56 The Formula is derived from the proposed pricing concepts and is designed to suit the book. 
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of LNG trade. The hypothesis is that uniform LNG pricing is feasible and its 
adoption offers sufficient benefits57 vis-à-vis trade-offs. Using the model, a 
probabilistic analysis of different market scenarios, vis-à-vis new prices, is 
undertaken. The outcome reveals the effects of exogenous price/volume shocks 
under different LNG and pipeline gas market scenarios.  
 
Finally, given the hypothesis, feasibility is evaluated based on the following 
analytical criteria58, from a country-specific perspective: 
o Extra rent earned  
For each exporter, the extra rent (price differential to marginal costs59) accruable is 
directly related to the new price, HHI and inversely proportional to the price elasticity 
of demand. Derived from Nash and Cournot60     







HHI
iceMCice PrPr  ; 
Where:  
MC = Marginal Cost;  
Hirschmann-Herfindahl Index (HHI) = ΣMs²; Ms² = Square of market share (Ms) and; 
ε = Price elasticity of demand. 
o In terms of revenue, market share and price differential, is each country 
better-off or worse-off given its: 
 Existing and potential liquefaction capacity  
 Dependence on export revenue or Discount rate61 
 Current and forecasted demand levels  
 
o Resource abundance: Each exporter’s willingness to adopt an influence 
mechanism is directly related to its resource abundance (as liquefaction 
capacity changes over time).62  
o Diversified pricing versus uniform pricing/volume control 
o Price Leader or Swing Producer 
                                                 
57 This includes a combination of Revenue, Market Share and Negotiating Leverage (applied in Chapter 
Five). 
58 Justified, described and applied in Chapter Five on the basis of an extensive literature review undertaken 
therein. 
59 In addition to the differential rent, part of the consumer surplus also goes to the Exporter due to the 
collusive action and the inherent capacity constraint in most energy markets. 
60 J. Nash, Non-cooperative Games, 286-295 Annals of Mathematics, Vol. 54, no. 2 (September 1951). 
61 Discount rate, here, defines a country’s willingness to forego present gains for higher prices in the future. 
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1.5.2 Structure of the Book 
Following from the above methodology, each chapter of the Book addresses one or 
more sub-research questions linked to the primary research question - To what 
extent could an LNG export organization, operating a uniform pricing or 
volume control mechanism, influence LNG trade in the Atlantic Basin? A brief 
description of the chapters, undertaken below, reveals how the secondary research 
questions are addressed.  
 
Given the research question, it would be inconsistent to analyze the impact of an 
exogenous factor (Cartel) on LNG trade without establishing the present and 
potential trade patterns in the region. Chapter Two, therefore, describes each 
exporting country that is likely63 to participate in an organisation of LNG exporting 
countries. It answers the question “which could be the key countries in any such 
cartel and why?” by describing each country’s LNG trade flows; supply capacity and 
future investment scenario.64 
 
The research theme underscores the need to examine and understand how price 
determination occurs within the Atlantic Basin LNG market - how efficient and 
competitive are the current pricing regimes? Accordingly, Chapter Three traces the 
evolution of pricing concepts that underlie international gas trade by reviewing 
literature on price determination. This section of the Book rigorously documents the 
development and current situation of three main price mechanisms: 
 Hub based spot pricing: NBP and Henry Hub 
 Oil product indexed netback market pricing in Continental Europe pipeline trade 
 Crude oil linked (JCC) pricing for LNG in the Pacific Basin 
 
Furthermore, it relies on price fundamentals to suggest possible uniform pricing 
concepts for Atlantic Basin LNG exporters. In other words, it answers the question: 
what principle would underpin a uniform pricing mechanism for LNG in the Atlantic 
                                                                                                                                                                  
62 Conversely, a relatively new LNG exporter with small reserves would be either cautious or indifferent 
about an influence mechanism. 
63 The countries were chosen based on their participation or ability to participate (liquefaction capacity and 
market share) in the Atlantic Basin LNG market within the research’s time frame - between 2005 and 2013.  
64 It highlights the demand situation in some the regional market but focuses more on supply-side issues. 
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Market? As stated in section 1.6.1, Chapters Two and Three jointly define the 
research context. 
 
Chapter Four is the Atlantic Basin LNG Trade Model (ABLTM). It describes the data 
set and analyzes the result. Atlantic Basin LNG Trade Model (ABLTM) is 
representative of a month-scale LNG market involving six exporting countries and 
five importing countries.65  The total revenue function is the optimization function 
and it is subject to some constraints – liquefaction capacity, price (given), and gas 
reserves.66 The Chapter answers the secondary research questions: “In what 
market scenario is uniform pricing or volume control applicable?” and “would a 
uniform pricing regime be easier to implement than volume control?” An attempt is 
also made, in the chapter, to show the conceivable benefits or losses to exporters 
from uniform pricing or volume control?  
 
Having applied the new price regime in the LNG trade model, Chapter Five 
addresses the feasibility issue by relating the simulation result to each country’s 
LNG context. It entails a study of cartel literature - in particular how price or volume 
quotas are manipulated over time. Considering the nature of gas markets and 
classic cartel problems it answers the following secondary questions: 
 What conceivable permutations of uniform pricing (UP) and/or volume control 
(VC) are realistic? 
 What are the key considerations for adopting uniform pricing or volume 
control?  
 What are the implications of uniform pricing or volume control for each 
exporter?  
 
Chapter Six speculates on the potential implications, of uniform pricing, for LNG 
trade (project finance, contracting, price arbitrage and demand). It first discusses 
recent empirical developments in the global LNG market (as they relate to this 
work). The concluding section then reflects on the contrast between what the model 
suggests and empirical developments. 
 
                                                 
65 The exporting countries are Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, as well as, Trinidad and Tobago, while 
the importing countries are France; Italy; Spain; the U.S and UK. 
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1.5.3 Scope of Research and Definition of Terms 
A key significance of LNG is the prospect for more arbitrage and connectivity of 
diverse markets in addition to the volumes traded. LNG trade offers a range of 
options to gas exporters and importers – it continues to integrate regional gas 
markets in the Atlantic Basin. The book focuses on the Atlantic Basin LNG market 
for the following reasons. 
 
First, the two largest natural gas markets in the globe are located in the Atlantic 
Basin – in North America and Europe. Furthermore, Europe has the highest 
regional dependence on LNG and demand is expected to increase even more.67 
Second, the region has the most competitive natural gas markets in the US and UK. 
Given the degree of liquidity in these markets, LNG transactions are more flexible in 
the Atlantic Basin due to the number of aggregators with import capacity and 
uncommitted vessels.  
 
Moreover, this situation has resulted in a high number of LNG arbitrage in the 
region and the trend is expected to continue. Such expectation - another reason for 
focusing on the Atlantic Basin - is traceable to the fact that exporters in the region 
are the most diversified. In other words, Atlantic Basin LNG exporters supply 
markets globally (unlike Asia-pacific exporters that do not export to the Atlantic). 
The reason is because Atlantic exporters have a lot of uncontracted capacity. As 
such, the irreversible trend towards globalization of gas trade, through LNG68, lies in 
the Atlantic Basin.   
 
Atlantic Basin LNG market is, therefore, the research scope and the time frame is 
between 2005 and 2013. This covers LNG trade on either side of or across the 
Atlantic Basin (shown on Table 1.3 on the next page) - North America (mainly the 
US); Trinidad and Tobago; Spain; Italy; France; United Kingdom; Algeria, Egypt; 
Nigeria; Libya and Qatar. In addition to the reasons offered, these countries were 
chosen69 from the Atlantic Basin for manageability and detailed analysis.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
66 Transportation cost is assumed fixed by the acquisition of vessels or exogenously determined. 
67 The potential demand for LNG in the importing markets is extensively described in Chapter Two. The 
discourse also justifies the countries chosen for this exercise. 
68 IEA, Natural Gas Review 2008, (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2008).  
69 The criteria and process of selecting the countries is described in Chapter Two. 
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Table 1.3 Research Scope 
Sources Liquefaction Transportation Regasification Importers 
Algeria       USA 
         
         
         
Egypt         
       UK 
         
Libya         
        
        Spain 
         
Nigeria         
       Italy 
         
Qatar         
        France 
        
         
        
Trinidad          
 
Considering that large amounts, in the global gas industry, have been committed to 
LNG, the simulation exercise is focused on the supply-side of the LNG value chain. 
For a comprehensive interpretation of results, demand-side issues are also taken 
into consideration in subsequent analysis. Although the book dwells on LNG Trade 
in the Atlantic Basin, empirical observations from Asia Pacific markets are also 
captured in Chapter Six.70  
 
Definition of Terms and Concepts 
Feasibility, here, simply means that it is practical to increase exporters’ revenue at a 
determined price payable by importing countries’ consumers. An extensive 
discourse on ‘what is economically feasible?’ is avoided here - it becomes more 
complicated to explain what economic feasibility is when the expected benefits are 
long term in nature.  
 
                                                 
70 In an attempt to reconcile the principles of uniform pricing and volume control with globalizing LNG 
trade. 
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Uniform LNG Pricing71 implies an agreement about LNG export price or pricing 
structure by a group of LNG Exporting Countries, applicable to their customers 
globally. It could be conceived as a system in which each and every exporter 
applies the same principle/formula to determine the delivered price payable by all 
buyers (in the long term LNG sales contracts).  
 
Volume Control could be conceived as any form of export control -by issuing quotas 
or market sharing or supply manipulation through delay/cancellation of future 
projects - to influence the market. However, Volume Control Mechanism as 
simulated here, is solely cut in current LNG production – to constrain the Average 
Contracted Volume. Uniform Pricing and Volume control mechanisms are assumed 
to be different sides of the same coin. And the ultimate aim is keeping price higher 
than it would have been.  
 
1.5.4 Originality and Justification for Methodology 
The methodology and structure of the book follows from the nature and infancy of 
LNG trade. This effort differs from the others because it appreciates that LNG 
exporters may not collude globally but could operate through direct uniform pricing 
or supply manipulation regionally. It, therefore, emphasizes price-fixing on a 
regional scope because LNG prices vary regionally (but are defined and influenced 
by various exogenous/inter-regional factors). The author captures the uniqueness of 
LNG trade, pricing and regional markets.  
 
This approach has been chosen because other studies on international cartels have 
either been comparative or applied actual production quotas.72  Moreover, the 
theoretical perspective applied here has its implications for the questions asked – 
as suggested by Bobrow and Kudrle.73 For instance, Coccorese confirmed that 
through informal sharing of information companies could influence the market and 
reap monopoly profit.74 Alhajji and Huettner compared the cartelization of some 
                                                 
71 This is the applicable definition here. Other conceptual and theoretical definitions of Uniform Pricing have 
been provided in the Analytical Framework below. 
72 In cases when the subject of the research is a supply-restricting cartel like OPEC. 
73 Bobrow, D.B. and Kudrle, R.T., Theory, Policy, and Resource Cartels, pp. 3-56, Vol. 20, No. 1, The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, March 1976. 
74 Coccorese, P., Information Exchange as a Means of Collusion: The Case of the Italian Car Insurance 
Market. Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, November 2008. 
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globally-traded commodities (like cocoa, tin, tobacco, copper, steel and diamond) 
with crude oil (OPEC).75 Meanwhile, Elaine has shown the significance of market 
structure to the effectiveness and sustainability of a cartel.76 
 
It is important to emphasize, therefore, that LNG is a different commodity – with a 
unique pricing and trading regime.77 The non-existence of an operational LNG cartel 
with production quotas for its member-countries and differences in market 
structures makes an absolute comparative analysis unsuitable for this effort. 
However, the efforts of Eckbo, Alhajji and Huettner; as well as, Bobrow and Kudrle 
revealed different reasons why some cartels were more successful than others. As 
such, further review of cartel literature was undertaken,78 in Chapter Five, to 
construct an analytical framework for contextualizing the simulation results. 
The book uniquely adopts probabilistic analysis in a spreadsheet model as a 
solution mechanism and descriptively analyzes the effect of market control 
mechanisms on LNG trade. The inherent benefit maximization objective of gas-rich 
countries justifies the modeling assumptions which are hinged on economic 
theories. LNG producers strive to optimize production to ensure the efficient 
utilization of reserves and liquefaction capacity. Herein is the justification for a 
probabilistic analysis. Besides, there is no research on the application of uniform 
                                                 
75 Alhajji A.F. and Huettner D. OPEC and other Commodity cartels: a comparison, 28 Energy Policy 
(2000). 
76 Tan, E.S., Market structure and the coal cartel in early nineteenth-century England, Vol.62, Issue 2, 
Economic History Review, 2009. 
77 The peculiarities of LNG trade and its pricing regimes are extensively discussed in section 2.1.2 and 
Chapter Three respectively. 
78 Some of the literature reviewed in Chapter Five includes: Eckbo, P., OPEC and the Experience of some 
non-petroleum international cartels, MIT Energy Lab working paper, June 1975; Pindyck, R., The 
cartelization of world commodity markets, in Vol. 69, No. 2, The American Economic Review, May 1979; 
Alhajji, A. and Huettner, D., OPEC and other commodity cartels: a comparison, in Vol. 28, Energy Policy, 
2000; Mikdashi, Z. Collusion could work, No. 14, Foreign Policy, spring, 1974; Bergsten, C., The threat is 
real, No. 14, Foreign Policy, spring, 1974; Fog, B., How are Cartel prices determined? Vol. 5, Journal of 
Industrial Economics, November 1976; Hnyilicza, E., and Pindyck, R., Pricing policies for a Two-Part 
Exhaustible Resource Cartel: The Case of OPEC, Volume 8, European Economic Review, August, 1976; 
Osborne, D., Cartel Problems, in Vol. 66, No. 5, The American Economic Review, December, 1976; Mills, 
D. and Elzinga, K., Cartel Problems: Comment, in Vol. 68 No. 5, The American Economic Review, 
December, 1978; Stevens, P., National oil companies and international oil companies in the Middle East: 
Under the shadow of government and the resource nationalism cycle, Vol. 1, No. 1, Journal of World energy 
Law and Business, 2008; Adelman, M., The real oil problem, in Regulation, spring 2004; Adelman, M, and 
Lynch, M; Markets for Petroleum, Encyclopedia of Energy, Volume 3, 2004; Claes, D., The Politics of Oil-
Producer Cooperation, 2001; Alhajji, A. and Huettner, D., OPEC and other commodity cartels: a 
comparison, in Vol. 28, Energy Policy, 2000; Danielsen, A.L. The Evolution of OPEC, (1982); and Griffin 
J.M. & Teece D.J (Eds), Introduction in OPEC Behaviour and World Oil Prices, 1982 
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pricing in international gas trade. This effort is, therefore, an attempt to see how the 
principles of uniform pricing could be applied in LNG trade. 
 
1.6 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Against the above introduction, it is important to show the existing body of 
knowledge into which this book fits and builds on. Several years ago, Banks 
highlighted the poor treatment given to natural gas in the economics literature.79 But 
today a lot has been done and the following is a review of literature on International 
gas trade; gas pricing; producer cooperation and the theoretical basis of uniform 
pricing.  
  
Mazighi examined the historical trend of international gas trade and showed the firm 
correlation between both forms of gas (pipeline and LNG). He stated that “before 
LNG becomes predominant, we need a delinking of these two means of trading 
gas”.80 Applying a schematic diagram in the analysis, Mazighi concluded that there 
was no evidence to support the emergence of a global LNG market before 2010. He 
also predicted a bipolarized international gas market in the Pacific and Atlantic 
Basins. The latter prediction has materialized but not in the manner suggested. 
Meanwhile, he did not specify whether gas and oil markets should be delinked in 
pricing or trading terms.  Furthermore, one would argue that, contrary to Mazighi’s 
thinking, the correlated and supplementary nature of LNG to pipeline gas enhances 
the globalization of gas trade.  
 
Brito and Hartley may have towed the above line of thought when they emphasized 
the importance of expectations in determining market outcomes and enhancing the 
transition to a world gas market. They claimed that “endogenous (induced) changes 
in expectations about market structure can reinforce and amplify the effects of the 
changes in exogenous factors”81. In their conclusion, among other factors, “an 
increasing role for spot markets in the trading natural gas”82 was suggested as 
potential replacement for long term contracts. While the US and UK gas markets 
                                                 
79 Banks, F., An Introduction to the Economics of Natural Gas, p.27, Vol. XXVII, No.1, OPEC Review, 
March 2003. 
80 Mazighi, A., An Examination of the international natural gas trade, Vol. 24, Issue 4, OPEC Review, 2003. 
81 Brito, D., and Hartley, P., Expectations and the Evolving World Gas Market, Vol. 28, No.1, Energy 
Journal, 2007 
82 Ibid. 
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have greatly influenced gas trade, one can not foresee spot trading replacing long 
term LNG contracts in the medium term.83 Dwindling domestic supply in both 
countries may have provoked increased gas trade in the Atlantic Basin but also 
different pricing issues. 
 
Amidst gas supply disputes and transit issues,84 Stern considered the new security 
environment for European gas and competition for LNG supplies.85 He traced the 
less favourable relationships between importers and governments of major gas 
trading countries. In the short term, according to him, steps should be taken to 
protect end-users from risks relating to infrastructure failure and inadequate 
storage. But in the long term, the combined effects of depleting domestic reserves, 
geopolitical tensions86 and globalizing LNG trade would determine European gas 
supply.87  
 
Meanwhile, Nyssens and Osborne considered the potential effects of more 
sophisticated profit splitting mechanisms (PSMs) on the European gas market. 
They concluded that PSMs were a disincentive to arbitrage88 and infringe anti-trust 
law. They, noted that in some cases PSMs are not restrictive and suggested further 
“detailed analysis of contractual mechanisms and their economic context”.89  
 
Drury, subsequently, analyzed the EC’s agreement with Algeria on the issue. He 
appreciates the commission’s dislike for PSMs on the logic that “it is trying to build a 
single European gas market, and anything which restricts the buyer’s choice of 
                                                 
83 Wagbara, O., To what extent is a liquid LNG Hub, in the Middle East, feasible? International Energy Law 
Review, Issue 3, 2008. 
84 There have been several price and contractual disputes between gas exporters and importers, as well as, 
transit disputes. For more details of these, please see Pirani, S. (Ed.), Russian and CIS Gas Markets and their 
impact on Europe, 2009 and Pirani, S. et’al, The Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute of January 2009: a 
comprehensive assessment, February, 2009 at http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/NG27.pdf ; Forbes, A., 
Gassi Touil: A failed partnership, in Issue 14, LNG Focus, October 2007; and Nyssens, H. et’al, The 
territorial restrictions case in the gas sector: a state of play, Competition Policy Newsletter, 1/2004 
85 Stern, J., The new security environment for European gas: worsening geopolitics and increasing global 
competition for LNG, NG 15, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, October 2006 
86 Between Russia and FSU countries on the one hand, and on the other hand, between EU countries and 
CIS, as well as, Middle East countries. 
87 Stern, J., The new security environment for European gas: worsening geopolitics and increasing global 
competition for LNG, NG 15, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, October 2006. 
88 This is especially the case when the LNG is sold Free on Board (FOB). 
89 Nyssens, H., and Osborne, I., Profit splitting mechanisms in the liberalised gas market: the devil lies in the 
detail, in Competition Policy Newsletter, No.1, Spring 2005 
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where in Europe to resell the gas it has bought is essentially a barrier to cross-
border trade and anti-competitive”.90 Drury also highlighted potential legal 
disadvantages of the agreement it would create difficulties for other LNG (FOB) 
exporters and may also push them back to delivered sales.  
 
It is notable that, in the current LNG market, European LNG importers are not 
particularly keen to resell acquired LNG in Europe91 but rather have an international 
perspective. While concluding a preview of LNG trade, Weitfeld and Fenzl echoed 
the above view that “international players will have a distinct advantage over 
regional actors since global players are obviously better poised to meet producer 
expectations with regard to serving different markets”.92   
 
Moreover, Luciani argues that the EC has not succeeded in creating an integrated 
gas market “and in all probability never will”.93 This view is similar to an earlier result 
obtained by Franziska, Hirschhausen and Kemfert. They suggested that Cournot 
competition is the most practical representation of the European gas sector but 
observed that it leaves room for imperfect competition to the advantage of “de-facto 
national monopolies”.94 In addition to the works reviewed here, Robinson95; 
Neumann et al96; and Asche et’al97 concluded that some national markets within 
Europe are integrated.  
 
Perhaps, given Luciani’s assertion, as well as, other modeling results above, it is 
conclusive that actual market integration98 is different from price convergence or co-
movement. While the theoretical basis for building an integrated EU-wide gas 
market to attract exporters is economically sound, it would be important to 
                                                 
90 Drury, D., Destination restrictions: Algerian agreement with EC creates potential headaches for Atlantic 
Basin FOB suppliers, Issue 14, LNG Focus; October, 2007. 
91 As the European Commission anticipates or expects them to. 
92 Wietfeld, A, and Fenzl, N., LNG Trading: Overview and Challenges. OEF, February 2009. 
93 Luciani, G., The Gas supply security Issue, OEF, February 2009. 
94 Holz, F., et al., A Strategic Model of European Gas Supply (GASMOD), Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 766-788, 
Energy Economics, 2007 
95 Robinson, T., Have European gas prices converged? Vol. 35, Issue 4, Energy Policy, April 2007. 
96 Neumann, A., et’al., Convergence of European Spot Market Prices for Natural Gas? A Real-Time Analysis 
of Market Integration, Presentation at the 7th IAEE European Energy Conference, Bergen, August 2005 
97 Asche, F., et’al, European market integration for gas? Volume flexibility and political risk, Vol. 24, 
Energy Economics, 2002 
98 “Market Integration” is the interaction of markets and prices across national boundaries (both physically 
and financially). 
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reconsider the strategic role of IOGCs for the EC’s to achieve its goal. Meanwhile, 
to what extent would exporters be willing to bear the underlying risks associated 
with selling in such “liquid” or “integrated” market? 
 
Taking a different turn, Foss considered the likely trend of US natural gas supply 
and prices, as well as, the future role of LNG imports in North America. She also 
questioned the extent to which de-linked oil and gas prices could affect fuel usage 
and competition in the long-run. A relevant fact deductable from the study is that 
“the impact of LNG will hinge on US market conditions, intra-basin competition for 
cargoes, and the commercial strategies of LNG operators”.99 While, shale gas 
production has affected US offering price for LNG, it would be interesting to know 
what exporters could do in terms of new investments.  
 
Due to the growth in gas trading Mazighi investigated the efficiency of futures 
markets100 and risks associated with short term trading of natural gas101. The former 
research showed that more liquidity is needed with relative increase in spot gas 
transactions for the futures market to be efficient. And in the latter article, Mazighi 
argued that “short-term trading of gas is far from riskless”.102 In other words, 
volume, price and infrastructure risks, associated with short term trading, present 
producers, consumers and project financiers with varying challenges.  
 
Like Mazighi, Brown and Yucel undertook a study on the determinants of natural 
gas prices in the US.103 Sequel to that, they investigated the co-movement of gas 
prices in North America and Europe. Applying econometric tests, they considered 
whether such price co-movements were arbitrage driven or vectored through oil 
prices. Their bivariate tests reveal that coordinated gas price movements across the 
Atlantic could be due to LNG arbitrage and that regional gas prices also adjust to 
deviations in the long-run crude oil-gas price relationship.104 
 
                                                 
99 Foss, M., United States natural Gas prices to 2015, NG 18, OIES; February, 2007. 
100 Mazighi, A., The efficiency of natural gas futures markets, in OPEC Review, June 2003. 
101 Mazighi A., Some risks related to the Short-Term Trading of Natural Gas, Page 233, Paragraph 2, OPEC 
Review; September 2004. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Brown, S. and Yucel, M., What drives natural gas prices? The Energy Journal, Vol. 29, No.2, 2008.  
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In a similar effort, Neumann showed that, through price convergence, Atlantic Basin 
gas markets were integrating.105 Neumann applied the Kalman Filter method and 
the exercise indicated spot natural gas prices in regional markets are converging 
towards the law of one price.106 The effort also highlighted the role of LNG – 
especially short-term trading - in the Atlantic Basin. The research calls for more 
study on how the restructuring of Europe’s gas market would affect liquidity and 
further convergence in the Basin. In this vein, Rice University’s World Gas Trade 
Model indicates that Russia would play a pivotal role by linking LNG prices between 
North America and Europe when it enters LNG trade.107 
 
Meanwhile, Mazighi assessed the potentials of either the Henry Hub (HH) or NBP 
price becoming the natural gas marker. He posited three conditions for the 
emergence of an international reference price108 and concludes that “the HH price 
has a bigger potential than the NBP to become an international price reference, 
particularly because the UK market is supposed to import more and more gas 
indexed to oil in the coming years”.109 However, Mazighi did not foreclose the 
probable existence of two or more regional reference prices for gas. Perhaps, it 
would be interesting to reconcile the results obtained by Neumann; Brown and 
Yucel with Mazighi’s.    
 
Focusing on China, Miyamoto and Ishiguro traced the penetration of LNG into the 
Chinese energy mix. Their study110 also expounded on gas price determination and 
the reasons behind China’s shift in LNG import policy. According to the authors, 
government scaled down import plans due to LNG’s inability to compete in China’s 
energy markets.111 In their view, LNG imports are considered expensive in China 
and so it faces a bleak future in the medium term. A major setback of their work, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
104 Brown, S. and Yucel, M., Market Arbitrage: European and North American Natural Gas Prices, Vol. 30 
Special Issue, Energy Journal, 2009. 
105 Neumann, A., Linking Natural Gas Markets – Is LNG doing its job? Vol. 30, Special Issue, Energy 
Journal, 2009 
106 With differences due to transportation or transaction cost. 
107 Rice University, Impacts of Worldwide shift to greater reliance on Natural Gas analyzed, News Release  
108 The three conditions are an organized market, sufficient level of liquidity in the market and the existence 
of a global market (for gas). 
109 Mazighi, A., Henry Hub and national balancing point prices: what will be the international gas price 
reference? OPEC Review, September 2005. 
110 Miyamoto, A., and Ishiguro, C., Pricing and Demand for LNG in China: Consistency between LNG and 
Pipeline Gas in a fast growing market, NG 9, OIES, January 2006 
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however, is that the potential effects of on-going climate change initiatives and 
environmental concerns about GHG from coal were ignored.112  
 
Roberts reiterated some of the concerns highlighted by Miyamoto and Ishiguro, but 
concludes differently. According to him, “China’s nascent relationship with LNG…is 
bisected by the intervention of internal and international market forces, and these 
are forces which clearly have the capacity to shape the prospects for the growth of 
LNG in China”.113 Going by the change in Gas Utilization Policy and energy 
prices114, however, regional initiatives may be favourable to LNG imports and 
Fesharaki posits that “different provinces and sectors (China) will be subject to 
different pricing”115.  
 
Apparently, as Yergin and Stoppard predict, enhanced LNG trade could have “far-
reaching impact on the world economy, bringing new opportunities and risks; new 
interdependencies and geopolitical alignments”.116 Huntington similarly highlights 
the significance of growing inter-regional and dynamic interrelationships within the 
gas industry and advises policy-makers and analysts not to ignore the trend.117   
 
Adopting a mathematical model of global energy markets118, Aune et’al presume 
that lower costs would enhance LNG’s incursion into Atlantic gas markets. They 
focused on prices and different trade scenarios of global gas market in the future.119 
A major outcome of their work is the vital role which Middle East gas supplies could 
play in restraining upward price movements (if investments are unconstrained by 
political factors). However, expanding gas trade is not compatible with decreasing 
                                                                                                                                                                  
111 As a result of increased LNG trade and global competition for the commodity 
112 When these factors are considered it becomes apparent that LNG’s penetration into China’s energy 
spectrum is somewhat beyond China’s control.  
113 Roberts, P., China and the LNG Revolution, Issue 4, I.E.L.T.R, 2006.  
114 On 20th June 2008, Chinese government increased the prices of energy products by 17-18%. By 1st July 
2008, wholesale electricity tariffs were allowed a 5% increase (to accommodate hikes in Coal and LNG 
prices). Andrews-Speed, P., China’s recent energy price rises: why now and what next? CEPMLP Gateway, 
July 2008 at http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/gateway/index.php?news=29314  
115 Fesharaki, F., Globalization of LNG Markets: East versus West Prices and Flows, Presentation at the 2nd 
IAEE Asian Conference, Perth Australia; November, 2008. 
116 Yergin, D. and Stoppard, M; The Next Prize, 103 Foreign Affairs Journal 82 (2003) 
117 Huntington, H., Natural Gas across Country Borders: An Introduction and Overview, Vol. 30 Special 
Issue, Energy Journal, 2009. 
118 The model combined Electricity, Coal, Crude Oil and Gas markets. 
119 Aune, F., et’al, Globalisation of Natural Gas Markets – Effects on Prices and Trade Patterns, Vol. 30 
Special Issue, Energy Journal, 2009. 
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LNG costs. This is because EPC costs are mainly determined by available 
expertise and equipment, relative to demand. So, as the market expands, increased 
investments constrain resources and hike EPC costs along the chain. 
 
Meanwhile, fears persist of an exporters’ cartel emerging from the recently formed 
Gas Exporting Countries’ Forum. In his article, Chabrelie relies on corporate 
strategies to analyze the issue. She concludes that “the increasingly tangled inter-
relationships and mutual holdings of the players all along the gas chain will mitigate 
the risk of actor impinging on prices and production capacity”120. Jensen posits that 
due to “the differences between the two markets (oil and gas)…this concept 
(cartelization) is unrealistic”.121 Jensen identified the prior need for a buyer and the 
long-term nature of gas transactions122 as fundamental constraints to any sort of 
producer co-operation. But, to what extent could spot trade, contract flexibility and 
arbitrage increase exporters’ leverage and alter the above assertion.  
 
However, in projecting the outlook for global LNG trade (low case scenario), Jensen 
acknowledges that geopolitical issues could constrain supply. Two of the major 
findings in the work are notable: “there are very great uncertainties about how LNG 
markets would develop and the likelihood of geopolitical constraints would be after 
2010 when the current projects have been completed”.123 One would argue that 
with demand insecurity, some proposed and on-going projects may be delayed 
longer. Reviewing some other literature on gas demand, contracting and pricing,124 
Jensen poses a vital question “How do you place a value on long term gas supply?” 
He then asserts that “It is a question that is important in making major gas project 
                                                 
120 Chabrelie, M., LNG: A Commodity in the Making, PANORAMA 2006 at 
http://www.ifp.fr/IFP/en/events/panorama/IFP-Panorama06_10-GNL-VA.pdf 
121 Jensen, J.T, The LNG Revolution, in 24, No.2 J. of IAEE Paragraph 3, Page 34, 2003 
122 Jensen, J.T., The development of a global LNG market, (Oxford: O.I.E.S., 2004). 
123 Jensen Associates (JAI); The Outlook for global trade in liquefied natural gas projections to the year 
2020, Consultant Report prepared for California Energy Commission in 2007. 
124 The article – Gas as a Transitional Fuel - reviewed by Prof James Jensen was published in the February 
2008 edition of the Oxford Energy Forum. Five authors considered different aspects of the theme: Stern, J. 
asked whether the future for international gas trade is constrained; Stoppard, M., looked at LNG growth to 
2010; Gergmann, B., assessed European gas markets and the interplay of competition, climate protection 
and supply security; Bros, T., considered whether the UK gas model is a system hard to justify; while Pirani, 
S., explained the pricing policies for Russian gas based on European netbacks. 
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investment decisions but I am not sure anyone has an answer”.125 His conclusion 
underscores the focus of this book on long term LNG pricing.   
 
Taking a term perspective of the cartel issue, Jaffe and Soligo, assert that a gas 
producers’ group cannot exercise sufficient market influence in the short run. In the 
long run, however, they speculate that the extent of any producers’ group influence 
would be determined by technological improvement, cost and attractiveness of 
other competing fuels.126 Stern cautions that “the possibility of some type of price 
setting organization (for gas/LNG) should not be ruled out”127 and that the 
organization is likely to grow quickly in the scenario of a price crisis for exporters.128 
He also speculates on a European or Atlantic based LNG producers group 
sometime in the future.  
 
The Baker Institute rules out the possibility of an exporters’ cartel in the near term 
because there are many gas exporters “with diverging interests to exert effective 
constraints on capacity expansion projects”.129 Nevertheless, they conclude that 
“cartelization should be considered as a potential future feature to global gas 
markets”.130 In a more recent report131, the Institute highlights that promoting the 
development of a competitive global gas market is in the common interest of gas 
importing countries in Western Europe; North America; and Northeast Asia. 
 
Arguing differently, Hallouche stated that “a Gas OPEC is not conceivable 
strategically, economically or politically, and it is not in the interests or aspirations of 
most gas exporters”. Hallouche, however, considered some possible sub-groupings 
- OPEC-Form Members; Iran-Qatar-Algeria partnership; African Group and Atlantic 
                                                 
125 Jensen, J., Comments on Gas Demand, Contracts and Prices, OEF, May 2008. 
126 Jaffe, A. and Soligo, R., Market Structure in the New Gas Economy: Is Cartelization Possible? P.27 Para 
3, at http://www.rice.edu/energy/publications/geopoliticsofnaturalgas.html  
127 Stern J., The new security environment for European Gas: Worsening geopolitics and increasing global 
competition for LNG, p.17, Para 1, NG 15, OIES, October 2006. 
128 Could the 2008/9 global recession result in such a massive gas price crisis for exporters? 
129 Baker Institute, The Geopolitics of Natural Gas, p.9, No. 29, Baker Institute Study, March 2005 at 
www.rice.edu/energy/publications/geopoliticsofnaturalgas.html  
130 Hartley, P. et’al, International Influences on the link between U.S. crude oil and natural gas prices at 
http://www.rice.edu/energy/publications/docs/natgas/ng_intl_influences-nov07.pdf  
131 Baker Institute Policy Report, The Global Energy Market: Comprehensive Strategies to meet geopolitical 
and financial risks – The G8, Energy Security and Global Climate Issues, No.37, July 2008 at 
http://www.rice.edu/energy/publications/PolicyReports/BIPP_37_July08_GEM.pdf  
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LNG exporters. He concluded that if the market becomes demand led, a group of 
exporters could proactively regulate long-term over-supply.132  
 
It is apparent that energy economists and petroleum analysts believe that market 
influence is currently neither feasible nor necessary because gas is different from 
oil133 and sold mainly by pipeline and contracts. Despite the constraining factors 
highlighted in the above review, one does not intend to dismiss the issue of a gas 
cartel as misleading or conclude that it is inconceivable.134  
 
The fact, however, is that there are great potentials for co-operation by gas-rich 
countries.135 Why do economists expect an OPEC-style gas cartel in a market that 
is unlike oil and may never be as liquid as the oil market? Yes, OPEC’s approach is 
one option, which may not be feasible for gas exporters, but it is not the only option 
neither is price determination the only objective for creating a cartel. Rather than 
wait for the emergence of a global gas market, exporters could proactively aim to 
invent a future for gas trade. 
The ‘gas-cartel’ discourse vividly captures the political, institutional and speculative 
factors that influence investment decisions. Meanwhile, it is evident that the Gas 
Exporting Countries Forum136 (GECF) has been the subject of the gas cartel 
question. While only little is known about this organization today, its character and 
existence would remain contentiously interesting in future. It would, however, be 
more interesting and beneficial to know how a gas cartel would determine prices in 
the emerging global gas market. Addressing the ‘how’ question is more important 
because a feasible influence mechanism determines the nature of any producer 
group. Hence, the need to investigate which market influence path - Contractual, 
Fiscal, Price or Volume control mechanism137 - is feasible.  
 
But what is the theoretical basis for uniform pricing? 
                                                 
132 Hallouche, H., The Gas Exporting Countries Forum: Is it really a Gas OPEC in the making? P.54, Para 1, 
NG 13, OIES, June 2006. 
133 Chapter Two briefly discusses the differences between oil, pipeline gas and especially LNG. 
134 Wagbara, O., What are the prospects for a Gas OPEC? International Gas, October 2008. 
135 For further details, please see Wagbara, O., How would the Gas Exporting Countries Forum influence gas 
trade? Pages 1224-1237, Vol. 35, Issue 2, Energy Policy, February 2007. 
136 An existing Producers’ Group subsequently referred to, in this Book, as the Forum or GECF. 
137 Wagbara, O., How would the Gas Exporting Countries Forum influence gas trade? Pages 1224-1237, 
Vol. 35, Issue 2, Energy Policy, February 2007. 
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Huge literature exists on the issue of Uniform Pricing as a means of trading final 
and intermediate products in various industries138. Among authors, there is a 
commonly held view that uniform pricing schemes (within and across national 
boundaries) are collusive practices: Greenhut and Greenhut assert that it is profit-
maximizing in certain competitive situations.139 Scherer asserts that such pricing 
systems hamper competition by reducing a “complicated price quotation 
problem…to a relatively simple matter of applying the right formula.”140   
 
Norman considers “uniform pricing a special case of spatial price discrimination” 
and built a framework to determine its optimality from a producer’s perspective.141 
According to him, firms in sectors that are monopolistic or collusive oligopolies are 
not constrained to maximize profit and, given a sales revenue maximization 
objective, uniform pricing can be optimal142. “In a uniform delivered pricing system, 
according to Espinosa, each firm quotes the same price to all the customers”.143  
 
He tried to reconcile the arguments relating to Uniform Delivered Pricing and 
concludes that such systems “cannot be labelled as facilitating collusive practices in 
all instances; (rather) the structure of the market should be taken into 
consideration”.144 From available literature, the following conditions are 
necessary145 for the application of Uniform Pricing (from an exporter’s point of view 
- at least):  
 
(i) Profit in the industry should be loosely constrained: 
For LNG Trade, part of exporters’ profit is constrained by contracted liquefaction. 
While uncontracted capacity offers additional (unrestricted) profitability through the 
spot market. 
                                                 
138 Cement Industry; Internet access; Steel, as well as, British Coal Industry (in 1930). 
139 Greenhut, J. and Greenhut, M. Spatial price discrimination, competition and locational effects Volume 
42, Economica, 1975 
140 Scherer, F. as quoted in Espinosa, M., Delivered pricing, FOB pricing, and collusion in spatial markets. 
Vol. 23, No.1, RAND Journal of Economics, Spring 1992. 
141 Norman, G., Uniform Pricing as an Optimal Spatial Pricing Policy, Vol. 48, Economica, New Series, 
Vol. 48, No. 189. (February, 1981). 
142 Ibid 
143 Espinosa, M., Delivered pricing, FOB pricing, and collusion in spatial markets. Vol. 23, No.1, RAND 
Journal of Economics, Spring 1992. 
144 Ibid 
145 The extent to which they are sufficient would be determined by consumers’ response to the Uniform 
Price.  However, Consumers’ response is not extensively covered in this work. 
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(ii) The market area for each exporter restricted relative to the distance and, 
consequently, (iii) Low marginal costs of production relative to the unit elastic price: 
In the case of LNG, each additional liquefaction train incurs lower marginal cost per 
unit relative to existing trains.  
 
(iv) Low unit transport costs within a particular spatial market146: This relates to the 
high cost of transporting LNG for distances less than 3,000 Kilometres.147  
 
In this chapter, the essential elements of the study has been presented in addition 
to a literature review to underpin the main research problem - market-based pricing 
for LNG may be less remunerative and uncertain for exporters and the possibility of 
rent-seeking could encourage them to collude and/or collectively adopt some 
market controlling mechanism. To test the viability of such a mechanism is a key 
objective of this work. So, to prepare the work area, it is necessary to describe the 
context of LNG trade – this is an aim of the next chapter.   
                                                 
146 Norman, G., Uniform Pricing as an Optimal Spatial Pricing Policy, Vol. 48, Economica, New Series, 
Vol. 48, No. 189. (February, 1981). 
147 Compared to pipeline cost but depending on the location (onshore/offshore); geographical region; pipeline 
pressure (high/low); and number of LNG Trains. See Jensen, J., The future of gas transportation in the 
Middle East: LNG, GTL and Pipelines, 2004. 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
ATLANTIC BASIN LNG TRADE  
  
2.1.1 Introduction 
This chapter sets the scene of the book by describing the context148 of LNG trade. 
Starting with the characteristics of LNG149, it traces the history of LNG trade from 
global, regional and national perspectives. To answer the main research question, 
this discourse helps to determine which could be the key countries in an LNG cartel 
and why. Through the narrative, justification150 is made for the choice151 of countries 
simulated in Chapter Four152. In addition, it expounds on the demand potentials of 
LNG in the importing markets.153 
 
2.1.2 The nature of LNG 
Gas is formed out of organic material deposited in the earth crust. But, compared to 
crude oil and coal, natural gas is an environmentally superior154 fuel which is evenly 
distributed across the globe. One would therefore expect that gas would be used 
more widely than the other fuels. Unfortunately, this has not been the case due to 
its nature - the challenge of handling gas155 and the cost of transportation. Initially, it 
was transported by pipelines only and so gas trade was local, national or 
continental - but limited by the reach of pipelines.  
 
Consequently, each national or regional pipeline gas market was defined and 
characterized by its peculiar structure, demand patterns, supply, pricing and other 
socio-economic variables. This situation resulted in operational, commercial and 
structural difficulties. First, market interaction was limited or none existent due to 
bilateral gas sales contracts and the rigid nature of pipelines. Second, the cost of 
                                                 
148 Export options/routes; existing and potential supply capacity; as well as; future investment scenario. 
149 Both as a commodity and project, LNG is different from crude oil and pipeline gas. 
150 The countries were chosen based on their participation or ability to participate (liquefaction capacity and 
market share) in the Atlantic Basin LNG market within the research’s time frame - between 2005 and 2013.  
151 Emphasis shall be on the main countries that participate in Atlantic Basin LNG trade: Algeria; Egypt; 
Libya; Nigeria; Qatar; as well as, Trinidad and Tobago (subsequently referred to as Trinidad in this Book).  
152 A few excluded countries are also discussed. 
153 It is generally a discussion of regional demand trend/issues in North America and Europe. But in Chapter 
Four, the following countries are used to simulate Atlantic Basin LNG Trade: US; Spain; Italy; France; UK. 
154 Relative to crude oil, natural gas has a lower energy-to-volume ratio. 
155 Like potential difference determines the direction of electric current, so also is pressure or temperature 
used to chart the flow of natural gas from one point to another.  
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building a pipeline is almost “proportionate156 to its length, for any given dimension 
of the pipeline”157. Besides, transit pipelines also create other geopolitical issues. 
Moreover, the seasonal variation of gas demand makes storage capacity158 
necessary but with its cost implications for gas traders/importers. 
 
To overcome some these constraints, experiments in the liquefaction of natural gas 
began in 1934 in the USSR and 1940 in the United States of America.159 Similarly, 
the CAMEL LNG transport venture was initiated in 1961 to carry gas from Hassi 
R’Mel in Algeria.160 Although gas is still transported by pipeline, LNG has 
completely changed the perception of gas and the conventional regional isolation of 
pipeline markets (as Figure 2.1 shows). In some regional gas markets, the need for 
additional storage capacity161 is an important gap filled by LNG.  
 
Figure 2.1 Major trade movements162 
 
 
                                                 
156 If other externalities are taken into consideration it could cost more. 
157 Hannesson, R., Petroleum Economics: Issues and Strategies of Oil and Gas Production, 1998. 
158 By raising the pressure some storage can be created in pipeline or tankers.  
159 Rojey, A., et’al, Natural Gas: Production, Processing and Transport, 1997. 
160 More detailed history of LNG trade by Algeria is provided in section 2.3.1. 
161 The need for more storage capacity is increasing in many gas markets (especially within Europe) due to 
declining domestic production and uncertain pipeline imports. This issue is discussed some more in section 
2.2 below. 
162 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2008. 
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At this point, some characteristics of LNG are worth highlighting – in contrast with 
oil - before considering how it has evolved across regions: 
 
1. Long term contracts  
LNG differs from oil because it is traded mainly through long-term contracts.163 As is 
peculiar to natural gas, it also involves high transport and storage costs. Long-term 
contracts serve as vehicle for sharing upfront investment risks in LNG projects. 
Through contracts, LNG projects confer equity on project partners, in the form of 
liquefaction capacity and off-take rights, which they use to service downstream 
supply commitments. Because of its non- transparent nature, the long term 
contracts market for LNG is illiquid and non-competitive. Developments in the 
market, however, indicate that exporters are keen to maintain the long term contract 
regime.164 
Figure 2.2 Traditional and newer models of LNG165 
 
 
Like in the oil market, some derivatives - futures, options and swaps - now exist in 
some natural gas markets. While this is not the case for LNG, natural gas futures 
contract is not yet an efficient instrument for hedging against price and volume 
risks. However, the following vital deductions are worth noting: 
 the prevalent long-term LNG take-or-pay (TOP) contracts (and pricing) 
structure previously existed in the oil market and; 
 the use of spot market (NBP and Henry Hub) prices to index long-term 
contracts now is similar to the evolutionary path of oil trade; 
                                                 
163 So far, spot LNG has been a means of satisfying peak natural gas demand mainly during extreme winter 
and summer periods in Europe and North America.  
164 Wagbara, O., To what extent is a liquid LNG Hub, in the Middle East, feasible? International Energy Law 
Review, Issue 3, 2008. 
165 IEA, Natural Gas Market Review 2007 Security in a Globalising Market to 2015, 2007.  
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 As was the case with oil, LNG contracts are becoming more flexible and 
sometimes involve cargo swaps166. Figure 2.2 shows the traditional and 
newer models of LNG business. 
 
2. Cost Structure  
LNG has a high fixed and low operating cost structure. As a result the initial trains 
required project finance tied to long term sales agreements.167 Technological 
advancements later reduced the cost of LNG projects168 and so enhanced the 
economic viability of previously stranded gas reserves through LNG exports.  
 
Figure 2.3 Liquefaction EPC costs (2008 USD tpa)169 
 
 
The initial reduction in engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) costs, 
however, ended in 2004. Subsequently, the trend was reversed (as in Figure 2.3) 
because of construction capacity constraint and rising cost of raw materials 
                                                 
166 Shook, B. and Jaffe, A.M., Developments in Atlantic Basin LNG: Implications for Japan, Working Paper  
167 Project finance, then, also required other contracts across the supply chain (from well head to 
regasification terminal). 
168 Across the LNG value chain – Liquefaction, shipping and regasification. 
169 Adamchak, F., Global LNG supply and competition: Long and short term issues. Presentation to the 
National Capital Area Chapter of the United States Association for Energy Economics, on 19 September, 
2008.  
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(especially steel).170 Consequently, only four supply-side Final Investment 
Decisions (FIDs) were taken between 2005 and 2008. 
 
3. Transport costs and market interaction 
Like oil, LNG’s ability to flow in three dimensional space and the consequent 
technical economies of scale revolutionized gas trade globally. The low transport 
cost element in the delivered price, per unit of distance, induces rapid arbitrage in 
response to regional price differentials171. From the onset of this decade, spot 
trading (Figure 2.4), price arbitrage and diversion of LNG vessels have occurred 
across the globe. Invariably, the high cost of transportation does not always restrict 
gas trade interregional.  
  
Figure 2.4 Short-term and spot trade as a % of LNG Supply172 
 
 
While the process results in crude oil price convergence, the same does not apply 
to LNG due to the lack of an international price marker. This trend, alongside 
growing intra-continental trade, has contributed to the integration of gas markets 
and could enhance opportunities for influencing LNG trade.  
 
4. Spare Capacity:  
                                                 
170 Cost patterns could change again but its direction would depend on how the unraveling global economic 
crisis affects the determinants of EPC costs.  
171 Horsnell, P; Oil in Asia: Markets, Trading, Refining and Deregulation, 1997. 
172 http://portale.unibocconi.it/wps/allegatiCTP/30maggio.pdf    
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The cost structure and contractual nature of LNG, described above, make it 
expensive and complicated to hold uncontracted liquefaction173 or regasification174 
capacity. There could be geological cost advantages, relating to gas production, for 
some exporters in the Middle East or Africa, but most LNG projects have similar175 
cost structure. Compared to the cost of production, in some countries, it is less 
costly (but also economically challenging) to hold spare crude oil capacity.176  
 
In sum, the above description shows how LNG trade differs from natural gas 
markets and the global oil market. While it is not a framework used directly for 
analyses, it justifies the fact that LNG is different from most internationally traded 
commodities (as earlier stated in section 1.5.4) The narrative also creates the 
context for understanding LNG trade. Considering the staggered evolution of LNG, 
the following discourse highlights its development and importance in different gas 
markets. 
 
2.2 DEVELOPMENT OF LNG TRADE 
Algeria’s CAMEL project set an auspicious stage for the commercial trading of LNG 
globally.177 And by 1969 three other trades had began – two of them were in the 
Atlantic Basin.178 The third strand of trade in that year marked the beginning of 
commercial LNG export into Asia Pacific and it was from the Kenai terminal Alaska 
(US) to Japan.179  
 
Then, LNG was the only source of gas supply in Japan, Korea and Taiwan - 
imported mainly from Indonesia, Brunei and Malaysia (as Figure 2.5 indicates). 
More so, during the period 1975 to 1996 LNG demand in the region rose by an 
average of 3.31Billion M3 per year.180 As LNG trade boomed in the Pacific Basin, 
                                                 
173 It is relatively more expensive even when liquefaction capacity is strategically held for spot trading 
purposes.   
174 Idle regasification terminals are sometimes used for self-contracting and to gain/secure downstream 
access. Whatever the case may be, there are economic implications for holding such capacity. 
175 Scale-related cost advantages are also another exception. 
176 Here lies OPEC’s ability to influence price (even in a competitive market scenario) given inelastic 
demand. 
177 Jensen, J., The development of a global LNG market: Is it likely? If so when? 2004. 
178 One of them was from Libya to Spain and Italy, while the other was from Algeria to France. 
179 http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energy_in_brief/liquefied_natural_gas_lng.cfm 
180 Jensen, J., The development of a global LNG market: Is it likely? If so when? 2004. 
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interest was being lost in the Atlantic Basin - trade was crippled by gas price 
disputes and oil price shocks.181  
 
Figure 2.5 Historical sources of LNG Exports182 
 
 
Initially, Indonesia was the largest exporter of LNG in the world, but as its 
production declined, new LNG producers emerged in the Atlantic Basin (Middle 
East and Africa). By year 2000 Qatar had become an LNG importer and one of 
the top five LNG exporters (as Table 2.1 indicates). Qatar, which was third 
largest exporter in 2005, has taken over from Indonesia as the biggest exporter. 
It is also notable that as Algeria’s proportion of LNG exports declined, Nigeria 
emerged in the top five within ten years of becoming an LNG exporter. Atlantic 
Basin exporters are contributing significantly to Pacific LNG supplies.183 
 
So far, Japan has remained the dominant LNG importer globally and 
consumption continues to soar in the Pacific - an average of 5.9% between 1997 
                                                 
181 More discussion on this is provided in Section 2.2.1 below. 
182 Source: Cedigaz 
183 Fesharaki, F., Globalization of LNG Markets: East versus West Prices and Flows, Presentation at the 2nd 
IAEE Asian Conference, Perth Australia; November, 2008.   
The Pacific Basin Suppliers dominated 
growth until 1996, accounting for 72% of 
supply at that time 
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and 2007.184 And, trade almost doubled within Asia Pacific in those ten years – 
with a 6.1% rise in 2008.185  
 
Table 2.1 Top Five LNG Exporters in the World (1995-2008)186 
 1995 (%) 2000 (%) 2005 (%) 2008 (%) 
Ranking is 
based on % 
of LNG 
export 
relative to 
global total in 
that year 
Indonesia (36.4) 
Algeria (19.2) 
Malaysia (14.1) 
Australia (10.7) 
Brunei (9.3) 
Indones. (26.4) 
Algeria (19.3) 
Malaysia (15) 
Qatar (10.5) 
Australia (7.5) 
Indones. (16.7) 
Malaysia (15.1) 
Qatar (14.4) 
Algeria (13.6) 
Trinidad (7.4) 
Qatar (17.5) 
Malaysia (13) 
Indones. (11.9) 
Algeria (9.7) 
Nigeria (9.1) 
Total: 
Atlantic187 
19.2% 29.8% 35.4% 36.3% 
Total: 
Pacific188 
61.2% 48.9% 31.8% 24.9% 
 Source: Extracted by author from BP Statistical Review of World Energy and US EIA 
 
 
However, a notable pattern obvious in Table 2.2 is that the proportion of global 
LNG imported by Japan since 1995 has been declining. This could be 
attributable to the increasing demand for LNG globally and the declining 
proportion of global LNG imported by Pacific countries (in the Top Five ranking). 
For instance, according to CEDIGAZ, in 2008 Asian imports grew by 4.8% - but, 
Japan recorded only 3.7% increase in LNG imports while, China, Taiwan and 
South Korea had 15%, 9.7% and 8.1% rise in imports respectively. Despite the 
effects of the global economics crisis, this trend could continue as energy 
demand in China and India persists. 
 
On the other hand, the historical data reveals that LNG demand has been 
increasing fast in the Atlantic Basin. Especially, the Spanish proportion has been 
rising in the last fourteen years, in addition to the US market – which emerged 
as one of the top five LNG importers in 2005.  
 
                                                 
184 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2008. 
185 GIIGNL; The LNG industry, 2008 
186 This Table has been computed with data from the referenced sources. 
187 This row is a summation, from the top five, of the percentages of Atlantic Basin Exporters. 
188 This row is a summation, from the top five, of the percentages of Pacific Basin Exporters. 
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Table 2.2 Top Five LNG Importers in the World (1995-2008)189 
 1995 (%) 2000 (%) 2005 (%) 2008 (%) 
Ranking 
based on % 
of global 
LNG export 
in that year 
Japan (64.3) 
S. Korea (9.9) 
France (7.6) 
Spain (7.4) 
Belgium (5.1) 
Japan (53.9) 
S. Korea (13.6) 
France (7.6) 
Spain (5.5) 
USA (4.6) 
Japan (40.4) 
S. Korea (16.1) 
Spain (11.6) 
USA (9.5) 
France (6.8) 
Japan (34.6) 
S. Korea (16.1) 
Spain (12.7) 
France (5.6) 
Taiwan (5.3) 
Total: 
Atlantic190 
20.1% 17.7% 27.9% 18.3% 
Total: 
Pacific191  
74.2% 67.5% 56.5% 56% 
Source: Extracted by author from BP Statistical Review of World Energy and US EIA 
  
Atlantic Basin Gas Markets  
In the Atlantic Basin, town gas192 had been traded in Europe and North America 
long before natural gas was discovered - in the 20th century. As a result, most 
countries in the region had their natural gas industry even before the advent of 
cross border gas trade. Now, gas trade in the Atlantic Basin consists of two regional 
pipeline markets193 and LNG Trade.194 LNG has played a significant role in 
linking195 the two regional gas markets in the course of their evolution. But what is 
the role LNG these markets and how has it evolved over time in the Atlantic Basin? 
 
The first commercial delivery of LNG in the Atlantic Basin was from Algeria to 
Britain - Canvey Island terminal - in 1964.196 Earlier on, in 1958, Methane Pioneer197 
- the first LNG tanker in the world – had demonstrated198 the safety of ocean travel 
by carrying 5,000m3 across the Atlantic from Lake Charles in the United States to 
England.199 Over the years, North America and Europe began to rely on LNG as a 
                                                 
189 National LNG imports as a percentage of total LNG imports.  
190 This is merely a summation of the percentages of Atlantic Basin LNG Importers in the top five. 
191 This is merely a summation of the percentages of Pacific Basin LNG Importers in the top five. 
192 Town Gas was manufactured gas from coal - used and traded locally in the 19th Century. 
193 North American natural gas market and European natural gas markets 
194 Supply to the Atlantic Basin LNG market emanates from exporters in South and Central America; West 
Africa; Middle East and North America. The main LNG exporters in these regions are described extensively 
in section 2.3. 
195 These markets interacted sparingly before the LNG revolution. Some similarities have been observed in 
the nature of market restructuring and regulatory framework.  
196 Chabrelie, M., LNG: A Commodity in the Making, pg.1, paragraph 1, PANORAMA 2006 at 
http://www.ifp.fr/IFP/en/events/panorama/IFP-Panorama06_10-GNL-VA.pdf 
197 Jensen, J., The development of a global LNG market: Is it likely? If so when? 2004. 
198 Seven other trips were undertaken. 
199 Sullivan J. A. and Shook, B., Ships, Crews stumbling Blocks in developing LNG Supply Chains, p.3, 
Natural Gas Week, February 6, 2006. 
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source of marginal gas supply. Perhaps, it would be necessary to review the history 
and role of LNG in each importing country before considering the feasibility of 
market influence.  
 
2.2.1 North America200 
North America pioneered gas market reforms through the partial lifting of wellhead 
price controls in the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978. Subsequently, in 1989, the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)’s Order 500H201 completed the 
liberalization process and gas price deregulation in the US. The Canadian 
Agreement on Natural Gas Prices and Markets unbundled gas sales in 1985.202 The 
reform process in Mexico is progressing and already has a linkage with the US 
Market. So, gas prices are unregulated, but FERC regulates operations of the major 
– interstate – pipeline network (in the US), while the NEB regulates the Canadian 
inter-provincial pipelines. 
 
The region has the most liquid and integrated gas market in the world – it 
incorporates the US, Canada and Mexico. It is made up of producers, storage 
companies, pipeline companies, ‘aggregators’ (i.e. marketers), local distribution 
companies (LDCs) and consumers. Having developed gas-to-gas competition, the 
US has over 8,000 gas producers, while Canada has about 3,000. So, shippers 
purchase gas from producers, as well as, transportation services from pipeline 
companies for shipping the gas. With such liquidity, domestic gas producers 
respond to changes in prices. When prices are high, gas production increases203 
but when price falls due to decrease in demand, production falls.   
 
The US gas market had encountered LNG in the course of evolving – the first 
liquefaction plant was built in 1912 and followed by the premier commercial plant in 
Ohio (1941).204 By 1969, the first commercial LNG export left Kenai terminal 
                                                 
200 United States of America is the focus of this sub-section but it reflects Canada and Mexico in the 
American picture. 
201 Sometimes, FERC’s Order 500H is referred to as Wellhead Decontrol Act. 
202 IEA; Security of Gas Supply in Open Markets: LNG & Power at a turning point, 2004. 
203 An exception is during extreme weather conditions when demand is very high. At such periods, spot LNG 
imports are also attracted. 
204 http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energy_in_brief/liquefied_natural_gas_lng.cfm 
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Alaska205 for Japan.206 Subsequently, three LNG projects,207 between American 
Importers and Algeria’s Sonatrach, were agreed in the 1970s.208 By the 1980s, 
however, the prospects of LNG imports in the US diminished dramatically - due to a 
number of reasons.  
 
One key factor was market restructuring which significantly transformed the US 
domestic gas market, as well as, price fundamentals. A second reason was the 
rejection209 of two proposed Algerian LNG import projects. The regulatory body 
cited similar reasons – related to national and regional gas supply considerations - 
for turning down both applications.210 Another very important factor was the price 
dispute between Algeria and its American LNG importers – discussed in more detail 
below. 
 
Sonatrach’s attempt to unilaterally hike the price of LNG in the contract with El 
Paso, in October 1979, started the price dispute.211 El Paso argued the action was a 
breach of previously agreed Contract terms and that it had been restrained, by the 
US Government, from accepting the new price. This led to the suspension of 
deliveries to the terminal in April 1980 and further negotiations with US DOE.212 
Negotiations reached an irrevocable end on 18 February 1981 and the El Paso 
contract came to an end with the writing off of related assets.213 Almost about the 
same time, supplies for the Trunkline LNG Contract (signed in 1975) was being 
delayed by Algeria for technical difficulties. Subsequently, the pricing terms in the 
contract was amended to include escalation based on crude oil. This gave rise to 
the indefinite suspension of LNG purchases by Trunkline for financial reasons.214   
 
                                                 
205 The oldest LNG export terminal in North America 
206 Since then it has exported LNG to Japan almost continuously. 
207 The LNG projects - Distrigas; El Paso and Trunkline – had also been approved by US regulatory 
authorities. 
208 Stern, J., Natural Gas in North America and Asia, 1985. 
209 Within a three-day period, in 1978, both projects – El Paso II and TAPCO (Tenneco) rejected by the US 
governments Economic Regulatory Administration.  
210 For more details, see Stern, J., Natural Gas in North America and Asia, 1985. 
211 Stern, J., Natural Gas in North America and Asia, 1985. 
212 An agreement was almost reached, but the negotiated were complicated by a change in US Government 
Administration from Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan in late 1980. 
213 Stern, J., Natural Gas in North America and Asia, 1985. 
214 Stern, J., Natural Gas in North America and Asia, 1985. 
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Apparently, the regulatory authorities – state and federal – refused to allow LNG to 
be sold at prices higher than market rates. Amidst falling domestic gas prices, it was 
uneconomical for US importers to resell the imported LNG locally. One reason 
being that deregulation brought forth a huge volume of new gas which reduced 
prices such that LNG could not compete in the US for nearly two decades.  
 
Besides, new contracts could not be signed because the US Government was 
concerned about the potential implications of Sonatrach’s demand215 on Mexican 
and Canadian gas prices.216 As a result, three import terminals at Lake Charles, 
Elba Island and Cove Point were idle. Nevertheless, US LNG imports did not come 
to a complete halt. Rather, Distrigas continued to receive LNG at the Everett 
terminal throughout deregulation. A major reason being that in New England, gas 
prices were high enough to allow LNG to be resold profitably.217  
 
Table 2.3 US Gas Demand and Imports (1973-2008) MMcf 
Years Consumption  
Total Gas 
Imports  
Pipeline 
Imports  
 LNG 
Imports  
1973 22,049,363.00 1,032,903.294 1,029,514.984 3,388.310 
1975 19,537,593.00 953,007.609 948,114.660 4,892.949 
1980 19,877,293.00 984,767 898,917.000 85,850.000 
1985 17,280,943.00 949,715 926,056.000 23,659.000 
1990 19,173,556.00 1,532,258.848 1,448,065.483 84,193.365 
1995 22,206,889.00 2,841,048.409 2,823,129.959 17,918.450 
2000 23,333,120.75 3,781,602.987 3,555,567.466 226,035.521 
2005 22,010,596.27 4,341,034.052 3,709,773.607 631,260.445 
2008 23,206,444.62 3,980,778.897 3,629,080.468 351,698.429 
Source:  US Energy Information Administration  
 
The above discourse is evident in Table 2.3. Noticeably, LNG imports were low in 
the mid 1980s and 1990s – when most import terminals were idle. Amidst the 
growth in pipeline imports and demand, the volumes of LNG imports dropped 
drastically between 1980 and 1985, as well as, 1990 and 1995. 
 
                                                 
215 As well as, the effects of additional LNG supply from Algeria. 
216 Stern, J., Natural Gas in North America and Asia, 1985. 
217 And when not high enough, Distrigas’ renegotiation contract (on netback basis) gave Sonatrach the option 
of refusing a delivery if it did not like the prevailing price. 
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It was not until the late 1990s-2000 that LNG importation was revived in the US – 
two idle terminals were reopened, five new ones have been commissioned since 
2005 and another three expected by 2010218. Ironically, this revival was driven by 
unexpected decline in domestic production, increased energy demand (globally) 
and corresponding rise in oil and gas prices.219 
 
Figure 2.7 History of US Gas imports as a % of Demand220 
4.68%
4.88%
4.95%
5.50%
7.99%
12.79%
16.21%
19.72%
17.15%
Years
History of Pipeline and LNG imports in US Gas Demand(%) 
1973 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008
 
 
Surprisingly, in the last fifteen years, the volume of US gas imports increased faster 
than consumption (as Figure 2.7 shows).221 But, LNG imports have not increased to 
a significant proportion of US consumption222 over the years. Rather, it has 
remained below 3% most of the time - another reason why Algeria’s attempt at 
“price control” failed. 
 
Yet, the sources of US gas imports (as Figure 2.9 indicates) have also increased 
over the years. Moreover, it is noteworthy that LNG imports are diversified to the 
extent that no exporter (apart from Trinidad) supplies more than 3% of US LNG 
imports. Although, it is primarily an importer of gas, the US also exports - Mexico 
receives regular truck-loads of LNG from the US. In addition to US imports, Mexico 
                                                 
218 Petroleum Economist, April 2009. 
219 In addition to other drivers of LNG boom highlighted in Chapter One (page 3). 
220 Data extracted by author from http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/ng/ng_move_impc_s1_m.htm  
221 For instance, in 2005 was slightly lower than the volume in 1973, but imports more than tripled. 
222 When compared to pipeline gas imports. 
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also imports LNG cargoes at the Altamira terminal from other countries – Nigeria,223 
Egypt, Qatar, as well as, Trinidad and Tobago.224 
 
      Figure 2.9 Sources of US gas imports by country/pipeline/LNG225 
 
  
Meanwhile, Canadian gas export to the US is declining, while US conventional gas 
production peaked four years ago.226 With declining production in Western 
Canadian Sedimentary Basin,227 Kitimat LNG228 has been proposed for the west 
coast of Canada.229 When matched against projected demand estimates, it is 
likely230 that the North American natural gas market would increasingly depend on 
LNG231 (as indicated in Figure 2.10) and unconventional gas232.  
                                                 
223 Mexico imports from Nigeria mainly (apart from the US). According to the US EIA, for instance, in 2006 
Mexico imported about 48.3% of its LNG from Nigeria. 
224 http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/LNGimp2006.html  
225 Data extracted by the author from US Energy Information Administration database. 
226 Yergin, D., Testimony to the Joint Economic Committee United States Congress, October 7, 2004. 
227 CEDIGAZ., 2008 natural Gas Year in Review. Press Release, May, 2009. 
228 Supplies are expected from the 5mtpa export terminal - the second in North America (after Kenai 
Terminal in Alaska).   
229 Dawson, T, North American gas’ reversal of fortune. Petroleum Economist, April 2009.  
230 In 2006, the US, gas demand was about 60Bcf/d while its production decline curve is projected at 17Bcf/d 
per year (excluding shale gas). 
231 http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energy_in_brief/liquefied_natural_gas_lng.cfm  
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The US has, therefore, led several regulatory changes to encourage investment in 
LNG infrastructure. The most outstanding of these changes was FERC’s elimination 
of “open-season” requirements. Arguably, the ‘Hackberry Decision’ (in the US) set 
the stage for exemption of LNG regasification terminals from third party access 
rules in Europe. In effect, US LNG regime offers clear incentives, “freedom to adopt 
the most suitable business model and regulatory certainty”233 to investors.  
 
Figure 2.10 US LNG and Pipeline Import Projection 
 
 
Consequently, LNG import rose from 2.5% of US gas imports in 1985 to 16.7% in 
2007.234 In 2008, however, US LNG imports fell to 1bcf per day235 and this has been 
attributed to the increased shale gas production and global financial crisis (which 
began in the US that year). But, since October 2008, the number of operational gas 
drilling rigs in North America has decreased by forty percent.236 
 
Perhaps, amongst other factors, the inability of US importers to compete in a global 
LNG market may have contributed more to the decline in LNG imports in 2008. 
Besides, the US Energy Information Administration expects LNG imports to 
                                                                                                                                                                  
232 In the long term shale gas could contribute significantly to US gas supply. Along this line, there are 
indications that Kitimat LNG may have applied for permits to export LNG, from shale gas production, to 
Japan. At present, however, due to the economic recession, the pace of drilling has slumped. Petroleum 
Economist, June 2009.   
233 Trischmann, H., LNG into Europe: European regulation – American style? Issue 12, I.E.L.T.R. 2004. 
234 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2008 
235 Petroleum Economist, April 2009. 
236 Rogers, H., ‘Letter to the Editor’ in respect of LNG Trading: Overview and Challenges, OIES, May 2009.  
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overtake pipeline imports in the next decade.237 Despite the above outlook, it is 
notable that LNG is still a marginal supply and price taker in the US market.238 
 
Do these developments guarantee that North America would have significant 
effects on Atlantic Basin LNG trade in the future? Potential US impact would vary 
over time depending on interaction between domestic gas prices and international 
LNG prices, as well as, the effect of unutilized regasification capacity239. Although 
new terminals are expected,240 LNG involves price risk – “the willingness to bet that 
the long-term marginal cost of supply will be lower than the prevailing US gas 
price”241. In 2005, for instance, Europe, Japan and Korea did outbid the US for LNG 
Cargoes and caused it to “fall victim to intense trans-Atlantic pull in both summer 
and winter”242.  
  
At present, there are about seven proposed or on-going regasification terminal 
projects in Canada, while Mexico has about five. In the East Coast of the United 
States243 over forty (40) LNG regasification terminals have been proposed. Whether 
they are eventually built would depend on EPC costs, crude oil price and domestic 
gas production244. Besides, it may be too early to speculate on the potential and 
ultimate impact of the global economic crisis on LNG trade. 
 
To a large extent, US government’s energy policy could affect the future role of 
LNG in the US energy spectrum. Until then, the multiplicity of regasification 
terminals and perhaps an excess capacity in this segment of the business would 
affect the overall LNG trade. If gas is in short supply, gas will flow to those 
consumers who are willing to pay the highest price. A large number of terminals 
offer opportunity for price arbitrage even within North America and such a 
                                                 
237 http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energy_in_brief/liquefied_natural_gas_lng.cfm  
238 An extensive discussion of LNG pricing in the US is presented in Chapter Three (sections 3.1.2.5 and 
3.2.3). 
239 Foss, M., United States Natural Gas Prices to 2015, at http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/NG18.pdf   
240 As indicated in Figure 2.9.  
241 Deutsche Bank, LNG: Going… going… Gone Global, London, Global Equity Research, 2nd May 2003 
242 Energy Intelligence Group, US feels global shocks, p.2, paragraph 2, World Gas Intelligence, Vol. XVII, 
No.5, February 1, 2006 
243 Stern, J., Security of Supply: case study of European gas markets, CEPMLP Lecture on March 6, 2006, in 
University of Dundee. 
244 Shale gas production, especially: which has increased drastically recently. This increased production 
affected LNG imports in 2008, but its sustainability remains uncertain.  
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possibility245 could reduce market control options. However, if the supply is 
abundant, will the producers try to control the price or volume to remain viable? In 
the light of such issues, it would be important to tell which scenario is likely to occur 
in the future and how such developments could influence gas trade? 
 
2.2.2 Europe 
Europe’s gas industry has come a long way.246 The Dutch Groningen247 field, which 
was the first major discovery (in 1959) started commercial production in 1965. 
Thereafter, UK’s North Sea gas fields were discovered in the late 1960s and the 
Norwegian offshore Troll field discovered in 1980.248 The geography of Europe, with 
short distances between gas production points and areas of use provides an 
attractive market for gas to compete with other fuels. After North America and the 
FSU, the European gas industry is the third largest regional market - demand grew 
on average by 3.7% annually from 1973 to 2000.249 
 
Gas markets in Western Europe were initially organized around a few players, 
especially government monopolies and merchant transmission companies.250 The 
development of Soviet (now FSU) gas resources led to the creation of gas markets 
in Continental European. The industry opened up with deliveries of gas to various 
countries in the region within the framework of the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA251). Thereafter, some joint cooperation (barter) projects with the 
Soviet states significantly expanded gas trade in the 1970s and 1980s.  
  
Following various EU Directives252 and structural reforms, by July 2004 European 
natural gas markets became open to 530,000 industrial sites.253 The Policy 
                                                 
245 Most times, terminal or capacity ownership is a pre-requisite for acquiring LNG cargoes and/or 
contracting liquefaction capacity. For instance, developers of the 7th NLNG train considered only prospective 
buyers with firmed up regasification capacity.  
246 Town Gas actually existed before 1965 in Europe but it is not covered here.  
247 Slochteren is the correct name of the field. Generally, it is called Groningen after the closest large town.  
248 Odell, Peter R; Oil and Gas: Crises and Controversies 1961-2000, Paragraph 1, Page 391, 2002. 
249 IEA; Security of Gas Supply in Open Markets: LNG & Power at a turning point, 2004. 
250 Stern, J.  Competition and Liberalization in European Gas Markets, Paragraph 1, Page xv, 1998 
251 Also referred to as COMECON, CEMA and from 1991, Organization for International Economic 
Cooperation. 
252 Directive 98/30/EC of 1998 and its amendment: Directive 2003/55/EC of 2003. 
253 IEA; Security of Gas Supply in Open Markets: LNG & Power at a turning point, Paragraph 1, Page 288, 
2004. 
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Directives, invariably, opened the gas industries to competition and liberalized 
access to pipeline networks.254  These developments, ultimately, set the stage for 
the establishment of a uniform, liberalized natural gas market in Europe. This 
objective is yet to be achieved but LNG is increasingly playing a role (as Figure 2.12 
indicates) in many gas markets within Europe.  
 
Figure 2.12 Total European Gas Supplies255 
 
 
Initially, as Table 2.4 shows, LNG was not very common in Europe. Since 2003, 
however, the number of LNG importers and proportion of LNG in gas consumption 
has been increasing – over 12% of Europe gas imports and 11.3% of European gas 
demand.  
 
However, from Figure 2.13 below, it is apparent that only four of the LNG importers 
significantly determine European gas consumption - France, Italy, Spain and the 
United Kingdom. Apart from the size of their gas markets, these countries have 
been importing LNG from the 1960s.  
 
 
Table 2.4 Development of LNG imports into Europe (1995 to 2008)256 
                                                 
254 Stern, J., Competition and Liberalization in European Gas Markets 1998 
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% of LNG 
in Gas 
Demand 
European 
LNG 
Importers 
in 
2005 
% of 
LNG in 
Gas 
imports 
% of LNG 
in Gas 
Demand 
European 
LNG 
Importers 
in 
2008 
% of 
LNG in 
Gas 
imports 
% of 
LNG in 
Gas 
Demand 
France 
Italy 
Spain  
U.K 
Belgium 
France 
Spain 
Turkey 
40.3 
21.6 
82.6 
19.4 
Belgium 
France 
Greece 
Italy 
Portugal 
Spain 
Turkey 
U.K 
13.6 
26.2 
16.1 
3.4 
37.6 
65.3 
18.1 
3.4 
20.4 
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Figure 2.13 Top Five Gas Consumers in Europe258 
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Furthermore, their individual and collective contribution to European gas demand 
has been rising.259 Given Table 2.4 and Figure 2.13, it is necessary to consider the 
positions of individual countries. So, their gas context is described below to show 
the history and relevance of LNG.260 The following narrative also sets the scene for 
subsequent adoption of these countries in the simulation exercise. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
255 http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file41844.pdf  
256 Data extracted by author from US Energy Information Administration’s World LNG Imports by Origin 
(1995-2005) and BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2006 and 2009 editions).  
257 These countries imported LNG during the period from 1993 to 1998. And by 2003, Greece and Portugal 
had become LNG importers. 
258 Data for this chart was extracted by author from BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2009. 
259 Germany is one of the Top Five Gas consumers. However, it is yet an LNG importer and its proportion of 
EU Gas Demand has been declining. 
260 LNG has been and is important in Belgium’s gas balance but it has been excluded from the analysis here. 
This because it is not among the top five gas consumers in Europe - the size of its market is relatively small.  
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2.2.2.1 France 
The French gas industry developed through the production of town gas from coal in 
the 19th century. In 1939, natural gas was discovered and has been used mainly for 
heating. For a while, it remained a regulated industry dominated by a state-owned 
monopoly (GdF). The growth of domestic gas utilization, however, was interrupted 
by the shift to nuclear energy after the Arab oil embargo and subsequently the first 
oil shock in 1973. France owns the second-biggest integrated nuclear power 
infrastructure in the world. While the interconnection of nuclear plants generated 
most of the power, gas-fired plants contributed less than four percent of France’s 
electricity supply in 2005.261 Perhaps, this explains why France was slow to 
liberalize its gas sector.262 
 
Table 2.5 Percentage of LNG in France’s gas supply (1995-2008)263 
 
Exporters 
LNG 
Imports 
(% of Gas 
Supply) 
1995 
LNG 
Imports 
(% of Gas 
Supply) 
2000 
LNG Imports 
(% of Gas 
Supply) 
2005 
LNG Imports 
(% of Gas 
Supply) 
2008 
Algeria 21.62 26.11 16.36 17.19 
Egypt - - 2.29 2.40 
Libya - - - - 
Nigeria - 0.63 9.16 8.14 
Qatar - 0.20 - - 
Trinidad - - - 0.18 
Total264 21.62% 26.94% 27.99% 28.48% 
Source:  US EIA and BP Statistical Review 
 
GdF and Elf Aquintaine265dominated the natural gas industry until 2004 when the 
markets were opened.266 Its developmental pace notwithstanding, gas contributed 
about fifteen percent of France’s primary energy supply in 2005. In the course of the 
gas industry’s evolution, two LNG receiving terminals were built close to Marseille 
                                                 
261 IEA, Natural Gas Market Review 2007 Security in a Globalizing Market to 2015, 2007. 
262 Trischmann, H., LNG into Europe: European regulation – American style? Issue 12, I.E.L.T.R. 2004. 
263 BP., Statistical Review of World Energy and Energy Information Administration, World LNG Imports by 
Origin. 
264 Only six main LNG exporters in the Atlantic Basin were considered here but, the Total dependence 
includes other exporters. 
265 Elf has now merged with Total to form Totalfina Elf. 
266 In 2002, the EU decided that gas markets should be opened fully for industrial consumers in 2004. 
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and Nantes between 1972 and 1980.267 Since then, as evidenced in Table 2.5, the 
proportion of LNG in France’s gas supply has been increasing.268 Today, there are 
five hubs and over ninety-seven percent of its gas supply is imported. There are on-
going plans to increase liquidity in the domestic gas market by merging three of the 
existing hubs269 into one.  
 
Besides, the energy regulator is disposed to more investments in LNG 
infrastructure. For instance, third party access (TPA) to GdF’s regasification facility 
is not completely free even though it was Europe’s largest LNG importer in 2002. 
Access requires the conclusion of a contract but the contracts are not easy to come 
by. In addition, “the duration of access to the LNG terminals is limited to one year, 
and the maximum duration per year for gas delivery to the transport network is set 
at 90 days, subject to the capacity”.270 Besides, access tariffs are set using a 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC) of 11% - to get a good return on capital 
and to boost new investments.271 As a result of these incentives, other LNG 
importers (Exxon for example) are considering building their own terminals. 
 
The above developments portend better opportunities for LNG in France. Obviously 
pipeline and LNG imports would increase as the new trading area (hub) is 
connected (by pipeline) to Montoir de Bretagne regasification terminal, as well as, 
the German and Belgian gas markets. A second regasification terminal at Fos 
Tonkin is also linked to the southern gas grid, while three other terminals have been 
earmarked for Dunkerque, Fos Cavaou and Antifer.    
 
It has also been projected that, between 2004 and 2020, fifty-nine percent of 
incremental power demand would come from gas.272 France’s security of supply 
strategy is hinged on diversification of gas imports273 as domestic production 
                                                 
267 IEA, Development of competitive gas trading in Continental Europe: How to achieve workable 
competition in European gas markets? IEA Information Paper, 2008 
268 This implies increasing dependence on LNG exporters. 
269 The hubs are North H, West and East owned by the GRTgaz (subsidiary (TSO) of GdF).   
270 Dorigoni, S. and Portatadino, S., LNG development across Europe: Infrastructure and regulatory 
analysis, in Vol. 36, Energy Policy, 2008. 
271 Ibid 
272 IEA, Natural Gas Market Review 2007 Security in a Globalizing Market to 2015, 2007.  
273 Diversification, in terms of gas supply sources and routes (for pipeline gas) in line with EU energy policy. 
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declines. Despite its huge production of renewable energy,274 perhaps France 
would continue to import LNG from Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, Oman and Qatar.   
 
2.2.2.2 Italy 
The establishment of Agenzia Generale Italiana Petroli (AGIP) by the Italian 
government set the stage for mineral exploitation and subsequent discovery of 
natural gas in 1938.275 As the Italian economy developed, state-owned companies 
drove further gas exploitation, while public utilities regulated prices and cross 
subsidies. With increasing demand in the 1970s, imports were needed and prices 
became more competitive. Later, following the EU’s Gas Directives in 1998, the 
market was fully opened. 
 
Gas is the second major source of energy (after oil) in Italy – contributed about 
thirty-five percent of primary energy consumption in 2005. Italy is the third largest 
consumer of natural gas in Europe and over ninety percent of residents have 
access to gas.276 Due to the substitution of oil-fired plants with Combined Cycle Gas 
Turbine (CCGT) plants and shutting down of nuclear-power plants, gas has 
emerged the main source of power generation.277 Initially vertically integrated and 
dominated by ENI, the gas industry is now part of the EU’s effort towards 
competitive integrated energy markets. At present, the market is fragmented and 
there is room for players to earn monopoly rent.278 So, Italy’s gas market would not 
be described as efficient yet because there is room for improvement.279 
 
An important fact about gas demand in Italy is that more than half of it occurs 
seasonally - during winter. Since 1970, Italy has relied on imports. Due to the 
decline in domestic gas exploration and production, its dependence on imports has 
risen substantially to over eighty percent of its gas supply.280 Most of the imports 
have been through pipeline from Algeria and Russia but Italy has a regasification 
                                                 
274 About ninety-eight percent of this comes from Biomass and Hydropower.  
275 IEA, Development of competitive gas trading in Continental Europe: How to achieve workable 
competition in European gas markets? IEA Information Paper, 2008 
276 Italy also has large storage capacity to support high demand during peak periods. 
277 Ninety percent of new plants will be gas fired.  
278 This situation is not peculiar to the Italian market. 
279 Cavaliere, A., The Liberalization of Natural Gas Markets : Regulatory Reform and Competition Failures 
in Italy, OIES publication, May 2007 at http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/NG20.pdf  
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terminal. The terminal is located in Panigaglia and it has been in operation since 
1971. Meanwhile, its LNG imports from Nigeria are delivered at a French terminal281 
and swapped for pipeline gas from Algeria and Russia.  
 
Table 2.6 Percentage of LNG in Italy’s gas supply (1995-2008)282 
 
Exporters 
LNG Imports 
(% of Gas 
Supply) 
1995 
LNG Imports 
(% of Gas 
Supply) 
2000 
LNG Imports 
(% of Gas 
Supply) 
2005 
LNG Imports 
(% of Gas 
Supply) 
2008 
Algeria - 4.35 3.16 1.56 
Egypt - - - - 
Libya - - - - 
Nigeria - 3.40 - - 
Qatar - 0.06 - - 
Trinidad - - - - 
Total283 - 7.81 3.16% 2.01% 
      Source:  US EIA and BP Statistical Review 
 
Describing Italy’s gas situation, the International Energy Agency (IEA) asserts that 
“being a peninsula, gas connections and transit lines are limited compared to the 
size of the (Italian) market…and thus undermines the overall gas supply 
security”.284 Considering its constrained import infrastructure, Italy liberalized its gas 
sector to attract investments.285 For LNG, Table 2.6 shows that the proportion of 
LNG in its gas supply has been decreasing. Perhaps, the six-year scheme of tariff 
incentives which was introduced to ensure higher returns on new LNG investments 
would change the trend.  
The incentivized tariffs are generally higher than the EU’s TPA stipulation. Through 
Article 27(2) of Law 273 of 2002 and Regulation Decision 90 of 2003, a temporary 
regime of priority access was granted to terminal owners for up to twenty years.286 
Also, the Development Law contains measures to simplify the permits procedure for 
                                                                                                                                                                  
280 Ibid 
281 Montoir-de-Bretagne regasification terminal.  
282 Extracted by the author from: BP., Statistical Review of World Energy and Energy Information 
Administration’s World LNG Imports by Origin 
283 Only six major LNG exporters in the Atlantic Basin were considered here but, the Total dependence 
includes other exporters. 
284 IEA, Development of competitive gas trading in Continental Europe: How to achieve workable 
competition in European gas markets? IEA Information Paper, 2008 
285 The Executive Order (“Letta” Decree) No.164 of May 23, 2000 sets out the rules based on EC 1998/30 
Gas Directive. 
286 Trischmann, H., LNG into Europe: European regulation – American style? Issue 12, I.E.L.T.R. 2004. 
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potential LNG projects.287 The Law is part of an on-going strategy to generate fifty 
percent of Italy’s electricity288 from fossil fuels. 
 
These issues present a window for LNG imports and explain why over ten289 LNG 
liquefaction terminals have been proposed290 despite the available storage facilities. 
Infact, applications for new LNG terminals increased since 2002 and many have 
been approved amidst internal and regional oppositions. Moreover, the priority 
access discussed above is now a national law in Italy.291 Perhaps, in the coming 
years, increasing amount of LNG imports could be expected from Algeria, Egypt 
and Trinidad – existing LNG suppliers. 
 
2.2.2.3 Spain 
Gas consumption in Spain grew tremendously in the last fifteen years. But gas 
trading has remained tight due to low domestic production and lack of 
interconnecting pipeline to mainland Europe. In addition, its low storage capacity 
implies a heavy dependence on imported gas – by pipeline and as LNG. Initially, in 
1973 Spain imported an insignificant amount of LNG but it now imports over 12% of 
global LNG imports.292  
 
The trend of Spain’s LNG imports over the last fifteen (in Table 2.7) is an indication 
of the growing dependence on LNG (exporters). With its six regasification 
terminals,293 Spain has the most voluminous LNG industry and it is the largest 
importer in Europe. In fact, LNG has been and still is the primary source of gas.294 
 
Table 2.7 Percentage of LNG in Spain’s gas supply (1995-2008)295 
 LNG Imports 
(% of Gas 
LNG Imports 
(% of Gas 
LNG Imports 
(% of Gas 
LNG Imports 
(% of Gas 
                                                 
287 Dow Jones Newswires, Italy paves for Nukes, LNG, in LNG Intelligence, 10th July, 2009. 
288 While nuclear and renewable sources would each power 25% of Italy’s electricity supply.  
289 Two of them have received government approval. 
290 Stern, J., Security of Supply: case study of European gas markets, CEPMLP Lecture on March 6, 2006, in 
University of Dundee. 
291 It became a Law following the Marzano Decree approved on July 30, 2004.  
292 See Table 2.2 “Top Five LNG Importers in the World” (year 2008) 
293 The terminals are located in Huelva; Cartagena; Barcelona; Sagunto; Ferrol and Bilbao. 
294 Therefore, LNG pricing looks more like the Pacific (based crude oil or HH) rather than Continental 
Europe (oil products). The history and nature of LNG pricing is described in Chapter Three. 
295 Extracted by the author from various editions of : BP., Statistical Review of World Energy and U.S 
Energy Information Administration’s World LNG Imports by Origin 
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Exporters Supply) 
1995 
Supply) 
2000 
Supply) 
2005 
Supply) 
2008 
Algeria 60.29 23.45 16.04 12.57 
Egypt - - 10.91 12.60 
Libya 15.39 4.59 2.69 1.36 
Nigeria - 9.98 15.45 19.17 
Qatar - 0.70 14.09 13.14 
Trinidad - 4.94 1.55 11.08 
Total296 82.55% 45.67% 66.79% 73.72% 
      Source:  US EIA and BP Statistical Review 
 
So, any reduction in LNG supply would provoke severe adjustments in market 
dynamics and significant increase in LNG prices. This is especially because Spain 
depends a lot on Algeria (as Figure 2.14 shows) for its LNG and pipeline gas 
supply. 
 
Figure 2.14 Spain’s gas supply297 
 
In realization of this and to ensure supply security, Spanish legislation stipulates 
that no more than 60% of overall national supplies can come from a single country. 
As such, LNG imports are now being diversified – initially from Algeria (mainly) and 
Libya, but now includes Egypt, Nigeria, Qatar and Trinidad.298 Amongst other 
factors, the sustained increase in LNG imports could be attributed to the opening of 
Spain’s gas market in 2003.299  
                                                 
296 Only six main LNG exporters in the Atlantic Basin were considered here but, the Total dependence 
includes other exporters. 
297 IEA, Natural Gas Market Review 2007 Security in a Globalizing Market to 2015, 2007.  
298 Ball, J.R., and Drury, D., Geopolitics of LNG, p.164 in Griffin, P. and Smith, H. (Ed.), Liquefied Natural 
Gas: The Law and Business of LNG. (London: Globe Business Publishing Ltd; 2006). 
299 Full opening of the market was based on the Hydrocarbon Act 34/1998, as amended. 
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Meanwhile, the switch to gas-fired power generation also increased infrastructural 
investments. New storage and import facilities have been built or are on-going.300 
Although most of the new LNG import facilities were constructed to serve individual 
gas needs, they are not excluded from third party access. To protect and encourage 
investments, however, terminal owners are permitted to charge TPA tariffs with 
reasonable profit.301 Furthermore, there is a TPA ‘use it or lose it’ capacity 
requirement to discourage speculative reservation of capacity. In this regard, each 
third party application for access requires a financial bond for the first year of the 
resultant contract.302  
 
This regulatory framework was designed to ensure competition downstream. In 
spite of the Spanish government’s efforts, however, GN-Endesa still dominates 
Spain’s gas sector. Infact GN-Endesa - Europe’s fourth largest energy utility303 – is 
the main LNG importer in Spain’s domestic wholesale gas market. With the start-up 
of the Sagunto Terminal304 expectations are that LNG imports and competition 
would increase. A relevant question, therefore, is whether Spain would potentially 
face more competition from other LNG importers in the Atlantic Basin.  
 
2.2.2.4 United Kingdom 
In the UK, like France and Italy, gas was manufactured from coal and used for 
cooking in the early 20th century. But unlike its neighbours, the UK lacked domestic 
supply to satisfy rising demand during the industrial revolution. Subsequently, LNG 
became an option suggested by Shell. Before the first commercial cargo of LNG 
arrived in 1964, a pipeline had been built from Canvey Island to Leeds – connecting 
other parts of the United Kingdom.  
 
                                                 
300 300,000m3 Sagunto Terminal; 150,000m3 Huelva Terminal; Two 150,000m3 plants at Ferrol Terminal and 
another 150,000m3 at Barcelona.                                                                            
301 Trischmann, H., LNG into Europe: European regulation – American style? Issue 12, I.E.L.T.R. 2004. 
302 In the event that the third party uses less than 80% (on average) of its contracted regasification capacity in 
the initial six months of the contract, the bond is liquidated pro rata by the facility owner automatically. 
This, however, does deny the third party the right to permanently reduce its contracted capacity if it chooses 
to do so during the contract year. 
303 It follows after Electricity de France (EdF); German E. Onand and Italy’s Eni. 
304 On the Costa del Azhar in the Mediterranean. For more on this, see Energy Intelligence, Sagunto keeps 
Spanish LNG growing, p.5, World Gas Intelligence, Vol. XVII, No.7, February 15, 2006. 
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So, Algerian gas supplied eight regions of the UK until 1967 when natural gas was 
discovered and produced in the North Sea.305 A domestic gas network was then 
built to encourage industrial utilization of gas – setting the stage for a gas market. 
Therefore, UK’s gas demand grew rapidly, from 5.4% in 1970, to become the 
dominant fuel in the country’s total energy mix.306 United Kingdom is Europe’s 
largest gas consumer307 - about 20% of EU total and around 3% of global total. 
However, a third of UK’s gas demand is being met by imports and could rise to 
eighty percent (60% by pipeline and 20% as LNG)308 by 2020.309 Pipeline import 
capacity is about one-fifth of demand310 and its storage capacity is only 4% of 
annual consumption.311  
 
Even after completing the ongoing ten onshore storage projects, the UK could still 
fall below the EU norm of 14% coverage.312 The UK’s supply situation is a 
consequence of the quicker-than-expected declines in North Sea gas production 
and its interconnection with the less liquid Continental European market. Perhaps, 
some degree of market failure contributed to previous supply gaps in the UK gas 
market. For instance, between 2006 winter and 2007, the UK absorbed surplus gas 
from Continental Europe at a higher313 price. Such market failure could possibly 
create similar gaps in future, but the UK’s regulatory framework for gas still ensures 
a high degree of transparency and liquidity. 
 
The situation described above explains the trend depicted in Table 2.8 and 
portends an optimistic future for LNG imports. Until recently, the UK did not 
participate actively in Atlantic Basin (AB) LNG trade. But, between 2004 and 2007, 
there was significant addition to pipeline and LNG import capacity – 131mcm per 
                                                 
305 IEA, Development of competitive gas trading in Continental Europe: How to achieve workable 
competition in European gas markets? IEA Information Paper, 2008 
306 Wright, P. Gas Prices in the UK, p.1, paragraph 2, (2006) 
307 British gas supplies are also used to satisfy demand in Northern Ireland and Ireland.  
308 Pipeline gas is expected from Norway; Continental Europe and Russia. LNG is expected from Algeria; 
Egypt; Nigeria (mainly spot); Qatar and Trinidad.  
309 Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) Energy Markets Outlook 2008 
310 Wright, P. Gas Prices in the UK, p.13, paragraph 1, (2006) 
311 The UK’s gas storage capacity is one of the lowest in Europe. 
312 Shook, B, Storage-challenged UK looks to adopt US Salt Cavern expertise, p.5, Natural Gas Week, 
February 6, 2006.  
313 Relative to NBP - an index for Spot LNG 
Chapter Two:  Atlantic Basin LNG Trade 
 
 
 
 
       56 
day (about 50% of the UK’s consumption).314   As such, the UK’s dependence on 
LNG doubled from 2005 to 2008. Furthermore, the regulatory changes have been 
undertaken to encourage diversification through LNG.315  
 
Table 2.8   Percentage of LNG in the UK’s gas supply (1995-2008) 
 
Exporters 
LNG Imports 
(% of Gas 
Supply) 
1995 
LNG Imports 
(% of Gas 
Supply) 
2000 
LNG Imports 
(% of Gas 
Supply) 
2005 
LNG Imports 
(% of Gas 
Supply) 
2008 
Algeria - - 0.48 0.39 
Egypt - - - 0.09 
Libya - - - - 
Nigeria - - - - 
Qatar - - - 0.13 
Trinidad - - 0.07 0.50 
Total316 - - 0.55% 1.11% 
Source:  US EIA and BP Statistical Review 
 
So far, anyone seeking access to an LNG facility is required to apply for it with 
relevant details. Subsequently, negotiations would be undertaken towards achieving 
a bilateral access agreement.317 However, the UK’s gas market legislation318 also 
empowers OFGEM to entertain and grant requests for exempting LNG terminals 
from granting TPA.319 The willingness of LNG terminal developers to invest in the 
UK320 has, therefore, been attributed to the application of such TPA exemptions.321 
At present there are two regasification terminals322 in operation within the UK but 
the number is set to increase from on-going/approved projects.323 Considering 
difference in market size, it is noteworthy that the regime is similar to that of the US, 
                                                 
314 IEA, Natural Gas Market Review 2007 Security in a Globalizing Market to 2015, 2007.  
315 This is line with EU policy and obvious in Table 2.8. 
316 Only six main LNG exporters in the Atlantic Basin were considered here but, the Total dependence 
includes other exporters. 
317 The regulator (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets – OFGEM) may intervene, if negotiations are 
considered discriminatory and not in good faith, by requesting for an auction of regasification capacity.   
318 That is the Gas Act 1986 as amended through the Gas (Third Party Access and Accounts) Regulations 
2000 (SI 2000/1937). 
319 Trischmann, H., LNG into Europe: European regulation – American style? Issue 12, I.E.L.T.R. 2004. 
320 While only a few investments have been undertaken, the number of terminals is still significant 
considering the UK’s gas resources and interconnection with Continental Europe.  
321 Moen, K., The Gas Directive and Third Party Transportation Rights – What Pipeline Volumes are 
available? p.50, Vol.21 No.1 Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law, 2003 
322 They are Isle of Grain (Grain LNG) and South Hook terminals. 
323 Dragon LNG import terminal as located in South Hook is almost ready for commissioning. 
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Italy, Belgium and Spain.324 Nevertheless, it is important to note that LNG is still a 
small part of the UK’s gas supply. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
In some of the countries reviewed above, LNG is an important part of the gas 
market and may become more important in all of them. So, new opportunities exist 
for LNG in Atlantic Basin natural gas markets. But, increased reliance on imports 
could expose these markets to shocks in international LNG trade. For instance, 
some countries325 may have to show greater willingness to secure gas by paying 
more or encouraging investments. In the present context of global recession (low 
energy demand), one wonders whether some of the projections about LNG are 
likely to change. If so, will it affect the LNG trade and how? Few projections have 
been reviewed downward but, it is too early to speculate on the potential 
implications for LNG trade. Besides, the main determinants of LNG demand326 are 
also simultaneously being distorted as markets adjust, interact and re-adjust. 
 
A pertinent question worth considering is whether LNG exporters would compete for 
markets within and outside the Atlantic Basin. If not, with supply diversification and 
competitive energy markets, a larger part of the rent would be available for the 
taking. But will this create an incentive for market control or defense of price - 
through a uniform pricing arrangement? A continuous re-assessment of price 
incentives by LNG exporters seems the logical expectation in all circumstances. In 
this context, how do the exporting countries stand?  
 
2.3 Exporting Countries 
A cursory look at Table 2.9 reveals that there are few Atlantic Basin LNG exporters 
today but by 2015 liquefaction capacity would increase. For the purpose of 
manageability, precision in the simulation and thorough analysis, it becomes 
                                                 
324 These countries have the highest number of regasification terminals in the Atlantic Basin.  
325 Given that each North American/European consuming country has its specific energy needs and priorities. 
Besides the EU’s 1998 Energy Markets Directive allows member states to adopt individual provisions to fit 
their peculiar circumstances.  
326 Crude oil price; pipeline gas prices and demand; electricity prices; prices of coal and emission permits, as 
well as, available liquefaction capacity are the principal determinants of LNG price. 
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necessary to narrow down the number of countries. To achieve this purpose, three 
simple criteria are applied, within the timeframe of the book, using Table 2.9: 
 
 Extent of current participation in the market327: 
Based on LNG export capacity, the top five countries (2005 to 2010) were chosen – 
Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Qatar and Trinidad;  
 
Table 2.9 Atlantic Basin liquefaction capacity and gas reserve328 
Country                Past       Future (mtpa)     
Share of 
global LNG  
exports 
(%) 
Share of 
global proven 
gas reserves 
(%) 
  2008329 2015 2007330 1st Jan ‘08331 
Algeria 20.23 25.7 10.9 2.6 
Egypt  12.20 21.8 6.01 0.9 
Libya  0.7 0.7 0.34 0.8 
Eql. Guinea  0.0 3.4 0.63 0.1 
Nigeria  21.70 71.8 9.35 3.0 
Norway  4.3 4.3 0.06 1.3 
Trinidad  15.1 20.0 8.02 0.3 
Angola 0.0 5.0 - 0.1 
Venezuela 0.0 4.7 - 2.7 
Russia (West) 0.0 30.0 - 27.2 
Atlantic Basin 74.23 157.4 52.31  
Qatar332 30.6 77.0 17.0 14.6 
Grand Total 104.83 234.4 - - 
Research Total - - 51.62 22.2 
Source:  Gas Strategies 
 
 Potential ability to participate in the market:  
Based on proven gas reserves and potential liquefaction capacity (by 2013) the top 
five exporting countries were chosen – Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt, Qatar and 
                                                 
327 The top-five countries jointly exported 51.62% of global LNG trade in 2007. 
328 Extracted by author from Gas Strategies Database (www.GasStrategiesOnline.com) 
329 Data for Algeria; Egypt; Nigeria; Trinidad; Qatar and Norway were extracted from GIIGNL, The LNG 
industry, 2008. Expected capacity expansion is the difference between the capacity in 2008 and 2015.   
330 The 2007 figures for “Total LNG exports” were extracted from Wagbara, O., What are the prospects for a 
gas OPEC, in International Gas, October 2008.  
331 EIA, International Energy Outlook 2008, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/  
332 Other Middle East gas-rich countries were excluded from this table because they are either non-LNG 
exporters or export less than one percent of the global sum.  
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Trinidad.333 Although Russia has the highest gas production and proven gas 
reserves it is excluded because it is unlikely to become a major LNG exporter by 
2013.334 
 Regional representation  
Finally, in addition to the above criteria, effort was made to include one small/new 
LNG exporting country and one country from each LNG producing region - North 
Africa, West Africa, Americas and Middle East. As a small LNG exporter, only Libya 
met the initial pre-requisite conditions, alongside Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Qatar and 
Trinidad – which are also representing their respective producing regions.   
 
So, before modeling, the subsequent part of this chapter describes each country’s 
trade pattern - export market, as well as, existing and potential335 export capacity. 
The theoretical basis for the description is that a country’s ability to exploit its gas 
resources depends on the available markets; price(s), in addition to its domestic 
energy needs and policy.336  
 
2.3.1 Algeria 
Atlantic Basin LNG trade, as stated earlier, was pioneered in 1964 by Algeria’s first 
commercial LNG delivery (from the Arzew GL4Z plant) to Canvey Island UK.337 
Algeria dominated the LNG trade in the Atlantic Basin for almost fifteen years until a 
price dispute with the US in the late 1970s. By early 1980s Algerian exports to the 
US were suspended and subsequently Algeria was squeezed out of North America 
by Trinidad and Tobago in 1999. But, in those years, Algeria had also developed 
LNG trade relations with France, Turkey and Italy.338  
 
This North African country is now the largest exporter of LNG to Europe and the 
fourth largest producer of LNG in the world (Table 2.10 shows new and renewed 
contracts). With a liquefaction capacity339 of 26.2Bnm3, Algeria accounted for 10.9% 
                                                 
333 The five top countries accounted for over one-fifth of the world’s proven gas reserves in 2008. 
334 Additional discourse on Russia has been included in section 2.4 below. 
335 Possible completion date of 2013 
336 Section 2.2 highlights demand context, pricing issues are addressed in Chapter Three. 
337 EIA, Country Analysis Briefs – Algeria, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Algeria/NaturalGas.html  
338 Apart from consolidating trade with United Kingdom - before gas was discovered at the North Sea.  
339 Petroleum Economist March 2007. 
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of global LNG exports in 2007.340 It extended its market share by constructing two 
other important export terminals at Skikda and Algiers, while another train is being 
added to the Arzew Plant. Algeria now exports LNG to more countries – including 
Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Spain and the Unites States.  
 
Table 2.10 Algeria’s LNG Contract Obligation341 
Export to Nominal Qtty342 (mtpa) Duration Form 
France 
“ 
“ 
1.3 
2.5 
3.7 
1992 - 2013 
1972 - 2019 
1976 - 2013 
F.O.B 
F.O.B 
F.O.B 
Greece 0.5 2000 - 2021 F.O.B 
Italy 
“ 
1.40 
0.86 
1997 - 2014 
1999 - 2022 
F.O.B 
D.E.S 
Spain 
“ 
“ 
“ 
0.75 
0.45 
1.15 
0.92 
2002 - 2017 
2002 -  
2002 - 2021 
2002 -  
D.E.S 
D.E.S 
D.E.S 
Turkey 3.0 1994 – 2014 D.E.S 
U.S.A 3.2 1989 – 2009  
    Source:  GIIGNL 
 
Downstream, Algeria’s Sonatrach343 has some capacity at the UK’s Isle of Grain 
regasification plant, and also participates in other European gas and electricity 
markets.344 In total,345 Algeria accounted for twelve percent of EU’s gas imports 
(second to the FSU) in 2007.346 Algeria attained this height by exporting gas 
through pipeline as well. Its pipeline gas exports to Europe started in 1983347 and 
could reach 60bcm per annum by 2010. Considering Table 2.10, some pertinent 
questions come to mind. Is Algeria likely to meet its present and future contractual 
obligations for LNG and pipeline gas? Moreover, one wonders where its priority 
would be – pipeline or LNG.348 Conceivably, both options offer Algeria a strategic 
                                                 
340 BP, Statistical Review of World Energy, 2008. 
341 GIIGNL, The LNG industry, 2008. 
342 Annual Contracted Quantity 
343 Sonatrach is Algeria’s National Gas Company. 
344 Sonatrach does this through MOUs, subsidiaries and/or partnerships in Spain, France and Portugal. 
345 Pipeline gas and LNG combined. 
346 Cedigaz, 2007 Natural Gas Year in Review, Press Release, May 7, 2008 
347 Through the Trans-Mediterranean (Transmed) pipeline. 
348 At present Algeria exports a fairly equal amount of LNG and pipeline gas to Europe. 
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advantage in its bid to earn more gas revenue. Perhaps, this explains Algeria’s 
interest in the Trans-Sahara Gas Pipeline349 – an alternative source of gas supply. 
 
Meanwhile, Algeria has a fairly robust domestic grid, built around major gas fields, 
that enables widespread gas utilization. Natural gas provided sixty-four percent of 
the primary energy supply in 2006. One reason for this high consumption is the 
inefficient price levels (fixed in the 1970s and 1980s). At the current rate of 
domestic consumption and exports, Algeria’s proven reserves could run out after 
fifty years.350 However, due to the high and increasing rate of gas exploitation, 
some Algerians are arguing for a drastic cut in exports. In 2007, for instance, 
Algeria’s exports to Europe decreased by six percent.351 Therefore, in an effort to 
lessen domestic burden on exports, the government is encouraging exploratory352 
efforts by foreign investors.  
 
 
2.3.2 Egypt 
Egypt began the liquefaction of natural gas in 2004 from its single-train Damietta 
LNG plant. The following year, a second liquefaction plant at Idku also began 
exporting LNG.353 Egypt now has a liquefaction capacity of 12.2MTPA and exports 
about 6.01% of global LNG354 to France, Italy Spain, and the US. Between 2007 
and 2008, gas exports generated revenue of about USD3.3billion for Egypt.355  
 
Considering the existing contract obligations (shown in Table 2.11), it is obvious 
that Egypt expects to earn increasingly more revenue from LNG. Besides, its 
clientele is expanding beyond the Atlantic Basin and some existing liquefaction 
plants have been earmarked for expansion. But, gas supply is uncertain and there 
is an existing moratorium – in June 2008, government suspended the initiation of 
new gas export contracts till 2010. One reason for this is that gas demand in Egypt 
                                                 
349 Through the TSGP Nigerian supply would feed Algeria’s grid or LNG for subsequent export to Europe. 
350 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2007. 
351 Cedigaz, 2007 Natural Gas Year in Review, Press Release, May 7, 2008 
352 Gas production and wholesale distribution is dominated by Sonatrach. 
353 IEA, Natural Gas Market Review 2007 Security in a Globalising Market to 2015, 2007.  
354 Stern, J., Gas as a Transitional Fuel, Table 1, OEF, February 2008. 
355 EIA, Country Analysis Briefs – Egypt, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Egypt/NaturalGas.html 
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is seventy percent of domestic production.356 Given the large amount of gas 
consumed,357 policy makers are concerned that Egypt’s proven gas reserves358 - 
0.9% of global total – would not sustain its economic development.359 At the current 
rate of production and consumption, the reserves could be exhausted after forty 
years.360 As such, Egypt would need more gas discoveries and production 
infrastructure to sufficiently meet export obligation.   
 
Table 2.11 Egypt’s LNG Contract Obligation 
Exporting 
Company 
Importer Country Volume 
(mtpa) 
Volume 
(Bcm) 
Start End 
Egypt LNG Train 1 Gaz de France France361 3.60 4.93 2005 2025 
Egypt LNG Train 2 BG USA/Italy 3.60 4.93 2006 2026 
SEGAS Union Fenosa Spain 2.41 3.30362 2004 2025 
SEGAS BG363   0.76 1.04 2005 2011 
SEGAS Petronas(ALTCO)   0.76 1.04 2005 2011 
SEGAS BP   1.06 1.45 2005 2025 
Egypt Total     12.19 16.70     
 Source: Gas Strategies 
 
However, Egypt's gas policy stipulates that a third of every gas discovery would be 
used domestically; another third to be kept for future generation and a final third be 
applied to export. Meanwhile, policymakers announced on-going efforts towards 
nuclear power generation364 to ease the pressure of domestic gas consumption on 
exports.365  
 
 
 
                                                 
356 Three sectors – Petrochemicals; Power generation and Manufacturing – account for over eighty-five 
percent of this. 
357 Both domestically and in the export markets. 
358 This is in addition to other fossil fuels. 
359 Egypt has a population of Eighty Million and the World Bank estimates it has a 7% annual growth rate.  
360 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2007. 
361 Contract is destination flexible. Cargoes could supply both France and other markets in Continental 
Europe. 
362 Volume increased to 4Bn cubic metres per year from 2009. 
363 BG and Petronas will take approx. 2.1 Bcm until 2008 and approximately 1.4 Bcm until 2011 (on equal 
proportions). Both upstream partner companies are in negotiations to extend the contract for 1.4 Bcm beyond 
2011.  
364 Alhajji, A., Oil and Gas in the Capitals, in Vol. 228, No.12, World Oil, 2007 
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2.3.3 Libya 
Libya became the second LNG exporter in the world when, in 1971, it delivered long 
term contracted cargoes respectively to Snam and Enagas of Italy and Spain. With 
an initial liquefaction capacity of 2.3mtpa at the Marsa el Brega plant, Libya’s LNG 
industry has not developed any further. It went through a series of price disputes366 
with customers and since 1981 the country’s export capacity has remained less 
than 1.15mtpa. There are, however, on-going plans to enhance the efficiency and 
capacity of the old plant. At present, most LNG exports go to Spain367 but it is 
expected that additional capacity would be sold to Italy and Turkey after the plant’s 
upgrade.  
 
Gas consumption in the economy is less than one-third of primary energy 
demand.368 At the current level of exports and domestic demand, Libya’s gas 
reserves could last for another eighty-five years.369 Meanwhile, with the lifting of 
United Nations sanctions, the Libyan government has taken several institutional and 
fiscal steps to attract investments towards exploring and exploiting gas deposits – 
about 1.32trillion cubic meters.370 In 2004, for instance, Libya made its petroleum 
fiscal regime more attractive371 for investments in gas exploration and production. 
Meanwhile, it also signed a Memorandum of Cooperation with Russia’s Gazprom in 
2008. These efforts are aimed at encouraging gas production and utilization by 
households and petrochemical companies, as well as, exports.  
 
But, like Algeria, Libya also has a conflict between furthering pipeline gas or LNG 
exports. With the completion of the Greenstream pipeline in 2004, for instance, 
exports from Melitah to Europe372 have increased substantially.373Aside from 
                                                                                                                                                                  
365 Approval has been given for building a network of 1gigawatts nuclear generating plants. 
366 Price disputes occurred between 1969 and 1971 (which delayed exports), as well as, in 1979 (due to a 
unilateral change in price regime). 
367 The existing contract was signed with Gas Natural in 1971. 
368 US EIA., International Energy Annual 2005, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/iea/  
369 It is, however, very low – less than one percent of world total. 
370 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2007. 
371 When compared to the exiting contractual terms for petroleum activities. Kemp, A., and Otman, W., The 
Petroleum Development Investment Risks and Returns in Libya: a Monte Carlo Study of the Current 
Contractual Terms (EPSA IV), North Sea Occasional Paper, Aberdeen, Scotland. 
372 The gas is delivered into Italy and further down to mainland Europe from Sicily. 
373 http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Libya/NaturalGas.html 
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exports to Europe, Libya has been considering several regional initiatives with 
Tunisia, on the one hand, as well as, with Algeria and Egypt.374 For instance, an 
agreement was signed in 1997 for a pipeline that would link Libya to the Egyptian 
gas grid. One then wonders the basis on which the various projects would be 
prioritized.   
 
2.3.4 Qatar 
 Until 1997 Qatar was not an LNG exporter, but it started small375, grew rapidly (see 
Figure 2.17) and has become the number one LNG exporter in the world.376 In 
2005, Qatar exported 1 trillion cubic feet of LNG, but with on-going projects,377 it 
could provide more than half of all new LNG supply globally378 - 77million metric 
tons of LNG.379  
  
Figure 2.17 Growth of Qatar’s LNG Exports380 
 
  
So far, Qatar’s LNG companies (Qatargas and Rasgas)381 export LNG to Italy, 
Mexico, Spain, United Kingdom, and United States, in the Atlantic Basin. Like 
                                                 
374 Unfortunately, some of these efforts have been under consideration since 1997. 
375 About 120,000 metric tons of LNG was first delivered to Spain in 1997. 
376 Qatar could remain the leading LNG exporter for years to come. 
377 Additional trains being added to RasGas and Qatargas are expected to be completed between 2010 and 
2015.  
378 Energy Intelligence Group, Report predicts a radical change in LNG equation, LNG Intelligence, 
Thursday, February 15, 2007. 
379 EIA, International Energy Outlook 2008, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/pdf/nat_gas.pdf  
380 Source: EIA natural Gas Monthly (Aug. 2006); IEA natural Gas information 2006, at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Qatar/NaturalGas.html   
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Algeria’s Sonatrach, Qatar Petroleum owns regasification capacity in the Golden 
Pass Terminal (US Gulf Coast) and South Hook in the UK. In their strategic effort to 
earn more revenue, Qatar plays along the LNG value chain. For instance, through 
Qatar Gas Transport (Nakilat)382 a 215,000m3-capacity vessel has been acquired. 
Furthermore, it aims to focus on petrochemical projects, in addition to regional gas 
pipeline projects.  
   
 Table 2.12 Qatar’s LNG Contract Obligation383 
Export to Nominal Qtty384 (mtpa) Duration Form 
Belgium 2.05 2007 – 2027 D.E.S 
India 7.5 2004 - 2028  
Japan 
“ 
4.0 
2.0 
1997 - 2021 
1998 – 2021 
D.E.S 
D.E.S 
Korea 
“ 
4.92 
2.10 
1999 - 2024 
2007 - 2026 
F.O.B 
D.E.S 
Spain 
“ 
“ 
“ 
“ 
“ 
0.66 
0.66 
0.75 
0.88 
0.75 
0.74 
2001 - 2012 
2002 – 2012 
2005 – 2025 
2003 – 2022 
2004 – 2023 
2005 – 2025 
D.E.S 
“ 
“ 
“ 
“ 
“ 
EU 0.75 2006 – 2025 F.O.B 
Taiwan 3.08 2008 – 2032 F.O.B 
 Source:  GIIGNL 
 
Meanwhile, domestic gas consumption is high – eighty percent of primary energy 
demand385 - due to power demand. Qatar’s subsidized price regime is responsible 
for rising gas consumption386 even as its reserve declined by one percent (5 trillion 
cubic feet) in 2007.387 Although, it has the third largest gas reserve,388 a moratorium 
has been placed on new LNG projects following a reserve integrity test. Qatar’s 
equidistance from the three major regional gas markets is notable. A more 
                                                                                                                                                                  
381 Both dominate Qatar’s LNG sector and are owned part by Qatar Petroleum (QP). QP, which could be 
described as the National Petroleum Company, is the main upstream producer of natural gas and vital player 
in downstream projects.  
382 Nakilat is the shipping company responsible for transporting Qatar’s LNG. It also represents Qatari 
midstream interest in the LNG chain.   
383 GIIGNL; The LNG industry, 2008. 
384 Annual Contracted Quantity 
385 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2007. 
386 Stern, J., Gas as a Transitional Fuel, Table 1, OEF, February 2008. 
387 EIA, International Energy Outlook 2008, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/pdf/nat_gas.pdf 
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interesting issue, however, is to reconcile the moratorium with Qatar’s existing 
contracts (detailed in Table 2.12). Moreover, it concluded another set of contracts in 
2008 - to supply UAE; China (Petrochina and Shell 3mtpa each for 25years) and 
Kogas 1.3mtpa for 8years.  
   
 A closer look at the contracts reveals that over the next few years Qatar has 
contracted to export 7.24mtpa and 30.09tpa respectively to the Atlantic Basin and 
Asia Pacific region389. In spite of Qatar’s geographical proximity to most LNG 
importers, it would be interesting to see how it satisfies domestic, regional and other 
supply obligations.390 Satisfying domestic and regional gas demand may seem a 
higher priority but LNG remains a vital source of revenue.   
 
2.3.5 Nigeria  
Domestic gas consumption in Nigeria was mainly in the form Liquefied Petroleum 
Gas. Although crude oil was discovered in Nigeria in 1957, its associated product 
gas was not commercialised but flared or re-injected for enhanced oil recovery. 
However, Nigeria staggered into the LNG market. The idea of Nigeria LNG (NLNG) 
was first proposed in 1965391 but nothing happened392 till 1989 when the company 
was incorporated. Between 1965 and 1989, a combination of internal socio-political 
variables constrained the export of Nigeria’s gas resources. Principal amongst them 
was the exploitation of oil; resource curse from large amount of oil revenues and 
political crisis.  
 
Politically, after a civil war that lasted for over three years,393 Nigeria encountered 
two military coups before a civilian government was elected in 1983. As such 
political instability and corruption resulted in protracted394 contract negotiations till 
another military regime replaced the civilian administration - led by Alhajji Shehu 
                                                                                                                                                                  
388 As of January 1, 2008 Qatar’s proven reserve was 905 trillion cubic feet (14.6% of the global total) 
according to EIA, International Energy Outlook 2008. 
389 Included in this classification are China, India, Japan, Korea and Taiwan. 
390 And simultaneously undertake seasonal price arbitrage when the opportunity arises.  
391 Asiodu, P., Developing and supporting critical energy infrastructure for Vision 2020: Challenges, 
Constraints and Prospects, in IAEE Energy Forum, Fourth Quarter, 2008. 
392 There were many missed opportunities but the dream staggered on. 
393 Nigeria’s civil war lasted from 1966 to 1970. 
394 Even after 1989, some of such issues lingered on and later became a subject of parliamentary inquiry. For 
more details see http://www.halliburtonwatch.org/news/nigeria_parliament_report.pdf   
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Shagari – in 1983. These political events culminated in the lack of rule of law and 
poor governance. Besides, Nigeria had no effective Gas Policy and so NLNG could 
not stand in a vacuum. Apart from the geopolitical constraints and high country 
risk,395 Shell’s plan was also hindered by lack of loans to finance the project.396  
 
Table 2.13 Nigeria’s LNG Contract Commitment397 
 
 
Faced with such insurmountable obstacles, Shell and other co-sponsors398 opted to 
provide funds for the project and boldly took the Final Investment Decision in 1995. 
The project suffered huge cost over run but within four years production had begun 
(in 1999) and the first NLNG cargo was exported to Italy.399 While the initial effort 
lingered for several years without LNG, it is remarkable that within seven years of 
first production, six trains (see Table 2.13) were built and commissioned. Worth 
noting is the fact NLNG as a project-company400 and its partners were granted 
attractive fiscal incentives and unusual exemptions.401 Now Nigeria has the second 
                                                 
395 Human rights were violated and Nigeria was defaulting in its international credit obligation. 
396 While the World Bank called for reforms and advised cautious lending, most International Financial 
Institutions refused to provide finance for the project.   
397 Petroleum Economist, January 2008. 
398 They were Agip and TotalFinaElf. 
399 NLNG, The Company: Milestones at  
http://www.nigerialng.com/NLNGnew/companyinfo/Milestones.htm  
400 Sometimes termed Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) created for the project - liquefaction and sale of gas. 
401 This included, but not limited to, 10-year tax relief; withholding tax exemptions; capital allowances; and 
untaxed dividends with ease of repatriation. 
Chapter Two:  Atlantic Basin LNG Trade 
 
 
 
 
       68 
fastest growing liquefaction capacity in the globe and sells LNG to France, Italy, 
Spain, United Kingdom and US. 
 
In 2007, Nigeria exported 3.5 metric tonnes of Natural Gas Liquids (NGLs) and 22 
metric tonnes of LNG. At present, there are three on-going (but uncertain) LNG 
projects aimed at enhancing Nigeria’s position as a major LNG exporter (especially 
in the Atlantic Basin). The projects are Train 7 of NLNG; Brass LNG and Olokola 
LNG (OKLNG).402 To further assert itself across the LNG market, the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and three other companies403 established 
a company - Nikorma Shipping Services - to provide LNG transportation 
services.404This is an achievement because of Nigeria’s preference for selling LNG 
destination ex-ship (D.E.S),405 as well as, its interest in price arbitrage.  
 
Domestically, the proportion of gas consumption in the energy mix is very low406 
due to lack of infrastructure and investments. To reverse this situation, the Yar’ 
Adua-Jonathan Administration proposed a framework for pricing and domestic 
supply obligation (DSO)407. In addition, domestic gas supply has been prioritized in 
the government’s double-edged gas utilization strategy. So far, fifteen companies408 
have been chosen to participate in the new gas utilization agenda, while 2011 is 
another deadline for ending gas flaring. Nigeria has the largest proven gas reserve 
in Africa (as Figure 2.18 shows), but the achievement of the above policy objectives 
remains uncertain.  
  
Figure 2.18     Top Gas Reserve Holders in Africa (2007)409 
                                                 
402 Brass LNG is expected to have two trains with a capacity of 10mtpa. It is jointly owned by NNPC, ENI, 
Conocco Phillips and Total. OKLNG, owned by NNPC, Shell, Chevron and BG, is a four-train 20mtpa 
project.  
403 They include Malaysia International Shipping Company (MISC); Deep Water Shipping Company and 
Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI). 
404 Alexander Oil and Gas Connections; volume 13, issue No. 3 - Friday, February 15, 2008   
405 Most of Nigeria’s newly signed contracts are D.E.S. 
406 Relative to oil; flared associated gas and proven gas reserves. According to the EIA’s International 
Energy Annual 2005, gas contributed only thirty-six percent of Nigeria’s Primary Energy Demand in 2005.  
407 This DSO mandates upstream petroleum operators in the country to set aside a predetermined amount of 
their gas production (and reserves) for the domestic gas (and power) market. 
408 They are BG, Chevron, Shell, Statoil, Centrica, Gazprom, Union Fenosa, Thailand’s PTT, E.ON Ruhrgas, 
India’s Gail, Kogas and local independents – Oando Group and Sahara Energy  
409 EIA, Country Analysis Briefs – Algeria, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Algeria/NaturalGas.html 
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Meanwhile, Nigeria is the major stakeholder in the West African Gas Pipeline 
project and appears to be making progress on the proposed Trans-Sahara Gas 
Pipeline (TSGP)410. The EU has offered both financial resources (Loan Provision) 
and political support for the project, while Gazprom of Russia has signed an MOU 
on gas exploitation and transportation with NNPC. In addition, Totalfina Elf has 
indicated interest to participate in the project with other investors.  
 
A baffling issue about the TSGP is that Nigeria lacks a domestic gas grid and is 
considering an investment to export its gas into Algeria’s grid.  Besides, as a key 
member of the Gulf of Guinea Commission411 Nigeria aims to access Equatorial 
Guinea’s gas deposits in exchange for gas supply to that countries’ LNG project.412 
Although Nigeria’s reserve could last for over 100 years,413 whether there would be 
sufficient gas supply for the above projects is another issue.  
 
It appears that the current administration – led by Umaru Musa Yar’ Adua - is 
determined to enforce the Gas Master Plan (especially to enhance electricity 
generation). The question that continues to bother industry stakeholders and 
prospective investors is whether domestic gas prices would be attractive to both 
                                                 
410 The proposed 4,500km pipeline would run from Warri (Southern Nigeria) through Niger Republic and the 
Sahara desert to Hassi R’Mel in Algeria.  
411 Blackwell Publishing, Gulf of Guinea, African Research Bulletin, 2006 
412 Nigeria’s Energy Minister (Edmund Daukoru) quoted in The Guardian, Nigeria earns N187 billion from 
gas in eight years, at http://www.nigerians-abroad.com/news/economy/nigeria-earns-n187bn-from-gas-in-
eight-years/ (23/02/07). 
413 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2007. 
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demand and supply. Perhaps, it is too early to speculate on Nigeria’s domestic gas 
pricing regime given its history of policy inconsistency and unstable polity.  
  
2.3.6 Trinidad and Tobago 
Trinidad’s economy which was initially dominated by oil has now become a gas-
based export region.414 Over fifty percent of Trinidad’s exploitable gas deposit is 
now dedicated to LNG export - which has replaced oil as the prime source of 
government revenue. Trinidad became an exporter of LNG with the coming on-
stream of the 3mtpa Atlantic LNG plant in 1999. Today, its Atlantic Group415 has 
become the largest US LNG exporter with four trains and total liquefaction capacity 
of 15mtpa. It provided over six percent of Europe’s LNG imports to Italy, Spain and 
the United Kingdom in 2006416and given its contract obligation (Table 2.14), could 
remain a relevant exporter in the Atlantic Basin (US and Spain especially). 
  
  Table 2.14 Trinidad’s LNG Contract Obligation 
Exporter Importer Country Volume 
(mtpa) 
Volume 
(Bcm) 
Start End 
Atlantic LNG Tractebel LNG USA 1.75 2.40 2000 2020 
Atlantic LNG Tractebel LNG USA 0.22 0.30 2003 2023 
Atlantic LNG BG USA 1.50 2.06 2006 2026 
Atlantic LNG BG USA 1.61 2.20 2003 2023 
Atlantic LNG BG USA 0.80 1.10 2003 2023 
Atlantic LNG Gas Natural Spain/USA 0.73 1.00 2003 2023 
Atlantic LNG Repsol  Spain/USA 0.66 0.90 2003 2023 
Atlantic LNG Repsol  Spain 1.68 2.30 2001 2021 
Atlantic LNG Gas de Euskadi  Spain/USA 0.73 1.00 2003 2023 
T.T’s Total     9.68 13.26     
     Source: Gas Strategies 
 
Meanwhile, Trinidad and Tobago operates a single buyer model in its domestic gas 
market. The National Gas Company (NGC) is the sole buyer,417 transporter and 
seller of a natural gas to downstream users in the economy. Gas price indexation is 
applied in the petrochemical industry but regulated tariffs apply to domestic users. 
                                                 
414 In addition to natural gas, Trinidad also exports steel, ammonia, LNG, and methanol. 
415 Three companies operated by Atlantic LNG but owned by National Gas Company of Trinidad and 
Tobago jointly with the subsidiaries of Suez LNG, BG and BP. 
416 US EIA at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/LNGimp2006.html 
417 It buys gas from the main producers - EOG, BG and BP. 
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Although price indexation is efficient,418 the tariff system for non-industrial users is 
non-competitive.   
 
Consequently, (as Figure 2.19 indicates) domestic gas consumption has increased 
rapidly with economic growth and could hamper future exports. In 2006, more than 
half of Trinidad’s gas production was consumed domestically - over ninety percent 
of its primary energy demand.419 Due to the uncertainty of future revenues from gas 
reserves, Trinidad created a stabilization fund420 before the reserves run out in 
twelve years421. 
Figure 2.19 Trinidad’s Gas Production and Consumption 
 
 
However, experience has shown that such funds are no cure-all,422 and so 
government imposed a moratorium on new LNG projects. Given that its proven gas 
reserve is about 0.3% of the global total,423 there are plans to initiate a bidding 
round for offshore gas acreage this year (2009).  
  
Table 2.15  LNG Exports to Atlantic Basin Markets424 by Atlantic Exporters425  
                                                 
418 Within a domestic context, this process ensures profit-splitting between NGC and petrochemical 
companies as the price of petrochemical products increase. 
419 B.P., Statistical Review of World Energy, 2008.  
420 Wagbara, O., Why does Trinidad and Tobago need a different Fiscal Regime for Gas?  
I.E.L.T.R, December 2005. 
421 B.P., Statistical Review of World Energy, 2008.  
422 Baunsgaard, T; A primer on mineral taxation,  IMF Working Paper WP/01/139      
423 Stern, J., Gas as a Transitional Fuel, Table 1, OEF, February 2008.  
424 This includes exports to other Atlantic Basin Countries apart from France; Italy; Spain; United Kingdom 
and the USA were considered. 
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Exporters 1995426 
Bn m3 
% of 
LNG  
Export 
2000427 
Bn m3 
% of 
LNG 
Export 
2005 
Bn 
m3 
% of 
LNG 
Export 
2008428 
Bn m3 
% of LNG 
Exports429 
Algeria 17.38 97.16 26.93 100 25.60 99.7 19.38 88.63 
Egypt - - - - 6.63 95.7 9.13 64.94 
Libya 1.28 100 0.78 100 0.87 100 0.53 100.00 
Nigeria - - 4.57 100 12.04 100 16.01 77.95 
Qatar - - 2.11 14.43 4.64 17.1 8.07 20.34 
Trinidad - - 3.64 91.24 14.01 100 15.39 88.66 
Source:  US EIA 
 
In summary, given the above discourse and Table 2.15, one can reasonably expect 
that the six exporting countries would become more relevant in the various gas 
markets within the Atlantic Basin. It is important, before concluding this chapter, for 
one to highlight the role of some Atlantic Basin gas producers excluded from this 
work. 
 
2.3.7 Excluded Gas Exporters 
Venezuela does not have LNG capacity but has a small amount of gas reserves.430 
Angola and Equatorial Guinea are new entrants to LNG trade and their gas reserve 
is very small. Consequently, there seems a thin basis for any sort of commentary on 
the above countries. Iran lacks liquefaction capacity but is a very important natural 
gas exporter and reserve holder. Since Iranian export is yet to affect gas supply in 
the Atlantic Basin, it is not included in this work. But why exclude Russia? 
 
Russia 
Gas has been flowing from Russia to Europe for the past four decades. Their 
energy trade relations have been very distinguished from the Soviet Union, through 
its collapse and to date. During the Soviet era, trade relations were between the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
425 Only exports from the following countries were considered: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, Trinidad and 
Qatar. 
426 Energy Information Administration, World LNG Imports by Origin, 1995 
427 Energy Information Administration, World LNG Imports by Origin, 2000 
428 BP, Statistical Review of World Energy, 2009.  
429 That is, as a percentage of each country’s total LNG export. 
430 Venezuela’s proven gas reserve was about 2.7% of the global total as at January 1, 2008, according to 
EIA, International Energy Outlook 2008. 
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Western European countries and the Central/Eastern European countries that were 
members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)431.  
 
Much recently, with the advent of the European Union (EU), a new relationship has 
been formed between Russia and Europe. Russian gas export to Europe, which 
reached a record 154.30Bcm in 2005, has been hampered by lingering price 
disputes with Ukraine.432 On the one hand, the EU wants Russia to ratify the 1994 
Energy Charter Treaty and Transit Protocol, as well as, access to Russia’s 
upstream gas sector. On the other hand, Russia is seeking access to Europe’s 
retail gas markets.  
 
So far, cargoes from Sakhalin II LNG433 were delivered to Japan and China in April 
2009. Meanwhile, Gazprom has signed an LNG swap agreement with Sonatrach of 
Algeria to deliver Algerian LNG to the US. But doubts exist about Russia’s 
capacity434 to meet its future gas supply obligations due to rising domestic 
consumption – 55% of the primary energy demand.435 The high domestic gas 
demand has been attributed to inefficient pricing but on-going reforms could 
improve Russia’s domestic gas price regime.436 While Russia could certainly play a 
role in the Atlantic Basin, it is doubtful that this can be significant prior to 2015. So, 
given the timescale, scope and criteria applied in here, Russia is excluded from the 
study.  
 
                                                 
431 Stern, J., Soviet and Russian Gas: The origins and evolution of Gazprom’s export strategy, (Oxford: 
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 1999).  
432 Gazprom cut gas supply to Ukraine completely from 1st to 4th January, 2006; by a quarter on 3rd March 
2008; and also from 1st to 19th January 2009. For a detailed history of the dispute and impact on Europe, see 
Stern, J., The Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis of January 2006, at 
http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/comment_0106.pdf January 16 2006; Pirani, S. (Ed.), Russian and CIS 
Gas Markets and their impact on Europe, 2009 and Pirani, S. et’al, The Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute of 
January 2009: a comprehensive assessment, February, 2009 at http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/NG27.pdf   
433 The 9.6mtpa liquefaction plant, located in Prigorodnoye, was launched in February 2009, and it is the first 
Russian LNG plant. Sixty-five percent of its liquefaction capacity has been contracted to eight Japanese 
firms and the rest would be exported to Korea and United States through Mexico. 
434 Russia’s gas production could last for over forty-seven years, at the 2006 rate. Its proven gas reserve was 
27.2% of the global total as at January 1, 2008, according to EIA, International Energy Outlook 2008. 
435 At the end of 2006: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2007. 
436 Stern, J., Gas as a Transitional Fuel, Table 1, OEF, February 2008. 
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2.4 Conclusion 
Effort has been made here to show the role of LNG in global gas trade and how this 
has evolved over the past two decades, particularly in the Atlantic Basin. The above 
description of potential demand;437 infrastructure; legal and regulatory regimes for 
LNG indicate the willingness of governments to secure future energy supply through 
LNG.438 While market and regulatory reforms is attracting more import 
infrastructure, it may require something more to attract sufficient LNG cargoes – 
higher prices439 or change in pricing regime. Besides until emerging climate change 
policy objectives are realised, all forms of gas would be needed globally.  
 
A relevant issue, therefore, is the extent to which Middle East and African gas 
producers could be relied upon for guaranteed supply. How certain can one expect 
simultaneous gas supplies from MENA to the Atlantic Basin, Asia Pacific and 
neighbouring MENA countries. In this regard, an attempt has also been made to 
highlight the complex internal and geopolitical exigencies that could arise. Although, 
LNG import is becoming widespread, it is also important to note the potential risks 
inherent in underutilized terminals. Because most of them – especially in East 
Coast United States - operate below installed capacity, there are serious economic 
and regulatory implications.  
 
This, however, does not demean the fact that terminal owners could engage in and 
benefit from arbitrage. Rather, they offer exporters negotiating leverage440 or 
incentive to defend falling prices by colluding. Perhaps, it will not be very difficult to 
imagine that UP or VC will be workable in these markets if:  
 no other significant incremental pipeline supplies will be available to these 
markets and/or  
 LNG becomes a much more important part of total gas demand, probably at 
least 20-25% 
 
                                                 
437 Despite the short term surplus created by the 2009 global economic crises. 
438 Mainly to increase LNG imports, in addition to new pipelines and renewal energy projects. 
439 Ceteris paribus – but, if a significant fall in demand occurs in many importing regions this may not be the 
case. 
440 That is when the demand for natural gas or LNG is high in some major importing markets. 
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Conclusively, the above discourse shows the potential influence that LNG exporters 
could assert on gas trade. Sometimes, the entry of large scale LNG into the UK and 
US markets affects441 the NBP and HH respectively.442 However, it is notable that 
most Atlantic Basin importers (apart from Spain) are mainly pipeline gas markets. 
And because LNG contributes only a small percentage of total gas supplies, 
pipeline gas sets the price.  
 
So, unless the situation changes significantly – in the foreseeable future – an 
exogenous effort443 may be required for the potential power to materialize. 
Meanwhile, this chapter has revealed countries that are essential for an LNG export 
organization to wield such price influence or market power. In addition, it has 
rationalized the choice of importing and exporting countries within Atlantic Basin - 
chosen for the purpose of manageability and detailed analyses. To fully set the 
background of this work, the next Chapter considers the principles that underlie 
pricing in international gas trade.  
                                                 
441 Though partially. So far, no research has been undertaken to determine the extent to which LNG imports 
affects the HH and NBP prices. 
442 Fesharaki, F., Asian, global LNG markets in transition are defining future, in Vol. 4,  Issue 3, Oil and Gas 
Journal, July 01, 2007. 
443 Perhaps, a collective action by LNG exporters to influence LNG prices or the principles of price 
determination 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
PRICING IN INTERNATIONAL GAS TRADE 
 
3.0 Background 
Price has remained a central issue since the emergence of gas as an important 
energy source. Whether gas is for domestic or international trade, the primary 
issues of price, politics and profitability are intrinsically intertwined.444 Like Chapter 
Two, this chapter contributes in setting the scene of the book as it describes pricing 
in international gas trade445. Divided into 3 parts, section 3.1 captures the 
underlying theoretical basis of price determination. Section 3.2 briefly traces the 
evolution of cross border gas pricing concepts and details the different pricing 
regimes for international gas trade. Relying on the theoretical foundations of 
sections 3.1.and 3.2, a uniform pricing concept for Atlantic Basin LNG trade is 
proposed (in section 3.3). 
 
3.1 Theoretical Framework 
Price may be defined as the instrument or mechanism for achieving efficiency 
(allocative and/or productive) as market signals are transmitted in the course of 
trade446. In different markets447, price mechanism functions differently as players 
interact. Because most energy yielding resources are non-renewable, strategic and 
political in nature448, they are priced in a distinct manner. Also, they have other 
characteristics, peculiar to their use and industry, which fundamentally determine 
how they are priced. For petroleum (both oil and gas): 
o    Production, generally, involves a producer449 and the resource owner450 
(private or state) 
o Investments are very large and may also be risky (due to asset specificity 
along the value chain) 
                                                 
444Victor, D.G; et’al, Natural Gas and Geopolitics: from 1970 to 2040, P.8, (2006)  
445 That is, trans-border upstream/wholesale gas price. Downstream (domestic) gas prices are not discussed 
but mentioned only where necessary. Gas refers to both Pipeline and Liquefied Natural Gas (unless 
when explicitly distinguished). Natural Gas simply means Pipeline gas. 
446 Exchange of goods and services in an economy (domestic or global) 
447 Markets are variously classified as perfectly competitive; monopolistic; duopolistic or oligopolistic. 
448 Market imperfections occur due to externalities and lack of information arising from these characteristics. 
449 This could be an IOC, NOC, Joint Venture or an Agent of the Resource Owner. 
450 Negotiating and collaborating to make investment and production decisions. 
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o Demand is mostly inelastic and continually interacts with concentrated 
supply451 
Given their effects on price, all the above deserve extensive consideration. 
However, for the purpose of this research, the exhaustible, physical and investment 
characteristics are emphasized - they are more relevant to the theory and principles 
gas pricing discussed in the next section. 
 
3.1.1 Basic Theories of Price Determination 
Dasgupta452 defined natural resource price in terms of ground rent453 and cost454 
while assuming a competitive market, as: qt = pn (1+r)t-n + ct Where: qt is price in 
time t; pn (1+r)t-n is the ground rent (pn) compounded at interest rate ‘r’ over the 
period (t-n)455 and ct is the cost in time t. According to Dasgupta, the ground rent on 
a resource is inversely related to the amount of deposits456 available, while cost is a 
function of available technology457. His hypothesis regards available deposits as the 
key measure of resource abundance/scarcity, but this is not always the case. It can, 
therefore, be described as narrow and insufficient for determining natural resource 
price in international trade.458   
 
However, the theoretical background for understanding non-renewable natural 
resource pricing hinges on the concepts of rent459. One of such is the Ricardian rent 
concept, named after David Ricardo. It relates to production cost differentials460 
which indirectly benefit producers. Such differential rent, due to site quality and 
location, relative to market, is called Ricardian rent461 (indicated as the area PrOP in 
                                                 
451 Petroleum reserves are mainly concentrated in a few countries around the globe.  
452 Dasgupta, P., Natural Resources in an age of substitutability in Kneese, A., and Sweeney, J., (Ed) 
Handbook of Natural Resource and Energy Economics, Vol. III, 1993.  
453 Ground rent or royalty is the appreciative value of a natural resource deposit underground. 
454 This includes the various costs along the supply chain. 
455 In other words, it is the rate at which a natural resource deposit appreciates underground over time from 
period ‘n’ to period ‘t’. 
456 That is large deposit (resource abundance) equals small ground rent and vice versa, while holding demand 
(present and future) and available substitutes constant.  
457 Technology is dependent on innovation from Research and Development. 
458 One is appreciative of the fact that a few pertinent issues have been highlighted.  
459 It is also called Economic Rent; Resource Rent; Ground Rent or Producer Rent. 
460 Costs vary across production fields, based on nature of the resource, size, geology and location relative to 
the market, within a country and across national boundaries. 
461 This term is derived from David Ricardo’s work on Labour, Land and Rent. Ricardo, D., Principles of 
Political Economy and Taxation, 2001.  
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Figure 3.1). Through technological developments, production and transportation 
costs fall and consequently, differential rents as producers compete for market 
share. In respect of price determination, the resource owner (producer) may choose 
to earn part or all of the rent. The Ricardian rent underlies the cost-plus462 price 
mechanism applied in gas trade. 
 
Figure 3.1: Non-renewable Petroleum Resource Pricing463 
 
 
The second concept of pricing, linked to the nature of petroleum markets, is called 
super-normal rent or profit.464 Supply in petroleum markets consistently lags 
demand.465 The gap PM2-PM1 in Figure 3.1 could be demand-driven or due to 
inadequate investments or the existence of market power – this explains why 
producers obtain super-normal profits.466 So, super-normal or scarcity rent is 
                                                 
462 This pricing principle is described fully in section 3.1.2 below. 
463 Extracted and modified from Energy Charter Secretariat, Putting a price on Energy, March 2007.  
464 Stevens, P., Introduction to the economics of energy, in Stevens, P. (Ed.) Energy Economics, Vol. 1, 
2000.  
465 That is the gap PM2-PM1 in Figure 3.1. This gap could also arise from the long lead time of petroleum 
projects. 
466 When market power is exercised, in the form of constrained supply, monopoly rent is created – captured 
in the rectangle PrPh in Figure 3.1. This rent could also be due to indivisibility of capital - but this leads to a 
cyclic process of high-low prices 
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generated as the market competes for constrained supply467 or pays prices above 
the resource owner’s marginal cost (shown as the area PhOOPr in Figure 3.1 
above).  
 
Arguably, the existence of super-normal profit set the conceptual framework for 
pricing energy resources based on replacement value - netback pricing.468 While 
the logic of scarcity-induced rent seems clear, the need to consider the opportunity 
cost of currently produced reserves is often ignored. The price of an exhaustible 
resource can have a number of components. These include:  
Marginal Cost + resource rent469 + correction for external costs470 + rent (due 
to monopoly or other market distortions). Normally, a private supplier will not 
consider the social costs and so exclude external costs. But all of these will show 
up in the surplus – so, suggesting that the scarcity rent captures the super normal 
profit is misleading.   
 
Some proponents of Hotelling have also termed this concept of super-normal profit 
“Hotelling rent”471 Attempting to resolve Hotelling’s work, Sweeney reiterates that it 
is logical, but “its rigid cost assumptions make the case less useful than more 
general cases for explaining or predicting depletable resource markets”472. In this 
author’s opinion, the existence of supernormal profit does not follow from Hotelling’s 
postulations. Moreover, his work is based on the finiteness of petroleum resources - 
part of a debate that would continue for some time.473  
                                                 
467 The super-normal profit that results from constrained supply or market power is a temporary phenomenon 
but this action is perceived by market participants as persistent.  
468 This method of price determination is extensively described in section 3.1.2 below.  
469 As argued in Hotelling’s Theorem. 
470 That is externalities - due to environmental, security and other considerations. 
471 Harold Hotelling had argued that resource-rich nations aim to optimize the benefits accruable from their 
resources by discounting future revenues based on interest rates that reflect government’s expectation. His 
theorem posits that the interest rate determines the annual revenue as an exhaustible resource is exploited and 
the resultant price path makes a backstop technology an economic substitute. For more on this, see Hotelling, 
H., The Economics of Exhaustible resources, Vol. 39, No. 2, The Journal of political Economy, 1931; and 
Minnitt, R., Frontiers of usefulness: the economics of exhaustible resources, Vol. 107, The Journal of 
Southern African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy, August 2007. 
472 Sweeney, J., Economic theory of depletable resources: An introduction, in Kneese, A., and Sweeney, J., 
(Ed) Handbook of Natural Resource and Energy Economics, Vol. III, 1993. 
473 Petroleum (Resource) Economists are heavily divided over what constitutes proven reserves and the peak 
oil discourse. Some align with geologists, who generally agree, on the finiteness of proven natural resources. 
While others assert that proven reserves are dynamic and would continue to change due to technological 
innovation, cost and price.  
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Meanwhile, Tilton disputes the notion of Hotelling or scarcity rent but rather refers to 
it as user costs because they are not true economic rents. According to him, User 
Costs “are the present value of the lost future profits associated with a unit increase 
in current production”.474 So, they arise (as Figure 3.2 shows) from producing 
quantity ‘0A’ rather than ‘0Q’. Furthermore, one can deduce from Figure 3.2 that 
User Costs do not appear to be a super-normal profit if market price is competitively 
determined.  
 
  Figure 3.2 Market price and Resource Owner’s User Costs475 
 
 
Taken together, the Ricardian rent and user cost (super-normal rent) make up the 
economic rent or resource rent or depletion premium of a natural resource. This 
rent has been the basis for gas price determination in both domestic and 
international trade.476 In real life, as a natural resource is commoditized, the 
determinants of resource rent vary as demand interacts with supply.  
 
So, there is no agreement, amongst economists, on how the rent is generated – 
either driven by demand or due to constrained supply. Rather, stakeholders’ 
perspective affects how this rent477 is defined and earned through pricing principles. 
Then, what principles underlie pricing in international gas trade? 
 
                                                 
474 Tilton, J., On borrowed time? Assessing the threat of mineral depletion, 2003.  
475 Tilton, J., On borrowed time? Assessing the threat of mineral depletion, 2003 
476 This is not to imply that commercial participants started with Ricardo or Super-normal rent and decided 
how to price gas. Rather, it is the nature and evolution of the markets; geological investment and profits that 
have defined gas pricing. 
477 Or the component parts of the rent. 
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3.1.2 Pricing Principles478 in International Gas Trade  
Against the above theoretical background some principles of pricing in international 
gas trade have evolved – Cost-plus479 and replacement value (applied in the 
Groningen and Netback mechanisms). This sub-section rigorously documents their 
development up to the three current regimes - Hub based spot pricing (NBP and 
Henry Hub); oil product indexed netback market pricing (common in Continental 
Europe); and crude oil linked pricing (common in the Pacific Basin480). Other views 
and perspectives on these principles, in the literature, are also captured. 
 
3.1.2.1 Cost-plus 
This principle determines gas prices by adding a margin481 on the cost of 
production482. Cost-plus mechanism was commonly used for pricing domestically 
produced gas sold to domestic utilities before the EU Gas Directive in 1998. Pricing 
in domestic gas markets is, however, not addressed in this book due to its intricate 
nature. When adopted in regional gas trade, it is referred to as subsidized export 
pricing. In such instances, gas is exported based on domestic price(s) within the 
exporting country.  
 
The theoretical interpretation, in this case, is that the exporter indirectly shares the 
super-normal rent with the importer. This is typical of economically 
integrating/integrated regions like in West Africa’s Gas Pipeline project483. Why 
would a producer adopt such a pricing regime for export? As long as the producer 
recovers its costs and some return on its investment, it is willing to sell gas that may 
not have any other use elsewhere. So, when the producer wants to develop a gas 
market or is interested in penetrating a market, this can be the pricing policy.  
 
                                                 
478 These are basic economic principles or arguments that underlie price determination in gas sales contracts. 
479 Cost plus pricing, was used predominantly in regulated national gas markets but more recent application 
of its principles is discussed in section 3.1.2.1.   
480 A detailed history of LNG pricing in the Asia-Pacific region is avoided here because it would be a huge 
task and the book is about the Atlantic Basin. But as LNG trade and pricing evolves, the Pacific has become 
the driving force and cannot be ignored. Its pivotal role in the determination of LNG prices currently is fully 
taken into consideration in Chapter Six.   
481 Producer premium (Ricardian rent) based on a fixed percentage or average cost of production. 
482 At the well head or further down the LNG supply chain (that is after regasification – see Table 3.1 below). 
483 Some participating countries (Togo and Benin Republic) decided to forego their right to charge transit 
fees. It is important to note, however, that this is a very rare phenomenon. 
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This principle was commonly used in integrated LNG projects because Capital 
Expenditures (CAPEX) along the value chain is very high. For clarity, an illustration 
with Table 3.1 indicates the usefulness of this principle for pricing purposes. 
 
Table 3.1 Cost-Plus pricing in an integrated LNG Project484 
                                                      CAPEX485                    Cost-Plus 
Development Gas Field486               $2.6Bn                          $1.60487 
Liquefaction                                    $3.2Bn                          $2.44 
Tankers488                                        $3.2Bn                          $1.96 
Regasification                                $1.0Bn                           $0.78 
Total                                              $10Bn                            $6.78489 
 
The above process of price determination is, however, no longer common but the 
underlying principle is sometimes applied within the unbundled LNG chain. Now, 
the principles of cost-plus pricing are adopted in negotiating the fixed component in 
LNG pricing formula or for setting minimum export price. For instance, in a simple 
linear LNG price function, the fixed element should be sufficient to cover the cost of 
feed-gas, as well as, fulfill debt service obligations – which are operational costs.490 
This leads us to the second principle of pricing in international gas trade – 
replacement value.   
 
3.1.2.2 Replacement value 
Replacement value mechanism assumes that the price of a substitute is a measure 
of a commodity’s value. The price of gas, at a consumption point491, is therefore, 
equal to the price of an alternative fuel at the same point. This approach assumes 
                                                 
484 Modified extract from Jensen, J., The Development of a Global LNG Market – Is it likely? If so when? 
2004  
485 Capital Expenditure (of $10Bn) is allocated as follows: 58% on development of gas field and 
Liquefaction infrastructure; 32% on ten LNG Vessels (at $320Mn each) and 10% on Regasification plants.   
486 Greenfield development of around 280billion M3 of gas reserves to serve as feedstock for a twenty-year 
LNG export contract.  
487 2007 data reveals that, for a cross-section of LNG exporting countries, domestic gas prices ranged from 
$0.75 to $2.60 /mmBtu. For those with fairly robust gas industries, $1.60/mmBtu was the standard feedstock 
cost in that year.  
488 Assume that the vessels would cover a distance of 2,400 Nautical Miles. 
489 This is a description of price on the basis of costs and a reasonable profit on investment - sometimes 
referred to as Cost-of-Service.  
490 A detailed description of LNG pricing is presented in section 3.2 below. 
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that consumers should pay an amount equivalent to the price of alternative fuels. 
While the price of substitutes may not be an efficient measure, the main purpose of 
using this method was to ensure penetration of gas in consuming markets. 
Perhaps, with the globalisation of gas trade, this issue of efficiency has become 
very pertinent and needs to be addressed. Like the cost-plus, the replacement 
value principle is applied in both domestic and international gas trade. It underlies 
the netback pricing method in cross-border gas trade in Europe.492  
 
Figure 3.3 Cost plus versus replacement value493 
 
  
But, neither cost-plus nor replacement value approach significantly considers the 
exhaustible nature (User costs) of the energy resource. Rather, as Figure 3.3 
illustrates, “the difference between the netback value and the cost plus value 
constitutes a rent that is shared among exporters and importers”.494 And, this 
negotiable rent is strategically split495 based on bargaining power - derivable mainly 
from the prevailing market situation.  
For natural gas, the case is more complex because it lacks a captive market496 - but 
is becoming a global commodity. Gas has to compete with alternative fuels for all its 
                                                                                                                                                                  
491 Depending on its use, but usually at the burner tip, in a particular sector, location or importing country. 
492 The netback method is rarely (or indirectly) used for pricing gas in the domestic market. 
493 Dorigoni, S. and Portatadino, S., LNG development across Europe: Infrastructure and regulatory 
analysis, in Vol. 36, Energy Policy, 2008. 
494 Jensen, J., The Development of a Global LNG Market – Is it likely? If so when? 2004. 
495 The mechanism for sharing the rent varies and depends on the parties involved; terms of trade; mode of 
transportation; trade relations and other non-economic factors. 
496 Captive market in the sense that crude oil products are the predominant transportation fuels. 
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end-uses and it cannot risk being overpriced. This fundamental issue – 
substitutability – has made the pricing of natural gas persistently ambiguous. So, 
there are at least two perspectives to the allocation of consumer and producer 
surpluses through the price mechanism. Given substitutability, gas importers argue, 
the price of gas has to be sufficiently low as to make it relatively competitive497 in 
each usage. Therefore, they adopt several approaches to bring down the 
replacement value (price of substitute fuels) - through regulatory policies, 
environmental policies, as well as, domestic pricing policies.498  
 
But, the price has to be, simultaneously, high enough to attract investments, as well 
as, provide investors/producers with some profit. Hence, exporters (gas producers) 
endeavour to push up the minimum price (in Figure 3.1) or the opportunity cost of 
gas through alternative gas utilization projects.499 Their ability to do this has been 
constrained by unbundling of the LNG chain. The latter condition has given rise to 
what may be termed exporters’ dilemma. Consequently, exporters have argued for 
the pricing of natural resources on the basis of energy content.  
 
While, the importers’ argument seems logical, it is inconclusive and deficient in 
cross border trade, because energy fuels vary - in terms of source, nature 
(exhaustible/renewable), strategic importance (geopolitical or commercial). While 
each perspective could ensure the setting of a theoretical price floor or cap (as 
depicted in Figure 3.1), it is notable that none clearly identifies how resultant rents 
would be shared. Rather, the perspectives underscore price regimes used in 
international gas trade at different periods. Some of these regimes are discussed 
below. 
 
Netback mechanism is an application of the replacement value principle500. In 
other words, netback pricing method deducts transportation (and any other agreed) 
cost from the price of an alternative fuel in the consuming market, to get the 
                                                 
497 So as to remain the preferred fuel or displace substitutes.  
498 Otherwise, they impose taxes as a means of getting more rent and making gas less competitive. Some 
economists have argued, however, that such taxes are redistributed income rather than wealth transfer. 
499 The opportunity cost of natural gas in each exporting country significantly determines the price (or cost-
plus value) of feedstock supply for any LNG project. 
500 It is sometimes considered another term for or a variant of the replacement value mechanism.  
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netback value, at a chosen point along the supply chain (usually upstream501). 
Depending on the agreed units - USD per mmBtu or p/therm - this may be 
computed as follows:  
Netback market Value (Border/City Gate) = Replacement Value502 - costs503 - 
taxes504 
Netback Value (import border/regasification terminal/wellhead =  
Net back Value (Border/City Gate) - costs505 - taxes 
Alternatively, the discounted netback value could be computed by for a whole gas 
project:  
NETBACK506ex-(ship/liquefaction/pipeline/wellhead)  = 
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Where: ‘r’ is the discount rate 
P is the Price of Natural Gas (weighted average of close substitute 
like coal, heavy fuel oil, light fuel oil, gas oil) 
V is the volume of gas delivered in years -‘t’ (from 1 to n) 
C is the Capital (fixed) Cost relating to element(s) of the chain in years 
-‘t’ (from 1 to n)  
O is the Operating Cost relating to the exact/all element(s) of the 
chain in years -‘t’ (from 1 to n) 
 
From the above formula, the Netback value for any gas project is highly sensitive to 
the price of substitute fuels; volume of gas delivered, as well as, delivery cost. Due 
to boil-off and other transportation losses, therefore, the Volume Vex-ship < Vex-
liquefaction < Vex-pipeline < Vex-wellhead, in the denominator varies at every stage of 
calculating the netback.  
                                                 
501 Depending on the mode of transportation, it could be at the liquefaction or delivery point. 
502 Rather than using one substitute, a weighted average of substitutes is used generally. 
503 To include: storage, load managing and distribution costs for bringing gas from the hub/city gate to 
consumers. 
504 This should include distribution, consumption and environmental taxes. 
505 To include: storage and transportation costs from the import/liquefaction terminal/wellhead to the hub/city 
gate. 
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The effect of distance on price is depicted below. 
Figure 3.4 Illustration of netback price from different destinations507 
 
 
Destination restriction clause, an integral part of the netback (replacement value) 
mechanism, ensured that imported gas could not be delivered elsewhere.508 As part 
of gas contracts, it also enabled exporters to restrain importers from diverting or 
reselling gas imports (arbitrage) since different prices were offered to different 
markets.  
 
Netback pricing mechanism has remained contentious, among economists, 
because potential buyers and sellers are always keen on the prospect of capturing 
substantial economic rents (mainly at each other’s expense). Questioning the 
economic efficiency of the netback value of gas, Siddayao argues that the netback 
approach is a useful but economically inefficient tool for determining the value of 
natural gas.509 Mashayekhi and Julius followed the discourse and argued that 
netback “is a poor yardstick for pricing in most cases”.510 In their opinion, one of the 
“factors provoking controversy is the chain of transfer points that separates the first 
producer from the final purchaser/consumer”511.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
506 Julius, D and Mashayekhi, A., The economics of natural gas: pricing, planning and policy, p.85, 1990 
507  Konoplyanik, A., Putting a Price on Energy: International Pricing Mechanisms for Oil and Gas, with 
special emphasis on Russia-EU-CIS Gas Relations. Presentation at CEPMLP Thursday Speaker Series 
Seminar, University of Dundee, October 2007.  
508 The application of destination and use restriction clauses has been deemed illegal under competition law. 
509 Siddayao, C.M., Is the netback value of gas economically efficient? OPEC Review, September 1997. 
Siddayao focused on domestic and regional pipeline gas markets. Besides, a great deal has happened since 
1997.  
510 Julius, D and Mashayekhi, A., The economics of natural gas: pricing, planning and policy, 1990. 
511 Julius, D and Mashayekhi, A., The economics of natural gas: pricing, planning and policy, 1990. 
From 
Gas 
Exporter 
A 
B 
D 
E 
C 
PB ≈ PC ≈ PD ≈ PE                              (gas prices at points B, C, D and E)  
AB < AC < AD < AE  (relative Distance from point A to B, C, D, E) 
PA►B < PA►C < PA►D < PA►E  (export prices from A to points B, C, D and E) 
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The International Energy Agency (IEA) maintains that it works to the extent that the 
prices of alternative fuels (replacement values) are undistorted and competitively 
determined.512 While this assertion may be true, it is highly uncertain. Besides, 
some gas exporters have argued, against the netback mechanism, for another 
pricing method termed parity.513 In their view, the “fair pricing of natural gas must be 
based on the parity of gas and oil fob”514 because they are complementary 
products. Based on an upstream to downstream approach, they assert that gas 
transportation and regasification cost should be borne by the importer.515  
 
In his paper, Percebois describes both arguments516 as inconsistent and attempts 
to reconcile them. According to him, the eventual contract price is a function of the 
prevalent bargaining power at the time of contracting and there are four possible 
solutions: 
o Parity at the wellhead517 
o Parity of fob or prices518 
o Parity of CIF prices519 
o Parity at the final use…when there is excess supply520      
 
Despite the above postulation, the netback mechanism has remained relevant 
(dominant in Continental Europe) and there are now several methods521 for 
calculating gas netbacks.  
 
                                                 
512 IEA, South American Gas Prices, Energy Prices and Taxes, 4th Quarter, 2003 
513 This pricing method has been covered sufficiently in the literature.  
514 Percebois, J. Gas market prospects and relationship with oil prices. Vol. 14, No.4, Energy Policy, August, 
1986. 
515 Instead of being deducted from the end-user price in the replacement value mechanism. 
516That is the Netback and Parity pricing arguments. 
517 A likely solution if there is excess gas demand in the market. 
518 This is possible if exporters have a stronger bargaining position. 
519 A possible outcome if both exporting and importing countries have almost the same bargaining position. 
520 Percebois, J. Gas market prospects and relationship with oil prices. Vol.14, No.4, Energy Policy, August, 
1986. 
521 Some of these methods/formulas are described in section 3.2 below. 
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3.1.2.3 Groningen522 price mechanism 
The Dutch Groningen gas policy was one of the first applications of the pricing 
principles described above. The regime captures David Ricardo’s notion of 
distance-related cost differential, as well as, the replacement value argument. 
Developed in 1962 by De Pous,523 for domestic commercialization of Groningen gas 
fields in the Netherlands, it became a model for long term gas export contracts in 
Europe. The Groningen mechanism was developed initially for pipeline gas trade to 
enable concession holders and other investors recoup their huge capital outlay. And 
so contracts were designed to capture the highest price obtainable in the market524. 
It was also aimed at optimising revenue for the Dutch government.  
 
Over the years, while maintaining its basic elements525, the Groningen pricing 
mechanism has evolved in international gas trade. Most natural gas imports into 
Europe from the Former Soviet Union (FSU)526 applied the Groningen mechanism. 
Various market-driven changes have consistently propelled the extension and 
application of the Groningen principles in international gas trade. It now 
incorporates indexation without destination/use restriction clauses (but subject to 
periodic review).  
 
In North America, before deregulation, consumers pushed for and enjoyed the cost-
of-service pricing – transportation/end-user concept. Also, during the same period, 
producers wanted ‘Netback’, as against “wellhead pricing”527 to enable them retain 
some economic rent. Deregulation of gas markets in 1978528 led to gas-to-gas 
competition and consequently netback – “basis pricing” off Henry Hub529.  
 
3.1.2.4 Oil product-indexed netback pricing 
Oil product-indexed netback pricing, like the Groningen formula, also applies 
replacement value principle (netback pricing). As the name indicates, it also 
                                                 
522 Premier gas field developed for exports in the Netherlands. 
523 Then, Dutch Minister for Economic Affairs, in his Note to Parliament. 
524 This, however, depends on the chosen alternative. 
525 That is the replacement value concept and cost differentials. 
526 This includes Russian exports before, during and post Cold War Soviet era. 
527 According to the type of gas, different kinds of regulated wellhead price regimes were applied by 
regulators then.  
528 Jensen, T. J., US reliance on International Liquefied Natural Gas Supply, February 2004. 
529 Distinct from Europe’s alternative fuels (rather than gas as in the UK – NBP)  
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incorporates the process of indexation. This mechanism, commonly applied in long 
term gas contracts, enables price to change530, along with market fundamentals, 
without the need for random price renegotiation. “A price indexation formula, 
incorporating a pass through factor, ensures that gas maintains its competitiveness 
in the end-use market.”531  
 
Irrespective of the basis of indexation532, an indexed-netback price, fundamentally, 
incorporates two factors – the base price and the index price. In functional terms, it 
is generally stated as:  
Pn = Pb + Pi     or    Pn = Pb x (Pi).  
Where, Pn, Pb and Pi are respectively, Netback, Base and Index Prices. However, 
the index element Pi is a function of the following variables: price of substitute fuel; 
replacement value; method and coefficient of indexation.533 
 
Specifically, the base element534 splits the price risk between producers and buyers. 
It essentially avails the producer/exporter sufficient revenue to service their project 
debts535, while allowing the buyer to make profit after reselling or using the 
commodity. The index price, on the other hand, links gas to alternative fuel(s), 
through a defined indexation formula/coefficient. The coefficient of indexation and 
lag process integrates market dynamics into the contract pricing structure, while 
smoothening out the effects of such changes. 
 
When crude oil derivatives form the basis for the indexation and netback value of 
gas, the process is termed oil product-indexed netback pricing. Following the 
acceptance of the Groningen pricing principle, in Continental Europe, it was logical 
                                                 
530 Change, however, is a function of the coefficient of indexation, as well as, change in the replacement 
value, lag period and escalation process (discussed below). 
531 Aissaoui, A., Lower gas prices: Have producers got the right signals? OIES, Oxford Energy Comment, 
March 1999 at http://www.oxfordenergy.org/comment.php?9903  
532 That is, the price of alternative fuels or end-product used to determine the replacement/netback value. 
533 Depending on the functional relationship between gas and the alternative fuel(s) the indexation method 
could be direct, indirect and/or lagged. The coefficient of indexation, on the other hand, determines the 
degree to which changes in the price(s) of alternative fuel(s) affect gas price.  
534 Negotiated sometimes or derivable from average production cost or replacement value within the supply 
area. 
535 And perhaps, provide an opportunity to earn some rent.  
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to use domestic and industrial fuels536 as references for determining the 
replacement value of gas. Because gas was indeed replacing the existing fuels – 
principally oil products – in those markets, oil product-based indices became the 
norm. Oil product-indexed netback pricing formulas537 are, typically, of the form: 
 Pn = P0 +A x CF1 x PTF1 x (Gn-G0) + B x CF2 x PTF2 x (LFn-LF0) +  
C x CF3 x PTF3 x (HFn-HF0)…………………………Additive Formula 
OR 
Pn = P0 x [A x Gn/G0 + B x LFn/LF0 + C x HFn/HF0]….Multiplicative Formula 
 Where: 
 Pn = new price of gas  
P0 = Base price of gas         
Gn and G0 = current and old prices, respectively, of Liquefied Petroleum Gas 
LFn and LF0 = current and old prices of Light Fuel Oil respectively 
HFn and HF0 = current and old prices of Heavy Fuel Oil respectively 
A, B and C are coefficients/pass through factors that determine the effects of the 
different indices (CF1; PTF1; CF2; PTF2; CF3; PTF3)538 based on negotiated weights 
 
Contracts with variants of oil-product linked pricing dominate European long term 
gas imports539 by pipeline and liquefied natural gas.540 What oil product indexation 
does is to ensure that gas prices remain lower (and in the same usage) relative to 
oil product prices. Furthermore, its smoothening effects minimize price volatility541 
(or risk) - which arguably discourages investment. This smoothening effect is 
possible because the oil (products) market is very liquid and not open to 
manipulation. However, some degree of volatility is required to generate arbitrage, 
attract traders and therefore liquidity to gas markets. Besides, the timing and nature 
                                                 
536 Then the main fuels were oil products – Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO), Light Fuel Oil (LFO) or Gas Oil, Liquid 
Petroleum Gas (LPG), - and coal. 
537 Pricing formulas are either additive, multiplicative or a combination of both.  
538 The values attached to these variables depend on the agreed escalation method, frequency of price 
recalculation and alternative fuels. For example, a 6-0-3 time lagged price escalation implies that the gas 
price would be based on the 6-month average price of the alternative(s), with a zero lag and rolled over every 
3 months.   
539 EC, DG Competition Report on Energy Sector Inquiry, SEC (2006) 1724, 10 January, 2007 
540 Examples of oil-product-based LNG pricing formulas are shown in section 3.2. 
541 Some degree of volatility, however, is required to generate arbitrage and attract investments (traders) to 
the market. Despite this economic fact, the timing and nature of such investments are more important given 
the peculiar imperfections of gas markets.  
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of such gas investments are more important given the peculiar imperfections of gas 
markets. 
 
Despite these advantages, contract negotiations involve huge transaction costs and 
yet the process leaves room for price disputes or renegotiation as market 
fundamentals create the need to realign weights or pass through factors. The 
mechanism, also, does not transmit short term gas market signals542 as they occur. 
Consequently, the rationale behind the continued usage of oil-product indexed 
pricing has been questioned (especially in Europe). While economists disagree on a 
better alternative to oil-product indexation, it is generally acknowledged that gas 
prices are influenced by oil. The question however is: how are they influenced and 
how strongly would they be correlated without formal contractual linkage? Similarly, 
it has also been argued that gas is not only used for power generation, and so 
power-sector-based alternative fuels should not be the basis for price 
determination.  
 
The latter argument could be tenable with the globalization of gas trade. This is 
particularly so in a situation where destination restriction clauses are impracticable 
or deemed illegal. Conversely, power generators believe that alternative power 
generation fuels should be the basis for price determination. But at present very 
little power is generated from oil products and coal/power prices play only a very 
small role in setting the base price and the index for gas (as Figure 3.3 depicts). 
Some research543 have been undertaken to further justify the argument against oil-
product linked pricing.   
 
In a major study on this issue, Stern544 emphasized the need for a shift to gas-on-
gas competition through gas hub-based pricing. Drawing from studies by Foss545 
and Wright546, Stern posits that: “Moving (from oil-products) to gas-indexed prices 
                                                 
542 It is worth noting, however, that the lead time for gas projects do not permit reasonable supply-side 
response to transient/short-term price signals. 
543 Some of such efforts are captured here but a more detailed review may be found in Stern, J. Will gas price 
naturally follow oil prices in the absence of a formal index? 
544 Stern, J., Is there a rationale for the continuing link to oil product prices in Continental European long-
term gas contracts? at http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/NG19.pdf  
545 Foss, M., United States Natural Gas Prices to 2015, at http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/NG18.pdf 
546 Wright, P. Gas Prices in the UK: Markets and Insecurity of Supply. 2006. 
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need not necessarily exclude a mechanism to moderate volatility by adopting a 
price reference period of several months, just as in current long-term Continental 
European contracts. The difference would be that the reference period would 
average spot gas prices, rather than oil product prices, over a period of weeks or 
months.”547  
 
The EU’s Energy Sector Inquiry Report548, presents a neutral view. It asserts that, 
over the period reviewed, “on a volume-weighted basis, there is no clear 
commercial advantage either way” - oil or gas based indexation.549 Focusing on the 
US (North America) gas market, Brown and Yucel conclude that in addition to a 
stable long term relationship, a complex short run link exists between oil and gas 
prices. In their opinion, furthermore, the continuum of market relationships, between 
oil and gas prices, is probably the consequence of more intricate market forces.550 
 
Jensen explains that contracting through oil-linked price indexation places a volume 
risk on the importer551 but in a gas-based pricing scenario, the buyer is still able to 
resell at the purchase price.552 Jensen concludes that the move from oil-linked price 
indexation to competitive gas-based pricing shifts more of the market risk upstream 
to the producer/exporter.553 This leads to the next pricing regime: Hub-based spot 
pricing.      
 
3.1.2.5 Hub based spot pricing: NBP and Henry Hub  
Restructuring of the US gas industry generated fundamental price changes in the 
North American (especially Canadian554) gas industry. Gas trade became more 
                                                 
547 Stern, J., Will gas price naturally follow oil prices in the absence of a formal index?  
548 Which reflects different stakeholders’ views on the issue 
549 DG Comp Energy Sector Inquiry Preliminary Report February 2006. 
550 Brown, S.P.A. and Yucel, M.K., What drives natural gas prices? The Energy Journal, Vol. 29, No.2, 
2008.  
551 Irrespective of the prevailing price (domestic or regional), whether it is profitable to resell or use, once 
contracted, the volume of gas must be taken.  
552 Provided the market is liquid enough to allow the importer to resell with an infinitesimal impact on the 
market price. This has not been the case in the UK, where imports have had very strong impact on UK prices 
from the time of interconnection with the Continent and have caused the UK to “import” oil linked prices. 
553 Jensen, J., U.S. Reliance on International Liquefied Natural Gas Supply, a Policy Paper prepared for the 
National Commission on Energy Policy, February, 2004 at http://www.jai-energy.com/pubs/natcomtx.pdf  
554 US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Order 380, of 1984, released local distribution 
companies (LDC) from their gas contract obligation and made the Canadian pricing system unsustainable. 
EIA, http://www.eia.doe.gov/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications/ngmajorleg/ferc380.html   
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transparent and involved competitive storage and transportation markets. With 
increased liquidity, therefore, the regional markets pooled resources from different 
production fields and trade developed around interconnected grids called hubs.  
 
A hub, essentially, integrates nodes from different locations through the law of one 
price and subsequently transmits market signals to other regions, as gas is traded. 
Gas hubs now provide other services like gas processing, storage and swap. A 
similar process of restructuring occurred in the UK with the unbundling of British 
Gas and establishment of a network operator. In the case of the UK, however, 
virtual trading occurs across the pipeline network and the market (hub) price is 
determined, when equilibrium is reached, at a notional balancing point (NBP).  
 
Figure 3.6555 North America Natural Gas Hubs  
 
 
Over the years, hub-based trading has developed considerably (as Figure 3.6 
shows) and the South Louisiana-based Henry Hub (HH) has emerged as the most 
liquid hub in the North America. Given the depth and volume of physical 
transactions that occur at the HH, its price is the basis556 for spot transactions in 
other hubs, as well as, the indexation557 of contracted gas imports in North America. 
                                                 
555 Park, H. et al; Price interactions and discovery among natural gas spot markets in North America, Energy 
Policy, Vol. 36, 2008. 
556 The Henry Hub price is usually the standard. 
557 This mechanism and the application of hub-based pricing in LNG trade are discussed extensively in 
section 3.2 below. 
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The other North American hubs are: AECO (Alberta); Malin (Oregon); Opal 
(Wyoming); Waha (Texas); Chicago (Illinois); Ellisburg-Leidy (ELL) in Pennsylvania; 
HH (Louisiana); and ONG (Oklahoma).  
 
Likewise, the UK’s NBP is the most competitive hub in Europe and its price 
determines LNG import prices into the UK. Furthermore, it serves as benchmark for 
other physical and exchange-based transactions on the Inter-Continental Exchange 
(ICE). As a result of UK’s linkage to Continental Europe558, the NBP influences 
prices in other hubs as gas is shipped and/or traded between Bacton and 
Zeebrugge559, across the pipeline and further on to Continental Europe. Conversely, 
long term oil-linked prices also influence NBP.560  
 
Figure 3.7 European Gas Hubs561 
 
 
Other hubs (shown in Figure 3.7) now exist across Europe but are yet to attain 
considerable level of liquidity and unable to generate competitive prices. They 
include: Italy’s Punto di Scambio Virtuale (PSV); the Netherlands’ Title Transfer 
Facility (TTF); Bunde-Oude at the Dutch-German border; and Points d’Echange de 
Gaz (PEG) located in France.  
                                                 
558 The UK imports and exports gas, through the bi-directional Interconnector (IUK) pipeline that runs from 
Bacton to Zeebrugge in Belgium; and also from Bacton (through the BBL) to Balzgand in the Netherland.   
559 So far, Zeebrugge is the most liquid and centrally located gas hub in Continental Europe.  Some 
researchers have argued, however, that it is indirectly an extension of NBP.  
560 The actual price movement observable, over time (annually), is a function of production, storage, demand 
and seasonal weather conditions in the UK and Continent Europe. 
EGL 
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Such a process of price determination, as in North America or the UK, is known as 
hub-based pricing. Hub-based pricing is fundamentally competitive and acts as a 
catalyst for geographic integration and maturity of gas markets. The process 
involves organized spot trading on an exchange (through cash settlements or 
financial instruments) for natural gas deliverable next day.562 Price, so determined, 
is subsequently applied in other spot and long term gas transactions (domestically, 
regionally or internationally). This price mechanism has developed from the 
competitive interaction of demand and supply, at a hub563 or across hubs as 
arbitrage occurs. Arbitrage-induced market interaction is common between the UK’s 
(NBP) and Belgium’s Zeebrugge (ZB).  
 
In the United States, through hub-based pricing, “the distinction between netback 
pricing and cost-of-service pricing has become blurred because of the highly 
competitive nature of the conventional gas supply offerings”.564 The basic distinction 
in Europe is between the UK – which works solely off NBP – and the rest of Europe 
where oil product-linked prices are dominant in long term gas contracts. For 
instance, future Qatari LNG supply to the UK would be based on the NBP. 
 
There are, inherently, three important risks (price, basis and manipulation) related 
to natural gas trading hubs. The first risk is manipulation – actual or suspected - by 
the dominant player(s). This is especially serious when the hub first starts trading 
and is a major reason why many of the hubs in Continental Europe have few 
transactions. The second is basis risk which results from changes in price 
differentials between hubs, as well as, between gas and other fuels. ‘Basis 
differential’ is the price difference between hubs. It, essentially, reflects the 
transportation cost from one hub to another, as well as, the market fundamentals in 
one hub relative to another. The basis differential may be influenced by various 
market factors (ranging from changes in the volume/quality of gas supply to the 
level of demand in a Hub). As liquidity increases in a hub, spot prices become more 
                                                                                                                                                                  
561 Source: Gas Matters, May 2005.  
562 Or some time in the future. 
563 This could be a physical or virtual location. 
564 Jensen, J., U.S. Reliance on International Liquefied Natural Gas Supply, Policy Paper prepared for the 
National Commission on Energy Policy, February, 2004 at http://www.jai-energy.com/pubs/natcomtx.pdf  
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volatile565 and consequently create uncertainty – price risk - in the market. 
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), “the move away from oil-linked 
price clauses in long-term contracts to contracts with gas-linked pricing poses a 
substantial challenge to gas sellers, reflecting the major changes in the 
marketplace.”566  
 
However, because NBP and HH prices are correlated567 to ICE and NYMEX traded 
futures568 respectively, market participants are able to hedge and diversify these 
risks. Furthermore, exchange-based financial transactions attract investment banks; 
trading firms; pension funds and institutional investors to gas trade569.  
 
Figure 3.9 Developmental Stages of Gas Pricing Regimes570 
 
 
Conclusively, as gas markets develop, different evolutionary price paths emerge (as 
Figure 3.9 indicates). It is worth emphasizing that each of the developmental stages 
                                                 
565 Mazighi A.E., Some risks related to the Short-Term Trading of Natural Gas, Page 233, Paragraph 2, 
OPEC Review; September 2004. 
566 IEA, Security of gas supply in open markets: LNG and Power at a turning point, 2004. 
567 Serletis, A. and Herbert J; The message in North America energy prices. Energy Economics, Volume 21, 
pp.471-483, 1999 
568 NYMEX natural gas futures contract is the most traded globally. 
569 It is important, however, to distinguish investment from speculative behaviour. The former is more 
desirable, most times, the latter. 
570 Konoplyanik, A., Putting a Price on Energy: International Pricing Mechanisms for Oil and Gas, with 
special emphasis on Russia-EU-CIS Gas Relations. Presentation at CEPMLP Thursday Speaker Series 
Seminar, University of Dundee, October 2007. 
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has direct and indirect impact on the operational pricing regime for international gas 
trade. The next sub-section goes a step further to describe how these issues affect 
pricing and management of risks in LNG trade.   
 
3.2 Pricing in LNG contracts 
The price of LNG is a key economic variable that governs the profitability of 
investments and the rate of its penetration in markets. Price in a long term LNG 
contract reflects the energy economics and structure of the market into which the 
LNG is being sold.571 So far, there have been three distinct import markets for LNG 
– United States; Europe (mainly Spain, France and Belgium) and Asia Pacific 
(mainly Japan and Korea). These markets have developed572 in relation to pricing 
generally and LNG pricing specifically. Within these three markets, therefore, LNG 
pricing was built on different fundamental principles set out in section 3.2.3 below. 
The historical context sets the framework for understanding the generic principles of 
pricing in LNG trade within each market. First, sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 define LNG 
contract terminologies, as well as, the generic risks and economic considerations 
that underlie LNG projects respectively. 
 
LNG Price, here, refers to the delivered wholesale price of LNG.573 Pricing further 
down the value chain is discussed but only to the extent that international LNG 
pricing is dependent on the market – and the prices in that market – into which the 
LNG will eventually be sold. Price in LNG trade is also tied to the nature and 
funding of the LNG projects; contract and trade terms.574  
 
3.2.1 Nature and funding of the LNG projects 
Traditionally, LNG projects were integrated from wellhead to regasification terminal. 
Consequently, the concept of a minimum price floor was created to provide 
sufficient security for project financiers and to service the debt.575 Project viability 
                                                 
571 Roberts, P., Gas Sales and Gas Transportation Agreements: Principles and Practice (2nd Ed.), 2008. 
572 Highlighted in Chapter Two and section 3.1 above 
573 Along the LNG supply chain this would depend on the stipulated/agreed title transfer point and the mode 
of sale - FOB, CIS or DES.  
574 That is long term or spot transactions; responsibility for transportation and transfer of ownership. 
575 Miller, P., The Chain of LNG Project Contracts, in Greenwald, G. (Ed.) Liquefied Natural Gas: 
developing and financing international energy projects, 1998. 
Chapter Three:  Pricing in International Gas Trade 
 
 
 
 
98 
(economics); risk considerations (financing) and competitiveness of LNG in the 
importing market were, therefore, the key determinants of price. 
 
The LNG contract price – compensation to the seller for taking the price risk576 and 
providing the fuel – was, therefore, based on the following philosophy: 
 to meet the seller’s costs and expected benefit577  
 defined in terms of alternative fuels and/or competing LNG or pipeline projects578  
 ignores its exhaustible nature and value in terms of energy content. 
 
The paradox of LNG pricing is that the solution should continually satisfy the above 
requirements, irrespective, of changing market conditions, throughout the contract 
period. Against this background, the contract price could result by adding the 
seller’s costs to get a total packaged (negotiable)579 price.580 An alternative 
backward approach deducts the seller’s costs from a fixed or variable demand-side 
replacement value to get the seller’s residual rent. Consequently, depending on the 
prevailing supply-demand balance, buyers’ ability to negotiate and enjoy lower 
prices is considered evidence of a buyer’s market and vice versa. With the 
restructuring of North American and European markets, however, integrated LNG 
projects became history and single element projects emerged.581 
 
3.2.2 Contract term and trade term 
Contract term implies the duration of the Gas Sales and Purchase 
Agreement/Contract. It is, therefore, important that a distinction be made between 
long term and short term (spot) LNG pricing due to the risk implications of contract 
flexibility582. Spot trading, in LNG trade, corresponds to the logic of spatial and 
temporal arbitrage. It could range from one day to one year, and is a consequence 
                                                 
576 On the other hand, the Take-Or-Pay clause placed the volume risk on buyers. 
577 This may be referred to as the ‘seller’s perspective’. It has been argued that some LNG-exporting 
countries may also have strategic or non-economic agenda.   
578 Otherwise referred to as the ‘buyer’s perspective’. 
579 The buyer may dispute some of the seller’s underlying cost assumptions towards arriving at a mutually 
profitable price.  
580 Roberts, P., LNG Pricing Paper presented at IQPC Conference on LNG Contracts, Trading and Pricing, 
in London, March 2006. 
581 Individual liquefaction terminal, regasification terminal and shipping projects became prevalent.  
582 The regional pricing concepts described below (in section 3.2.3) apply to both long term and spot but 
indexation formulas are mainly different. 
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of cargo diversion, from their original routes, as well as, uncommitted LNG sales.583 
Spot trading and all futures market transactions are essentially subsets of ‘short-
term trading’.584 Short term LNG trade is, therefore, any transaction that is not 
contracted on a long term basis and could occur from one day to three years. Long 
term LNG trade is a contracted transaction which goes from three to fifteen 
years.585 
 
Spot transactions are convenient, flexible, and most times, involve price premium - 
an incentive for cargo diversion or compensation for storage/uncommitted capacity. 
Spot prices are fixed at the time of consummating the transactions, with no 
opportunity for price renegotiation or indexation. Specifically, the parties may set 
price at $X or define it as “the prevailing reference price in a chosen market”586, at a 
particular point or date in the transaction587. An example of this process, referred to 
as pricing with the market is:  
 
Price (PLNG) = Pgas/oil on the (♦) exchange as at (date) 
 
Where: Pgas/oil is the price of gas or oil on the quoted exchange (♦) 
 
Long term contract gas – pipeline and LNG - pricing, on the other hand, involves a 
base price and an index (for indexation). Therefore, the effects of time on price are 
captured through periodic price renegotiation or escalation (using adjustment 
factors like Consumer Price Index - Inflation). The common bases for price 
renegotiation are: alternative fuels and their relative market shares; switching 
options; and time lag.  
 
The terms of an LNG transaction may be free on board (f.o.b) or destination ex-ship 
(d.e.s). An LNG sale is termed FOB when the buyer takes responsibility for 
                                                 
583 Mazighi A.E; Some risks related to the Short-Term Trading of Natural Gas, Page 237, Footnote 1, OPEC 
Review; September 2004. 
584 Mazighi, A., An examination of the international natural gas trade. OPEC Review, Dec. 2003. 
585 Some long term LNG transactions are structured as 3-year rolling short-term contracts. 
586 This may not necessarily be the importing market but it must have a marker price for determining the spot 
contract price.  
587 Generally, the market price on the date (time) of loading or unloading the vessel is applied. The choice of 
date, however, involves a price volatility risk (or reward). Relative to the prevailing price at the time of 
contracting, the buyer takes the risk (or reward) if the unloading date price is applicable and actual price rise 
Chapter Three:  Pricing in International Gas Trade 
 
 
 
 
100 
transporting the cargo. The transaction is completed and title transferred at the 
export terminal, immediately the commodity is loaded into the buyer’s (chartered) 
vessel. Destination ex-ship sale, on the other hand, is when the seller is responsible 
for transporting the LNG cargo to the nominated port or regasification terminal. 
Ownership transfer (from seller to buyer) is implied and takes effect as the LNG 
leaves the ship588 at the nominated point589 or unloading port.  
 
Trade term590 affects LNG price determination, risk management and rent. It, 
essentially, determines the transport element of the contract price and transfer of 
ownership. Whoever takes responsibility for transporting the LNG is compensated, 
through price adjustments, for boil-off losses591 and other associated costs. More 
important, the trade term determines who gets the arbitrage rent592. While the buyer 
gets it in an FOB sale, the seller in an ex-ship sale. An F.O.B sale (without 
destination restriction clause) gives the buyer more control over the landed price 
and enables them to trade surplus cargoes.593  
 
In order to avoid/reduce/resolve trade disputes, profit sharing mechanisms (PSMs) 
were designed to split the rent between exporters and importers.594 A PSM 
stipulates the basis for profit sharing when a buyer (on FOB or ex-ship sale - seller’s 
consent required) diverts a cargo to an alternative destination (higher price 
                                                                                                                                                                  
(falls). Conversely, the seller takes the risk (reward), if the loading date price is applicable and actual price 
rises (falls). 
588 Gas Matters (Drury, D.) Destination restrictions: Algerian agreement with EC creates potential 
headaches for Atlantic Basin FOB suppliers, LNG Focus, October 2007. 
589 Ownership may also be transferred at a location or some point before the stipulated terminal (for tax 
purposes, sales to the US are delivered before entry into US territorial waters). They are, however, not 
termed ex-ship sale, but technically referred to as Cost, Insurance and Freight (CIF) – price covers the energy 
element, insurance and transportation.  
590 This is another consequence of gas market restructuring. 
591 Based on a fixed daily boil-off rate an allowance is calculated. 
592 The abandonment of destination restriction provides arbitrage opportunities (and rent) as price signals are 
transmitted across regions through LNG trade. This gain from cargo diversion, referred to as arbitrage rent, 
has continued to be an object of negotiation or contention between LNG sellers and buyers.  
593 EIA, The Global Liquefied Natural Gas Markets: Status and Outlook, at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/analysispaper/global/lngmarket.html (2003)  
594 Drury, D., Destination restrictions: Algerian agreement with EC creates potential headaches for Atlantic 
Basin FOB suppliers, LNG Focus, October 2007. 
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markets). Although the mechanisms were market driven and also encouraged 
arbitrage,595 they later became illegal under EU competition law.596  
 
Figure 3.10   Terms of LNG Trade597  
 
 
The EU competition law seems to be deficient to the extent that it does not 
acknowledge the freedom of parties to negotiate. This is because LNG transactions 
are not always defined as FOB, CIS or DES598 as considered by Nyssens and 
Osbourne.599 Instead, parties “create within the LNG Sales and Purchase 
Agreement (SPA) a hybrid formulation for the transfer of custody, title and risk in 
respect of the LNG which they believe best suits their commercial 
circumstances”600- including profit earning or sharing arrangement. As may be 
inferred in Figure 3.10, a continuum of trading arrangements across territorial and 
international waters exists for negotiating risks and rewards.  
 
                                                 
595 Nyssens and Osborne posit, however, that in FOB contracts PSMs act as disincentive to arbitrage. But 
when the sale is CIF/DES, they are not “appreciably restrictive”. For more on PSMs, see Nyssens, H., and 
Osborne, I., Profit splitting mechanisms in a liberalized gas market: the devil lies in the detail, Competition 
Policy Newsletter at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/cpn2005_1.pdf  
596 The European Commission-Algeria (Sonatrach) settlement completed a prolonged legal battle by DG 
COMP to get rid of these clauses in all EU gas contracts – LNG and Pipeline. As part of the agreement, 
Sonatrach would transform all existing FOB and CIF sales contracts to D.E.S. See EUROPA, Commission 
and Algeria reach agreement on territorial restrictions and alternative clauses in gas supply contracts. 
597 Schematic was extracted from Robert, P., Effective Title Transfer in International LNG Trades, 
I.E.L.T.R., Issue 7, 2007. 
598 Sometimes parties to an LNG contract ignore these established formulations (or Incoterms).  
599 Nyssens, H., and Osborne, I., Profit splitting mechanisms in a liberalized gas market: the devil lies in the 
detail, Competition Policy Newsletter at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/cpn2005_1.pdf  
FOB: custody S→B 
LOADING 
PORT 
BUYER 
TRANSPORTS 
FOB: title S→B 
FOB: risk S→B DES: custody S→B 
DES: title S→B 
DES: risk S→B 
UNLOADING 
PORT 
-------------Territorial waters----------International waters----------Territorial waters----------- 
SELLER 
TRANSPORTS 
Chapter Three:  Pricing in International Gas Trade 
 
 
 
 
102 
3.2.3 Structure of the importing market 
Traceable to the regional development of gas trade, different LNG pricing concepts 
have also evolved to meet the structural needs of the importing markets. LNG 
prices are determined, generally, through netback formulas indexed to one or more 
of the following: price of natural gas/close substitutes in the importing market; price 
of natural gas/close substitutes in other importing markets; coal and electricity 
prices; as well as, the price of crude oil.601 Given available energy resources, each 
importing market, in the Atlantic Basin, has a preferred pricing regime.602 Beginning 
with a historical preview, the principles in each of the three importing markets are 
described below: 
 
a) Asia Pacific 
In the Pacific Basin, Korean and Japanese domestic gas markets developed on 
imported LNG. There was no domestic or pipeline gas supply to compete with LNG 
in Japan, but crude oil was the main alternative to natural gas in power 
generation603 in the 1970s and early 1980s. As a result, LNG imports were 
referenced to movements in the prices of Japanese crude oil imports – referred to 
as Japanese Customs-cleared Crude (JCC) price.604 So, when Korean and 
Taiwanese imports began, they priced off the JCC because it was the dominant 
market indicator.605 
 
As LNG trade evolved, in a bid to counter the price floor concept606, some buyers 
argued for price cap as protection in times of rising energy prices. The price floor 
and cap arguments resulted in the ‘S’ curve concept (illustrated in Figure 3.11). This 
principle was created “to soften the curves of escalation between the floor and 
                                                                                                                                                                  
600 Roberts, P., Effective Title Transfers in International LNG Trades, Issue 7, I.E.L.T.R., 2007. 
601 These LNG price determinants are also affected by weather, storage, and other domestic market 
fundamentals (like domestic production capacity, investment, inflation, exchange rate and government 
policies). 
602 This consists of indexation formulas; as well as, a mix of alternative fuels and adjustment factors. 
603 Just as in Europe. 
604 JCC (sometimes called Japanese Crude Cocktail) is the average price of crude oil imports cleared by the 
Japanese customs.  
605 To date, LNG imports to these markets are typically referenced to movements in the JCC. 
606 Minimum price required to meet project financing obligation (discussed in 3.2.1). 
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ceiling through adjustable escalation rates that decline as the lower and upper limits 
are approached and that increase within an intermediate band.”607  
 
Figure 3.11 Illustration of the S-curve concept as used in Japan608 
 
  
This concept, which originated in Japan, was applied predominantly in Asia Pacific, 
but has now been abandoned.609 As discussed in Chapter Two, LNG trade globally 
has traditionally been influenced by the size of these markets, as well as, their price 
regime. For instance, in the period 2007-08, Asia Pacific LNG pricing significantly 
affected the Atlantic Basin LNG market. So, Chapter Six of this work captures the 
extent of this impact in relation to the uniform pricing concept. 
  
b) North America 
For two historical reasons, in North America, all gas (including LNG) imports610 
(long term and spot) are indexed to the price of NYMEX gas futures deliverable at 
the Henry Hub. The first reason is because the US gas market is very competitive, 
organized and liquid. Second and more important, North American gas markets 
                                                 
607 Miller, P., The Chain of LNG Project Contracts, in Greenwald, G. (Ed.) Liquefied Natural Gas: 
developing and financing international energy projects, 1998. 
608 Source: James Jensen 
609 Platts European Gas Daily, European gas prices challenge Asian, Vol. 13, Issue 67, 7th April 2008 at 
http://www.platts.com/  
610 Irrespective of whether they are spot or long term contracts. 
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developed on indigenous resources and overwhelmingly on pipeline gas, before 
they began importing LNG. So, LNG has always been a marginal part of the market 
and competes with domestic pipeline gas supplies611. As a result, imports are 
referenced to prevailing gas prices, and invariably, the markets’ evolutionary path 
has affected LNG pricing logic. Examples612 of LNG netback pricing formulas for US 
spot or long term import (DES) are:  
 
 
 
Just like pipeline gas transactions at various Hubs, LNG price at each terminal is 
derived from Henry Hub price by allowing for a ‘fixed regasification charge and a 
basis differential’613. The underlying price and basis risks – consequence of hub-
based pricing - also apply to LNG imports. Developments in LNG trade between 
2007 and 2008 have raised doubts about exporters’ confidence in hub-based spot 
prices (HH or NBP) as efficient bench mark for LNG in the Atlantic Basin. These 
notable developments, which led to significant premiums above the Henry Hub,614 
are extensively discussed in Chapter Six. 
 
c) Europe 
Gas markets across Europe were built on domestic supplies and/or imports from 
neighbouring gas-producing countries – like Norway, United Kingdom, The 
                                                 
611 This includes shale gas and imports from Canada. 
612 Roberts, P., Presentation at LNG Pricing Workshop, IQPC London, March 2006. 
613 Relative to the Henry Hub: as at 2004, the charges were $0.35 and $0.10 respectively for the US Gulf 
Coast. 
614 Fesharaki, F., Asian, global LNG Markets in transition are defining future, Vol. 4, Issue 3, LNG Observer 
, July 01, 2007 at http://www.ogj.com/display_article/297536/94/ARTCL/Display/IsTrT/Asian,-global-
LNG-markets-in-transition-are-defining-future 
PLNG = [NYMEX * 85% – Discount]   or 
PLNG = [NYMEX * 90% – Discount] x (1-R)  or 
PLNG = [NYMEX * 95% – Discount] x (1-R) - BD  
where: 
PLNG – the LNG price in US dollar per mmBtu 
NYMEX – NYMEX Henry Hub natural gas futures contract price 
Discount - $(0.25) per mmBtu 
R – Boil off losses at the regasification terminal (also called shrinkage)   
assumed as 1.5% of NYMEX 
BD – Basis Differential between HH and the point of sale (local gas hub) 
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Netherlands and FSU. Then imported gas was used, as a substitute for oil products, 
mainly for space heating and power generation. Consequently, imported gas either 
competed with domestic gas or oil products but in some cases, had no substitute. 
Because LNG is seen as another form of imported gas, it has been priced as such – 
off competing fuels and/or by-products. Generally, netback market value approach 
is used to determine prices but the regimes for long term LNG contracts vary across 
Europe. Spain and the UK are exceptionally different from Continental Europe. 
 
Spain 
Spain’s domestic gas market is not purely competitive but could be referred to as 
‘managed’ or semi-competitive. It is termed ‘managed’ because the government 
directly/indirectly oversees most pricing issues despite the freedom of choice and 
entry. Due to Spain’s geographic location and small gas domestic production, the 
market emerged after its Western European neighbours. Given their limited options 
(from Algeria and via trans-Pyrenees pipeline)615, LNG imports are around two 
thirds of Spain’s total gas demand.616 Consequently, LNG is priced in some kind of 
“special” way and not as other gas imports. Initially, long term LNG was priced off 
oil products but it now indexed to either Brent crude price or the Henry Hub price - 
depending on demand levels and the need to attract more cargoes. 
 
The UK has a competitive natural gas market, as described in section 3.1.2.5 
above, and so LNG imports are not specially priced. Rather, like in the US, long 
term LNG imports are indexed to the price of NBP natural gas futures contract 
traded on the ICE (similar to NYMEX). The ICE natural gas index is the rolling 
arithmetic average of the daily volume-weighted front price. Based on the front 
month futures contract price, it is also the ‘spot price’ upon which a large 
percentage of pipeline and LNG contracts are priced617. Spot cargoes are priced 
either at NBP, fixed or indexed to a basket of NBP, oil products with a fixed 
component.  
 
                                                 
615 IEA, Development of Competitive Gas Trading in Continental Europe, Information Paper, 2008 at 
http://www.iea.org/textbase/papers/2008/gas_trading.pdf  
616 Spain’s 58bcm per annum regasification capacity makes it the third largest LNG importer in the World. 
Figure 2.14 in Chapter Two shows a vivid picture of LNG’s role in the Spanish gas market. 
617 Wright, P., Gas prices in the UK, p.68, para.2, (2006) 
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An example is given in the box below: 
 
 
Continental Europe 
“A major share of the international (gas) contracts in force on the European 
continent largely remain indexed either directly to the price of petroleum products, 
or indirectly through the use of crude oil netback prices”618. Specifically, through 
their national champions619, the four biggest gas markets (excluding the UK and 
Spain) index their LNG imports to petroleum products prices. Due to the inherent 
short term economic benefits, LNG importers in these markets could maintain this 
pricing pattern for a while. A typical European long term LNG pricing formula would 
reflect both direct and indirect substitutes620 as:  
 
 
                                                 
618 Chabrelie, M. F., Gas price indexation and strategies: A European Market perspective.   
619 Germany’s Ruhrgas; the Netherland’s Gasunie; France’s Gaz de France; Italy’s Eni, - These are the 
incumbent national gas companies that have been partially or fully privatized. Despite the drive towards 
EC’s Directives on gas markets, these companies are indirect monopolies in their domestic gas markets. 
620 Prices for pipeline natural gas contracts are indexed to a weighted average of the prices of other 
competing fuels – basket of petroleum products and coal. Fundamentally, natural gas is the direct competing 
fuel to LNG. 
 
Pt = Px [n(Gt/Gx) + b(Ot/Ox) + c(Ct/Cx)]  
Where: Pt is the price of LNG at time t, 
Px is the price of LNG at time x; Gt is the price of Natural Gas at time t, 
Gx is the price of Natural Gas at time x; Ot is the price of fuel Oil at time t,  
Ox is the price of fuel Oil at time x; Ct is the price of Coal at time t,  
Cx is the price of Coal at time x,   
The coefficients n, b and c determine the weights and impacts of the respective fuels - 
natural gas, fuel oil and coal - on the contract price of LNG at any time t.  
PLNG = [(PICE * 90%) – Discount] x (1-R) 
Where: 
PLNG = the LNG price   
PICE = ICE NBP Hub natural gas futures contract price 
Discount = (negotiable) in p/therm or USD per mmBtu 
R = Boil off losses at the regasification terminal    
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In some other parts of Continental Europe LNG Sales Contracts are indexed to 
petroleum products621 prices but the Title Transfer Facility (TTF) and Zeebrugge 
Hub prices are also used. Generally, different bases of indexation are applied in 
LNG trade but prices are determined through netback indexation formulas. The 
difference in pricing regimes is, essentially, traceable to the regional development of 
natural gas trade. Consequently, to a large extent, the indexation principle reflects 
“the price movement of the competing fuel from the purchaser’s point of view”622.  
 
Conclusion 
It is apparent that the pricing and risk-allocation mechanism, in LNG trade, 
represents a dilemma and no standard model has been developed globally. 
Arguably, this is because the markets are different in different parts of the world. 
Unless there is increased transparency and exchange of trade information across 
markets, we may not see a single market price for LNG.  
 
Perhaps, competition for LNG across Basins623 has confirmed the producer 
dilemma by creating a new paradox in the pricing of LNG. Exporters want a price 
that is not significantly different from those obtainable in other LNG import markets, 
while importers want prices that are competitive in their markets or for arbitrage.624 
Meanwhile, no defined relationship exists between spot prices and long term 
contract prices.  
 
The foregoing, therefore, portends the need for another pricing regime capable of 
reflecting a robust and more competitive market for gas (especially LNG). In sum, 
the following considerations would be vital for price determination as LNG trade 
evolves: 
 The basis for price indexation should not be open to manipulation (i.e. 
uniform, transparent and neutral) 
                                                 
621 Mainly high sulphur fuel oil; low sulphur fuel oil; as well as; electricity and coal prices. 
622 Griffin, P. and Smith, H., (Ed.) Liquefied Natural Gas: The Law and Business of LNG. P.8, (London: 
Globe Business Publishing Ltd; 2006). 
623 While demand in the Atlantic Basin is increasing gradually, spot LNG trade in the Pacific Basin is much 
more active. 
624 This option that is available to LNG buyers is disadvantageous to exporters. 
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 Pricing must progressively evolve to satisfy increasing spot trade and market 
liquidity by recognizing the effects of prices in other importing markets625 
 The indexation of LNG to multiple price indices across regions is certainly not 
compatible with the globalization of LNG trade. 
 
3.3 UNIFORM PRICING  
Available literature indicates that a reasonable number of studies, on gas price 
movements and relationships within the Atlantic Basin, have been undertaken. 
Some of these efforts include De Vany and Walls 1993; Shook and Jaffe 2001; 
Hirschhausen 2003; Mazighi 2003/4; Jensen 2004; L’Hegaret et’al 2005; Ross 
2004, Foss 2007; Stern 2007, as well as, Frisch 2008. These researchers 
questioned individual pricing concepts or attempted to explain the pricing principles 
or forecast LNG price path but little or no consideration was given to the interraction 
of regional pricing mechanisms and the implications for global LNG trade.  
 
3.3.1 Definition of the Problem 
The following quote, from a publication of the Energy Charter Secretariat, indirectly 
hints at the problem: “The concept of a uniform international approach to LNG 
pricing may be a theoretical ideal, but it is far from a reality in current LNG 
markets”.626 Given that “LNG is the mechanism for transmitting pricing signals 
around the world”627 it is pertinent to ask whether having various bases for 
indexation is efficient for global LNG trade. Taken together, how well do these 
mechanisms enhance price discovery along the value chain? The need for a 
suitable LNG price regime is evident628 and a primary challenge, therefore, is to 
reconcile the various bases for price indexation (Natural Gas Price at H/H, NBP and 
TTF; Price of Coal, Crude Oil Products and Electricity).  
 
Various arguments may be put forward for or against each of the pricing 
principles/practices described above. This is because there are inherent risks, 
                                                 
625 That is the seller’s perspective of replacement value. 
626 Energy Charter Secretariat, Putting a price on Energy, March 2007, p.188 at  
http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/document/Oil_and_Gas_Pricing_2007_ENG.pdf 
627 Jensen, J., Increasing Global LNG Investments -- A Presentation to the North American LNG Summit 
2007 – Houston June 20, 2007 at http://www.jai-energy.com/pubs/NOAMLNG.PPT  
628 This is obvious from the rising number price disputes, renegotiations and arbitration. See Frisch, M., LNG 
market may soon see emergence of regular auctions for spot cargoes. LNG Journal, April 2008. 
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relating to each pricing principle, which importers and exporters try to transfer or 
mitigate. Conceivably, the bargaining powers of importers and exporters would 
continue to shift, as oil price rise and fall, to alter the international gas pricing 
regimes. While, long term contracts ought to incorporate a forward price curve, 
none exists at the moment. Neither do the regimes objectively define the worth of 
future gas supply nor how to place a price on long term gas supply. Besides, 
inherent economic interests in the prevailing price regimes may also hinder the 
systemic emergence of another price regime for LNG. So, the following sub-section 
attempts to answer the question: What principles would underlie a uniform pricing 
mechanism for LNG in the Atlantic Basin? 
 
3.3.2 Proposition 
Uniform LNG pricing would be an agreement to index long-term sales contract to 
crude oil price using, basically, the same formula. It is a system in which all LNG 
exporters apply, essentially, the same principle to determine the long term delivered 
price payable by buyers. It is a formal price-fixing agreement with the aim of 
keeping prices higher than would have been.629 By applying such a model contract 
pricing formula, they could also aim to standardize upstream LNG pricing regimes 
within and across regional markets.  
 
For the purpose of this exercise, it is proposed that Exporters will adopt a 
combination of WTI and Brent Crude-linked pricing in an addictive formula: PLNG = 
A + bY + μ.  
Where A is the standardized transport cost element630; the basis of indexation (Y) is 
the average Brent-WTI Price; b is the coefficient of indexation (COI)631 and μ is 
exporter’s share(r) of any arbitrage-resulting rent (Md). The COI (b) is chosen here 
                                                 
629 This assertion is reinforced by the fact that producer-groups generally maintain a minimum price level 
above which prices are allowed to fluctuate. See Alhajji A.F. and Huettner D. OPEC and other Commodity 
cartels: a comparison, Page 1155, Vol. 28 Energy Policy, (2000). 
630 Exogenously determined and a function of the distance from exporter to importer (difference in distance if 
swap occurs): Typically the shipping industry has specific rates for specific Dead Tonne Weights for specific 
destinations.  
631 The variables and data used to create the Formula are defined extensively in Chapter 4.  
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as 0.1717632. Gas Exporters’ preference for crude oil price indexation is an open 
secret. For example, about seventy percent of Algeria’s long-term LNG sales 
contracts are index to oil. 
 
3.3.3 Underlying Argument 
Theoretically, gas has two price components: Production cost component borne by 
producers and substitution cost by the consumers. An agreement to exogenously 
determine price could enable exporters to exploit the substitution cost of end users 
rather than competing to produce at least cost as price rise. Such an agreement 
could be the mechanism for exporters to reap the resultant margin633, rather than let 
importers (wholesalers, local distribution companies or end-users) have it. This is 
economically rational because higher natural gas (oil) price(s) accelerate 
investments in domestic resources and/or increase LNG importation.634  
 
This author, therefore, proposes a uniform LNG pricing principle for long term LNG 
sales contracts based on oil-gas price relationship. A reason for this is that the 
value of oil is not equitably reflected in long-run LNG sales contracts.635 Arguably, 
uniform oil price indexation may not be a more efficient636 price determination 
mechanism but it could reduce the adverse affects of volatility on exporters and 
importers, as well as, eliminate the effects of refining capacity637 on LNG price(s). 
Although gas rarely competes in the transport sector638, oil price linkage is 
suggested here because it yields higher prices and long term LNG profitability for 
exporters.639 In other words, the proposed formula can keep LNG prices relatively 
higher than would be - an economic incentive for exporters. It, however, transfers 
developments in the oil market to wholesale gas prices in the importing markets.  
                                                 
632 Simply the reciprocal of 5.825 mmBtu (energy content equivalent of a Barrel of Oil): Previously, a Rule-
of-Thumb used for determining natural gas price in the US. Research indicates that it overstates the price of 
natural gas. 
633 That is ‘Super-normal Rent/profit’ discussed in section 3.1.1 above. 
634 This depends on the cost of exploiting gas resources or available import terminals in each market.  
635 This makes the current price regimes relatively disadvantageous to LNG exporters. 
636 Despite the use of the netback pricing, indexation, and self-contracting, in this author’s opinion, bilateral 
price negotiation in long-term LNG Contracts is inefficient.  
637 The indexation of LNG price to Crude products transmits the effects of refining capacity constraints on 
LNG price.  
638Unlike oil that is used predominantly in the sector. 
639 Relative to oil, on an energy equivalent basis, LNG is significantly discounted in the Atlantic Basin due to 
hub-based pricing. 
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It is necessary to emphasize that the above pricing mechanism is not expected to 
resolve the highlighted pricing issues and neither is the only option. Rather, it is only 
proposed here as a medium for investigating collusive uniform pricing in LNG trade. 
LNG exporters could uniformly opt to apply three price formulae in every long term 
LNG contract as an alternative to PSMs. A second alternative to the proposition 
above is to uniformly apply an LNG Hub-based spot price, but exporters would 
prefer oil. A uniform pricing model based on LNG ‘basis differential’ reflecting 
transport costs from Qatar to various regional markets is conceivable. Such 
differentials would be standard640 for different tanker sizes to specific delivery points 
in each market – similar to the land-based differential within each domestic or 
regional market641.  
 
This option, however, requires the establishment of an LNG Hub in Qatar (Middle 
East) or anywhere else642. While LNG pricing could become more transparent in the 
process, the feasibility of a competitive LNG Hub, in the Middle East, also raises 
other pertinent questions.643 Another choice could be the uniform adoption of a 
Master Sales Agreement without pricing formulas but priced on individual cargo 
basis. In effect, it would offer exporters the choice to renegotiate contract prices on 
short term basis. Though it seems more pragmatic, one wonders how rewarding it 
would be considering the significance of long term contracts in LNG trade. Chapter 
Four, therefore, sets the framework for determining the extent to which uniform 
pricing, as a mechanism for influencing LNG trade, is feasible.  
                                                 
640 Denoted as ‘A’ in the formula - typically the shipping industry has specific Dead Tonne Weights rates for 
specific destinations.  
641 An extensive explanation of Basis Differential, in the North American gas market, is available in Jensen, 
J.T., The Development of a Global LNG Market – Is it likely? If so when? 2004. 
642 The Hub does not need to be a producing region – it could be in Tokyo Bay. 
643 Some of these issues have been discussed in Wagbara, O., To what extent is a liquid LNG Hub, in the 
Middle East, feasible? I.E.L.R; Issue 3, 2008 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
ATLANTIC BASIN LNG TRADE MODEL (ABLTM)  
  
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
4.1.1 Background  
A model simply captures the vital characteristics of a real problem being 
investigated. The more accurate its representation of reality, the more useful it is 
and may be referred to as a valid model.644 On the premise of the discourse in645 
Chapter Three, this Chapter simulates Atlantic Basin LNG Trade; applies the 
Uniform Pricing (UP) proposition and Volume Control (VC) mechanism in different 
scenarios to determine feasibility. A brief review of modelling literatures follows after 
this background, while the next two sub-sections define the Problem and 
Methodology for this Chapter respectively. The second section (4.2) describes the 
elements of the Model (Assumptions; Structure and Data), while section 4.3 covers 
the scenario analyses and presentation of results.   
 
4.1.2 Literature Review  
Some research have been undertaken to study gas price movements, relationships 
and strategies in different markets - De Vany and Walls 1993; Mazighi 2003/4; 
Jensen 2004; L’Hegaret et’al 2005; Neumann and Vasquez 2006; Neumann and 
Ruster 2006; Neumann 2007 (see full references in bibliography). Other 
researchers646 have also designed models to capture the different aspects and 
future trend of LNG (and Natural Gas) trade both regionally and globally. Some of 
these models were reviewed in Chapter One (section 1.6) but more relevant cases 
are captured below.  
 
In their EUGAS scenario model, Perner and Seeliger investigated the impact of a 
gas cartel on the European gas market. Adopting an OPEC-style production quota 
approach for the gas cartel, they concluded that the “fictive gas cartel would have 
significant impacts on gas supply costs for Europe”.647 Taking a different approach, 
                                                 
644 Ragsdale, C.T. Spreadsheet Modelling and Decision Analysis, para.1, p.4, 1995 
645 The evolution, principles and dynamics of pricing in international gas trade were discussed in Chapter 
Three. 
646 See Energy Journal, Volume 30, Special Issue, 2009. 
647 Perner, J and Seeliger, A., Impacts of a gas cartel on the European gas market – selected results from the 
supply model EUGAS, Volume 12, utilities Policy, 2004. 
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Aune et al also simulated a Middle East Cartel Scenario in a numerical model of 
international energy markets. They introduced a fixed export duty on gas, as a 
means of maximizing revenue, and discovered a minimal effect on gas prices until 
2020.648 While agreeing with the conclusion reached by Perner and Seeliger, the 
same can not be said about the results obtained by Aune et al. In fact, the outcome 
is not striking because with netback price determination, a fixed export duty would 
only reduce the margin accruable to exporters.649  
 
Hayes simulated Atlantic Basin Gas Trade, using two models (linear optimization 
model run in GAMS and a Monte Carlo simulation run in MS Excel with the Crystal 
Ball add-in to determine the interaction of liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade with the 
fundamentals of pipeline gas supply, storage and consumption. Hayes’ model was 
aimed at analyzing how growth in LNG trade provided opportunities for seasonal 
arbitrage using vessels and import capacity, as well as, the effects on gas markets 
in Europe and the US.  
 
Hayes discovered that “LNG creates the means for spatial arbitrage that will interact 
with storage to effectively connect regional market prices over time”.650 
Furthermore, “the net result will be price spreads between “integrated” competitive 
gas markets that vary on a monthly basis, driven not only by transit costs but also 
by differential costs of gas storage”.651 The simulation here is similar to Hayes’ - 
both are month-scale Atlantic Basin trade models. While Hayes focused on 
demand-side issues (like domestic gas storage, transport cost and seasonal 
demand), here ABLTM dwells on supply-side LNG issues (pricing and market 
influence). Interestingly, Hayes emphasized that, irrespective of market type,652 long 
term supply security would be determined by growth in LNG supply (investment).653  
 
Meanwhile, Victor and Hayes assert that enduring regulatory regime, in LNG 
exporting countries, is the most relevant factor for attracting and increasing LNG 
                                                 
648 Aune, F., et’al, Globalisation of Natural Gas Markets – Effects on Prices and Trade Patterns, Vol. 30 
Special Issue, 2009. 
649 But, it would have little or no impact on gas prices in the importing market. 
650 Hayes, H.M., Monthly Gas Trade in the Atlantic Basin circa 2015 flexible LNG supply, storage and price 
formation in a global natural gas market, Dissertation 2007. 
651 Ibid 
652 Whether managed gas markets (as in parts of Europe) or competitive gas markets. 
Chapter Four: Atlantic Basin LNG Trade Model 
 
 
 
 
114 
investments.654 These assertions are tenable but they ignore the pricing issues 
inherent in gas (especially LNG) trade – which this author considers most 
pertinent.655   
 
Based on a set of standard scenarios and common input assumptions, eleven 
organizations656 used different models to participate in the Stanford University’s 
Energy Modelling Forum gas study (EMF 23). The summary report, of the various 
modelling efforts, states that “the long-run natural gas price path will move with 
world crude oil prices over the next two decades, although there is not a fixed 
relationship between the two energy prices”657. Perhaps, it is notable that most of 
the models in the programme obtained almost similar or related conclusions.658 So, 
the comprehensive report659 has been reviewed here rather than analyzing 
individual studies/results. 
 
Figure 4.1 Delivered US Price increase in various constrained scenarios660  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
653 Hayes, M. Institutions and Gas market Security, Dissertation 2007. 
654 Victor, D., and Hayes, M., Politics, Markets and the shift to Gas: Insights from Seven Historical Case 
Studies, in Victor, D. et’al, (Eds.) Natural Gas and Geopolitics from 1970 to 2040, 2006.   
655 LNG trade is evolving and continually interacts with pipeline markets in peculiar ways – making it 
difficult for anyone to predict what prices would be. 
656 See list of Organizations in Huntington, H; Findings of the EMF Study 23: World Natural Gas Markets; 
Presentation at the 26th IAEE/USAEE Conference, Houston, TX September 18, 2007. 
657 Energy Modeling Forum (EMF), Prices and Trade in a Globalizing Natural Gas Market, EMF Report 23, 
Stanford University, July 2007. 
658 Perhaps, this was due to the fact that they had common objectives and used the same template.  
659 See report of the EMF 23 programme at http://www.stanford.edu/group/EMF/projects/emf23/emf23.pdf   
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It is noteworthy that the EMF teams also simulated constrained LNG supply 
scenarios.661 Their results, as captured in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, indicate that prices 
were raised above their reference path.662 Some of these models663 constrained 
LNG trade by ignoring on-going liquefaction projects, while others imposed the 
constraint on regasification terminals. Two anomalies could be identified from both 
approaches. 
Figure 4.2 Delivered W. European Price increase in the constrained scenarios  
 
Source: http://www.stanford.edu/group/EMF/projects/emf23/emf23.pdf 
 
First, expectations about on-going liquefaction projects exert downward pressure on 
gas prices in the importing countries. Because, long term LNG lacks a forward price 
curve, it is inconsistent to determine the inverse effect on price, by not considering 
such project. Second, due to limited activities, most import terminals in the US have 
been operating below installed capacity.664  
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
660 See Energy Modeling Forum Prices and Trade in a Globalizing Natural Gas Market. 
661 Some tested model response by constraining new liquefaction projects while others imposed constraints 
on regasification terminals.  
662 Energy Modeling Forum, Prices and Trade in a Globalizing Natural Gas Market, EMF Report 23, 
Stanford University, July 2007. 
663 In Figures 4.1 and 4.2, the horizontal axis shows the models used in EMF 23.  
664 GIIGNL, The LNG industry, 2008 
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Consequently, a change in number of terminals (positive or negative) has 
absolutely no effect on domestic gas prices or LNG prices.665 Rather, it is the 
amount of LNG imported (or available for import) that could affect prices. So, the 
volume control scenario (simulated here) fills both gaps by constraining LNG trade 
through a reduction in available contracted capacity666 - while taking new 
liquefaction projects into consideration.   
 
In sum, available literature indicates that most models have either investigated 
natural gas price convergence, integration of natural gas markets or convergence of 
LNG netbacks.667 The model results (in the case of EMF 23) were not expressed 
relative to the size of LNG constraint in each importing market. Furthermore, neither 
of the models considered a uniform LNG pricing scenario, nor specifically captures 
the effects of an LNG exporters’ cartel.668 
 
So far, only Egging et al comprehensively captures the effects of cartel behaviour in 
the global gas market.669 But, their World Gas Model (WGM) did not consider cartel 
stability and also downplays the peculiar nature of LNG pricing - which benefits 
regasifiers.670 The WGM, however, reveals that “the cartel impact is particularly 
manifest in the LNG market”. In contributing to the body of knowledge, this author 
adopts a novel approach, a regional scope and a shorter time frame (2005 to 
2013).671  
  
4.1.3 Definition of Problem 
The question of feasibility, as mentioned in the introduction, is whether either 
mechanism optimally benefits exporters without significantly disrupting LNG trade. 
                                                 
665 For instance, in 2008 US LNG imports dropped by 55% from the 2007 volume despite the opening of two 
new terminals – Freeport LNG (in Texas) and Sabine Pass (Louisiana).   
666 This method is more logical than the approaches adopted in EMF 23. 
667 These research efforts also had different scopes - within the Atlantic Basin or across the globe.   
668 Existing models considered cartel of pipeline gas exporters; Middle East Exporters; pipeline and LNG 
Exporters together or constrained LNG supply.   
669 Egging, R., et al., Representing GESPEC with the World Gas Model, Vol. 30, Special Issue, 2009. 
670 The World Gas model acknowledges this - market power lies with the regasifiers.  Ironically, it seems to 
ignore an important issue - most LNG price regimes constrain the maximization of exporters’ revenue (as 
explained in Chapter Three – Figure 3.3). Meanwhile, the approach of selling LNG via one single cartel 
regasifier is unrealistic given regasification capacity constraint – which also limits the amount of LNG 
importable at any time.  
671 Considering the emergence of new climate change policies and reductions in long term gas demand 
projections 
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Therefore, feasibility is attained if exporters have no incentive to cheat; demand 
destruction does not occur and LNG trade develops despite any influence 
mechanism(s) adopted. To test for feasibility, the model generates quantifiable672 
gains and losses to exporters in both UP and VC scenarios.  
 
The author also aspires to determine the conceivable benefits or losses to exporters 
from uniform pricing or volume control. Given the assumptions, the model’s 
simulation exercises are aimed at answering the following secondary questions:  
 In what scenarios could uniform pricing or volume control be applicable? 
 Could a uniform pricing regime be easier to implement than volume control?  
  
 
 
4.1.4 Methodology  
In their paper, David Bobrow and Robert Kudrle673 assert that no single perspective 
can comprehensively cover the issues of an intergovernmental resource 
organization. This Chapter, therefore, combines statistical and descriptive analyses. 
Starting from the premise of a hypothetical LNG exporters’ organization the author 
assumes that LNG trade could be collusively influenced. This assumption is based 
on the view that the emergence of a global gas market in an uncertain price 
environment makes collusion attractive674 to exporters. Besides, it is a historical fact 
that cartels “are mostly feasible where they are least needed - where there are few 
sellers with high concentration”.675  
 
A simple spreadsheet model is built to capture some elements of Atlantic Basin 
LNG trade. With Palisade Decision Tools, six exporters and five importers are 
simulated using long term contract volumes, as well as, historical contract and spot 
(US and UK) prices. The revenue function of each benefit-optimizing exporter is 
used in a static 3-scenario simulation exercise to capture the effect of changes in 
some variable – Price (given/otherwise) and Contract volume (Supply).  
                                                 
672 Revenue; export volume; and uncontracted (spare) capacity relative to the base case. 
673 Bobrow, D.B. and Kudrle, R.T., Theory, Policy, and Resource Cartels, pp. 3-56, Vol. 20, No. 1, The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, March 1976. 
674 Although, it may be argued that, it also reduces the economic justification and drive for it.  
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Short term and long term perspectives are considered in the analysis. Short term, 
here, refers to the first twelve (12) months after the adoption of a market influence 
mechanism (UP or VC). Within this LNG (gas) supply cycle, it is assumed that, no 
response from importers is possible due to the strategic nature of the resource. Any 
other period after this LNG (gas) supply cycle (first year) is considered as long term. 
The base case could be viewed as the status quo in 2013. In other words, it 
captures current price trend and contractual volumes until 2013 (without any 
influence mechanism). 
 
Table 4.1 Simulated LNG participating countries  
Sources Liquefaction Transportation Regasification Importers 
Algeria       USA 
         
         
         
Egypt         
       UK 
         
Libya         
        
        Spain 
         
Nigeria         
       Italy 
         
Qatar         
        France 
        
         
        
Trinidad          
 
Following from the base case, sensitivity analyses of different market-determining 
scenarios (uniform pricing proposition and volume control) are undertaken. Price 
elasticity of demand for LNG676 is used as the link between Volume and Price in 
each consuming market. The model includes (Table 4.1) major exporters677 and 
                                                                                                                                                                  
675 Bobrow, D.B. and Kudrle, R.T., Theory, Policy, and Resource Cartels, pp. 3-56, Vol. 20, No. 1, The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, March 1976. 
676 From each importing gas market (apart from the US), the price elasticity of end use demand for natural is 
used as a proxy for the elasticity of demand for LNG. 
677 Algeria; Nigeria; Qatar; Libya; Egypt, as well as, Trinidad and Tobago 
Chapter Four: Atlantic Basin LNG Trade Model 
 
 
 
 
119 
importers678 in the region even though other Countries (plan to build) have 
regasification and liquefaction terminals.  
 
The model has a regional scope but it captures inherent global implications in the 
analyses and interpretation. Given the lead-time of LNG projects, supply-side 
response to price changes is not captured in the simulation but it is considered (as 
a spot market issue) when interpreting the results. The context and structure of the 
model follows from the nature and infancy of LNG trade. This approach differs from 
others because it appreciates that LNG exporters may not collude globally but could 
operate, directly or indirectly, through uniform pricing or supply manipulation. It, 
therefore, emphasizes price-fixing on a regional scope because LNG prices vary 
regionally (but are defined and influenced by other inter-regional factors).  
  
4.2 MODEL FRAMEWORK 
4.2.1 Assumptions of the Model 
 An Atlantic Basin World679 with a competitive LNG market of relatively few 
sellers and many buyers (given the seasonal competition for LNG) and no 
destination (or use) restriction clause(s) 
 LNG-exporting countries, in the Model, are assumed “firms” in an industry with:
  
 very high concentration;  
 negligible product differentiation; and 
 high barriers to entry: given the huge investment requirements, 
strategic and exhaustible nature of gas (LNG) 
 Exporters have the same Marginal Cost (MC), as well as, knowledge of the 
shape and position of the industry LNG demand curve: in other words, the same 
market information is available to all exporters680 
 The Atlantic Basin LNG Trade Model (ABLTM) is a static representation of long-
term LNG contracts681 captured on a monthly scale  
 ABLTM does not yield equilibrium682 solution(s) but is meant to give insights  
                                                 
678 Spain; Italy; France; U.K and the U.S 
679 This includes Qatar which, though situated in the Middle East, trades with Buyers in the Atlantic Region. 
680 The mutual exchange of commercial, technical and legal information is a fundamental benefit accruable 
to colluding exporters, even before an influence mechanism becomes effective. 
681 Spot LNG transactions are ignored in the simulation exercise but are considered in the course of 
interpreting and analyzing the model’s outcome. 
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 The principal objective of LNG Exporting Countries (individually and collectively 
as a group) is to maximize benefits (especially revenue) at any time in the 
course of exploiting their gas deposits;683  
 The null (main) hypothesis is that given demand, uniform LNG pricing or volume 
control is feasible684  
 Proposed price-setting formula is designed (in sub-section 4.3.1 below) to suit 
the research and to answer specific questions of interest; 
 The same685 LNG is sold destination-ex-ship (d.e.s),686 in equal-sized vessels; 
no shortages of uncommitted vessels687 and prices are assumed to reflect value 
and transportation cost; 
 Shipping cost from one exporter to importer is assumed standardized688 and a 
part of price, as well as, revenue: so no change in price or revenue results from 
change in transport cost; 
 There is no significant difference in LNG import price across regasification 
terminals within each importing country; 
 Each exporting country has only one liquefaction terminal  
 Natural Gas or LNG Storage capacity is also assumed fixed689 over the period 
covered in the Model  
 LNG export volumes are based on existing and expected annual (monthly) 
contracts and assumed to run through out the modeling period690 
                                                                                                                                                                  
682 Petroleum (oil and gas) markets are rarely in equilibrium. For instance, OPEC’s spare capacity; Strategic 
Petroleum Reserves; as well as, uncontracted LNG Liquefaction and regasification Capacities are evidence 
of this. 
683 Although some Petroleum Exporters (like Saudi Arabia or Trinidad) prefer a reasonably even growth of 
revenue (rather than windfalls), the generalization is based on their common socio-economic (and political) 
needs.  
684 Beneficial to Exporters but without a resultant ‘demand destruction’ or disruption to trade 
685 That is in terms of quality (Sulphur; Hydrogen sulphide; Hydrogen and Oxygen content; as well as, other 
impurities). 
686 100% of Nigerian LNG’s long term contracts are delivered sales. For tax purposes, sales to the US are 
delivered (ownership is transferred) before entry into US territorial waters and termed CIF. As part of its 
agreement with the European Commission, Algeria’s Sonatrach would transform all existing FOB and CIF 
sales contracts to D.E.S. See EUROPA, Commission and Algeria reach agreement on territorial restrictions 
and alternative clauses in gas supply contracts. 
687 Given the number of non-dedicated vessels under construction and free entry into the shipping industry, 
capacity is assumed sufficient.  
688 The basis for this assumption is described extensively in Appendix 3. 
689 This author appreciates that weather and storage costs are important factors that affect LNG demand and 
price formation in most domestic markets in the Atlantic Basin.   
690 The model covers contracts running until 2013. 
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 Exporters’ market share is defined by existing691contracts and capped by their 
liquefaction capacity (at 95% of their nameplate capacity692) 
 
 Figure 4.3 Potential Global LNG Supply Vs Demand (2006-2020)693 
 
 
 Demand for LNG exists (as Figure 4.3 shows) in the five countries of interest 
and there is sufficient capacity694 to regasify the contracted volumes 
 Demand is inelastic with respect to price in the short term (Base Case) but 
changes in different scenarios 
  
4.2.2 Data Description and Model Specification 
Most of the data (Contract Volumes and Prices) used in the simulation were 
extracted by author from Gas Strategies Database.695 Gas Strategies is a 
Consultancy which provides services to Companies in the LNG industry and 
provided the data on the grounds they would be used confidentially. As such, the 
data is reliable to the extent that it was sourced from a reputable organization in the 
industry. To mitigate this shortcoming, the accuracy of some data was verified by 
comparing them with data from the trade press. Meanwhile, Appendix 3 
                                                 
691 Including on-going constructions capacity expected by 2013 
692 In reality, however, actual capacity could be about 85% - due to operational problems with feed-gas 
supplies; liquefaction plants and host community issues. 
693 Harris, F. and Law, G., Seller’s market for LNG set to last, A Perspective from Wood Mackenzie. 
694 Currently the US and Spain underutilise their regasification capacity. 
695 See www.GasStrategiesOnline.com 
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systematically lists most of the data (non-confidential) used in the simulation 
exercise.  
 
The author simulates Atlantic Basin LNG trade involving six exporters and five 
importers in a simple spreadsheet model. The objective function696 is defined in the 
Base Case as the product of Average Monthly Contract697 Volume and simulated698 
Price. Changes in the revenue variables – price and contract volume - are captured 
and analyzed subsequently. Simulation and scenarios analyses enable the author 
to compare each Exporter’s situation within and without a mechanism (Uniform 
Pricing or Volume Control).  
 
The following defines the simple model: 
ionsconsiderat zero-Non         0;0;0
ConstraintCapacity  RegasRe (i),importer every for 
ConstraintCapacity Supply  Subject to
Function Objective        )(
0
        
5
1
                      
5
1
6
1
5
1
R









 
eieiei
ei
e
ei
i
e i
eiei
ei
tPQ
gQ
LiqQ
QP
Q
i
e
evenue
 
 
Where:  
Pei = Price paid for 1mmBTU of LNG contracted/sold destination ex-ship (d.e.s) by 
exporter ‘e’ to importer ‘i’ (and unit699 transportation cost is assumed part of it)  
e = Exporters (e = 1, 2, 3…6); i = Importers (i = 1, 2, 3…5) 
Qei = Trade (actual Volume delivered by (e) to (i)) 
Liqe = Exporter (e)’s Liquefaction Capacity and  
Regi  = Import (i)’s Regasification Capacity 
                                                 
696 Total revenue function of each benefit-optimizing exporter. 
697 Future LNG contracts up to 2013 have been captured and to allow for spot transactions, contractual 
obligation is not a constraint to revenue maximization.  
698 To allow for Simulation: Palisade Decision Tools software (@Risk) generates the fit for the historical data 
and simultaneously creates a distribution function used in Excel to simulate, compare and analyze variables. 
It permits the definition of all uncertainties related to all the input variables and determines the likely range 
of outcomes for each output variable in a probability distribution. 
699 Generally, in the Atlantic Basin, shipping cost ranges from 55 to 86 cents per MMBTU over a nautical 
mile. For example, Nigeria to the UK costs about 86cents; Algeria to Spain is about 55cents while Qatar to 
the UK is about $1 per MMBTU. 
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Specifically, inputs in the Model are Average Monthly Contract Volumes700, 
historical LNG Prices for Spain and France; historical Brent and WTI Crude Prices; 
Henry Hub and NBP701 natural gas prices. Due to the unavailability of actual 
contract pricing formulas, spot prices (NBP for UK; H/H for USA; and TTF for Italy 
and France) are used as proxies for actual contract prices. Spot natural gas prices 
are the closest substitutes for LNG long term contract prices but they have the 
tendency to make the revenue data more volatile. The impact of this limitation was 
reduced by using @Risk to fit the data.  
  
Figure 4.4 Schematic diagram of ABLTM702  
 
 
With different iteration results in each scenario (see Figure 4.4), the model’s outputs 
are: LNG prices (specific and uniform); change (%) in Price and Revenue. Other 
exogenous inputs considered are shipping cost per distance per MMBTU;703 Gas 
Storage Data for each importing country; LNG demand projections; liquefaction and 
regasification capacities. 
 
                                                 
700 Total Annual Contracted Volume divided by 12. 
701 Used after conversion from p/th to $/mmBtu using: 100,000 Btu = 1 Therm and monthly exchange rates. 
702 Chapter Five then addresses how the quantitative outcome fits into each exporter’s gas context and export 
strategy. 
703 This was useful in arriving at an assumed value for transportation in the U.P Formula. 
U. PRICING 
SCENARIO 
Input data and apply 
U.P. Formula in 
Objective Function 
Yes:  
Elasticity 
effects→ V.CONTROL 
SCENARIO 
FIT HISTORICAL 
DATA FOR EACH 
VARIABLE TO 
OBTAIN 
DISTRIBUTION 
Input data and apply 
Quota, in Objective 
Function 
No: 
Short Run  
Quota affects price? 
Compare changes in earnings within 
and across countries before and after 
applying Uniform Pricing Formula 
Compare changes in market share 
across countries before and after 
applying Quota 
Compare changes in earnings 
within and across countries before 
and after applying Quota 
------Input/Fitting -------------------Processing/Simulation/Iteration------------------Output and Interpretation-------
-------- 
Run 1,000 Iterations   Probability Distn. 
 Subject to Constraints            Used for comparison 
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In the Model’s Base Case, LNG long-term contracts704 reflect the monthly revenue 
portfolio and market share of each exporter. Mean Prices705 are generated through 
several iterations706 using Latin Hypercube. This process uses the entire distribution 
of historical prices rather than running regression to estimate price equations for 
each exporting country. It is also effective for forecasting future prices using past 
behaviour. “For example, because the price of natural gas tends to fluctuate with the 
season, periodic price data gathered over several years can be used in modeling 
future price variations for that fuel”707. Furthermore, the iteration process automates 
the random selection of scenarios. By using the same SEED numbers for iterating, 
the input clusters are chosen evenly across the variables and so the outcomes 
converge.   
  
4.3 SIMULATION EXERCISE 
Two hypothetical scenarios of trade influence are simulated. Subsequently, in each 
scenario, the model solves for prices and generates a mean price for each exporter 
to generate simulation results. First, the Uniform Pricing proposition and then the 
Volume Control option follows. Given its assumptions, each subsection begins with 
a background that describes its peculiar market scenario. 
  
4.3.1 Uniform Pricing Scenario 
Exporters uniformly adopt a combined WTI-Brent crude oil-linked pricing formula708 
for their long-term LNG contracts. For the purpose of simulation and analysis, it is 
assumed the Group determines LNG price at ($X per BTU) by applying the 
following additive709 formula:               
   PLNG = A + bY + μ 
Where:   A = Fixed component of Price710 
                                                 
704 1996 to 2013: sourced from Gas Strategies Online UK, Global LNG Database 
705 Given the assumption of sales destination ex-ship (d.e.s) 
706 By using Palisade Decision Tools to run Best-fit on historical LNG contract volumes and prices.   
707 Palisade, KnowledgeBase: Create a Distribution from new Results at 
http://helpdesk.palisade.com/kb/masterFrame.asp?http://helpdesk.palisade.com/kb/article.asp?ID=675   
708 Defined based on the principle proposed in Chapter 3 above 
709 LNG Price formulas may either be additive or multiplicative but for simplicity, a linear relationship 
between LNG Price and Oil is assumed.   
710 Sufficient to cover cost of feed gas but, in this work, it is assumed equal and fixed for all exporters. 
Hence, its value does not affect the outcome. 
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               Y = 




 
2
)( WTIBrent
(i.e. average Brent and WTI Prices)  
               b = 0.1717711 
   μ = r*Md  
The fixed component ‘A’ in the formula covers the unit cost of feed gas and 
transportation cost. The transport element is assumed exogenously determined712 
and a function of the distance from exporter to importer (or difference in distance in 
the case of a swap713). On the average, unit cost of transporting LNG per distance 
change only when larger vessels, which yield economies of scale, are used. In this 
exercise, given the specific-sized vessel assumption, transport cost per distance is 
fixed.714  
  
Md is the margin (rent or profit) consequent upon arbitrage/diversion of an LNG 
vessel; while r is the proportion (of the margin - Md) accruable to each exporting 
country. The variable μ ensures that exporters capture arbitrage rent. In a world of 
increasing flexibility, μ (especially the ratio ‘r’) is the mechanism that would ensure 
Uniform Pricing does not hamper or discourage arbitrage. As the Profit Splitting 
Mechanism (PSM)715, it would, motivate both importers and exporters to seek716 
arbitrage opportunities for their mutual benefit (since the off-taker gets (1-r)). In the 
short term, for instance, price differentials are caused by changes in 
demand/supply; weather (seasonal) or storage capacity and so do result in 
arbitrage.717 On long term basis, a 20% premium above Henry Hub (HH) netback 
could be enough incentive for LNG diversion eastward (across the Atlantic or to 
Asia) by an exporter.718  
                                                 
711 Derived from the 6 to 1 Rule-of-Thumb and the coefficient of Brent-WTI Crude Oil Prices 
712 Typically the shipping industry has specific rates for specific Dead Tonne Weights for specific distances 
or destinations.  
713 To avoid cross-shipping and reduce transport costs exporters (and other counterparties) sometimes use 
swap agreements.  
714 The transport cost to each regasification terminal is available from Gas Strategies Online, UK. 
715 Generally, the industry considers Profit Sharing a fairly convenient mechanism for the allocation of 
arbitrage rent. Currently, with a PSM clause, buyers and sellers share the margin, after deducting any extra 
costs of diverting a cargo. Such PSM clauses also contain provisions that allow for independent confirmation 
of secondary price(s) (if considered non-transparent). 
716 Irrespective of the nature of the sale (whether FOB, CIF or DES). 
717 Not considered in the simulation exercise below 
718 Fesharaki, F., Asian, global LNG Markets in transition are defining future, Vol. 4, Issue 3, LNG 
Observer, July 01, 2007. 
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Meanwhile, crude oil prices are simulated using a 6-0-2 escalation formula: six-
month-average; zero time-lag and rolled over every two months. The six-month 
average evens out seasonal price fluctuations and so the underlying effects on 
price are ignored in the simulation exercise. The coefficient ‘b’ equals one-sixth of 
the referenced indices and determined by applying the energy content principle (or 
simply 6-to-1 Rule of Thumb). So for every Brent-WTI crude oil price of $60, Y 
equals $10.  
  
Previously, simple Rules of Thumb719 have been applied in forecasting prices 
through the relationship between crude oil and natural gas prices. Developed by 
observing prices, the rules fairly described 1990s oil-gas price relationships in the 
US. When assessed with Henry Hub gas prices, for the past 20 years, results 
revealed that the 10-to-1 rule consistently under-forecasts, while the 6-to-1 rule 
consistently over-forecasts natural gas prices.720 Adopting the energy content 
principle (6-to-1 rule) in the Uniform Price Formula721 for LNG contract price 
determination yields some interesting results. A casual observation of LNG prices 
from 1998 to winter 2005 (gas price hikes) reveals that the formula generally tracks 
Algerian, Spanish722 and Italian long term LNG contract prices.  
  
Theoretically, the formula consistently captures the co-integrated relationship that 
exists between oil and natural gas723 in the domestic markets. Therefore, when oil 
price is rising (falling), LNG could still be price-competitive relative to oil products 
and pipeline gas, provided crude oil price remains fairly724 high. Generally, however, 
when domestic natural gas prices are low, the determined price of LNG could be 
                                                 
719 In the US, the 10-to-1 rule was used initially to forecast natural gas price. Later the 6-to-1 rule emerged to 
reflect the 5.825MBTUenergy content of a WTI barrel of oil. Japanese LNG Importers still apply some 
variations of these rules against the Japanese Crude Cocktail (JCC) for price determination in spot deals and 
Long term contracts. 
720 Brown, S.P.A. and Yucel, M.K., What drives natural gas prices? Research Dept., Federal Reserve Bank, 
Dallas, Working Paper 0703. February 2007. 
721 That is the coefficient ‘b’ in the formula defined above. 
722 Spain is the largest importer of gas in the Atlantic Basin and did set the LNG price for Europe in 2005/6 
winter seasons. See Frisch, M and Lapuerta, C. Price shocks reveal trends in Atlantic Basin Markets. 
723 The end-product of LNG 
724 That is price which the market can bear - consumers are able to pay- and high enough not to erode future 
demand within the global economic context. For further discourse on this, see Alhajji, A.F., What is the 
‘Fair’ Price of Oil?  
Chapter Four: Atlantic Basin LNG Trade Model 
 
 
 
 
127 
higher.725  The Formula, therefore, ensures that domestic natural gas prices (pricing 
regimes/policies) and storage levels would only affect spot LNG prices. So, rather 
than cheat in a uniform pricing set-up, exporters could gradually increase the 
volume of their spot deals to gain from demand-pull or volatility-induced arbitrage.  
   
4.3.1.1 Scenario Specific Assumptions/Inputs 
 The Uniform Pricing Formula (defined above) is applied to determine a 
(minimum) price ($X) for all Exporters and adopted in all existing contracts726 
 From the medium to long term, LNG demand is elastic;  
 The price elasticity of demand for natural gas, in each European market, is 
adjusted to determine the index for LNG; 
 From Holz et’ al727, the following elasticity indices (ψ) for natural gas demand 
were determined for the European importers: France(-0.70); Italy(-0.75) 
Spain(-0.65); and UK(-0.70)728 
  
Table 4.2 Natural Gas Consumption (Bcm) vis-à-vis LNG Trade movements in 
2006  
To↓ 
Total 
LNG 
Imports 
Gas  
Consumption729 
LNG as 
a % of 
N.G 
Nat Gas 
Elasticity 
LNG 
Elasticity 
USA    16.56    619.7 2.67% 0.90 0.02 
France    13.88    45.2 30.74% 0.75 0.23 
Italy      3.10    77.1 4.02% 0.70 0.03 
Spain    24.42    33.4 73.16% 0.75 0.55 
UK      3.56    90.8 3.92% 0.70 0.03 
 Source: Cedigaz 
 
 Relying on Holz and Pavel730 elasticity of US natural gas demand (-0.90)731 
is used with the above indices to determine the effect of changes in LNG 
price;  
                                                 
725 As stated earlier, the ultimate aim of Uniform Pricing is keeping LNG Price(s) higher than would have 
been 
726 For instance, some terms in EU-Algeria trade agreement applies to existing contracts. Although the 
agreement is bilateral, other exporters could be compelled indirectly to do same. See EUROPA, Commission 
and Algeria reach agreement on territorial restrictions and alternative clauses in gas supply contracts.  
727 Holz, F. et’ al A Strategic Model of European Gas Supply (GASMOD), 2006 Discussion Papers of DIW 
Berlin 551, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. 
728 Each Country’s index is increased/decreased by 0.05 (against the regional index: -0.7) depending on the 
share of natural gas in the importer’s energy mix (i.e. +0.05 for relatively low gas consuming countries and 
vice versa). In this Scenario, the natural gas elasticity indices are further adjusted, by the percentage of LNG 
supplied to each market, to determine the corresponding effect of a change in LNG price (Table 4.2 shows 
the elasticity indices).  
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 In addition to the above, all prior Base Case assumptions still hold 
 
4.3.1.2 Simulation Outcome732 
A simulation of 1000 iterations reveals, with about 95% probability, an increase in 
the revenue of exporting countries. Appendix 1 captures the probability distribution 
and significance of the outcomes. The output graphs show a good distribution 
spread for the results obtained and this indicates a significant range relative to the 
likelihood of occurrence.  
 
Given a high probability of obtaining desirable results, a small spread in possible 
outcomes is generally preferable. In addition, the graphs show that the probability of 
the occurrence is fairly concentrated around specific outcomes rather than being 
uniform across the range. It is evident from the graphs, however, that the change in 
monthly revenue of all exporters, yield a better spread than the change in unit price. 
This is rational because of the diverse range of prices at which LNG is sold in 
different markets.  
 
Table 4.3 Model Result: Change in Exporters’ revenues and market shares due to 
Uniform Formula induced price rise 
% CHANGE IN EXPORT PRICE DUE TO U.P 
EXPORTERS 
 
% Δ IN  
REVENUE 
% Δ IN  
MARKET 
SHARE FRANCE ITALY SPAIN UK U.S.A 
ALGERIA 8.48 -1.43% 48.62% 57.96% 57.96% 0.00% 37.79% 
EGYPT -16.16% -1.66% 44.81% 11.88% 11.88% 0.00 0.00 
LIBYA -23.89% -0.31% 0.00 0.00 68.67% 0.00 0.00 
NIGERIA -2.17% -0.45% 44.81% 54.27% 54.27% 0.00 3.69% 
QATAR 37.91% 4.37% 0.00 65.94% 65.94% 40.94% 56.21% 
TRINIDAD 2.92% -0.51% 0.00 0.00 50.00% 0.00 24.85% 
 
In the inelastic demand scenario,733 all the exporters recorded positive price gains 
due to the application of the uniform formula. Accordingly, Table 4.3 shows (in 
                                                                                                                                                                  
729 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2007  
730 Holz, F. and Pavel, F., Will there be enough for everybody? at www.infraday.tu-
berlin.de/fileadmin/documents/infraday/2005/papers/pavel_holz_Will_There_be_Enough_for_Everybody.pd
f  
731 Unlike Holz and Pavel, the elasticity is adjusted by 0.1 in absolute value to account for the decreasing 
North American production and increasing share of gas in the US energy mix. 
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columns 4 to 8) the percentage change in unit price, for the respective exporters in 
different markets. In this regard, Qatar benefits comparatively more, while Trinidad 
gains the least - this is traceable to the fact that Trinidad and Tobago exports its 
LNG mainly to the US. 
 
Moreover, Table 4.3 also captures (in column 2) the percentage change in 
exporters’ Monthly Revenue in the elastic demand scenario. This is different from 
the inelastic demand scenario – as reflected in Appendix 1. The reason is because, 
when demand becomes elastic,734 it results in a reduction in imports (market shares 
– Column 3) and revenues for some exporters. From this static perspective, it is 
notable from the Table that Egypt, Libya and Nigeria suffer revenue losses. Algeria, 
Qatar and Trinidad, on the other hand, earned more revenue. Similar to the price 
gain situation, Qatar gained the most revenue absolutely and relatively, while 
Trinidad gained the least. From an importer’s perspective, Spain could incur the 
highest price increase because it relies heavily on contracted LNG and has a rigid 
domestic gas market.735 
 
The change in revenue is due to a simultaneous (iterated) price adjustment in 
comparison with the base case. It generates the possibility of swapping or 
interchanging supply/destination locations for certain suppliers - but only to the 
extent of liquefaction capacity available. Given that piped gas supply is a competitor 
for LNG, there is possibility of diversion of gas to pipeline export for the losing 
exporters.736  
   
From the exercise, it has been found that there is clearly a change in market share 
for all exporters but the exact level of change depends not only on the elasticity of 
demand in each importing market, but also on the demand situations in various 
other importing markets and how importers respond in general. Exporters’ response 
                                                                                                                                                                  
732 See Simulation Summary; @Risk Summary Reports and Output Graphs, in Appendix 1, as guide to 
understanding this sub-section.  
733 When importers do not respond to UP- induced changes in price. 
734 Indicating a medium/long run reduction in demand due to the sudden adoption of the Uniform Pricing 
Formula 
735 Historically, Spain takes all its contracted LNG volumes and sometimes resells.  
736 Perhaps, Algeria that has significant pipeline export capacity (to do this) could utilize the opportunity to 
compensate those that lost revenue. More so because the choice of swapping is open to all exporters within 
the group. 
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to the change in market share and revenue would, furthermore, depend on their 
uncontracted liquefaction capacity and the spot market price for LNG. Ultimately, in 
a dynamic scenario, Uniform Price can only impact on exporters’ revenue 
negatively, overtime, if the consequent fall in demand737 surpasses the exogenously 
generated price increase.  
  
4.3.1.3 Theoretical Explanation of Outcome 
Economic theories of elasticity, demand and supply confirm the above simulation 
results. The exercise indicates that: Each exporter’s revenue increases by (ΔP) * 
(Qe) and the Group’s revenue also increases by   )(*)( 
6
1
e
e
Q

P . 
Where: ΔP = UP – Pt  (i.e. Change in Unit Price)  
UP is the Uniform Price determined through the new Formula 
Pt is the Contracted Price 
Qe is the Average Monthly Contract Volume for Exporter ‘e’ 
In the short term, to the extent that gas is less costly;738 appliance (capital) stock is 
fixed; storage capacity is constant; and LNG importers are willing to pay the new 
price (UP). Given the short-run assumption of inelasticity, each Exporter’s market 
share should not change. 
 
Theoretically, the long run outcome is obtainable only to the extent that there would 
be sufficient affordable substitutes to replace LNG in each domestic market.739 The 
result simply indicates that, 90% of the time, each exporter’s volume is reduced by 
the value ΔQe740, while that of the Group is reduced by )( 
6
1
e
e
Q

 ceteris paribus.   
Where:  
 ΔQe = )( 
5
1
ei
i
Q

 (i.e. the total change in Average Monthly Contract Volumes 
from Exporter (e) to all importers ( i = 1,2,3…5)) 
 ΔQei = (Qei* ψi)    
                                                 
737 This has to occur, generally, in the importing markets.  
738 Relative to substitute fuels and the cost of Carbon Emission Permits 
739 In the long run we're all dead” Keynes, J.M. quoted in 
http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/j/johnmaynar110030.html  
740 Change in Average Monthly Contracted Volume for exporter (e). 
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 ΔQei is change in Average Monthly Contract Volume from Exporter (e) to 
importer (i) 
Qei is Average Monthly Contract Volume from Exporter (e) to importer (i) 
ψi  is the price elasticity of demand for LNG in importing-Country (i) 
 
To the extent that relative gains, from the new price are fair, cheating may not be 
attractive. This is economically rational because higher gas prices could motivate 
Exporters to collude and reap the margin,741 rather than let importing countries have 
it. Despite the above economic (price and revenue) incentives indicated by the 
model, the following conditions would enhance the feasibility of uniform pricing, as a 
market influence mechanism:  
 
 Transparent LNG Pricing742  
A neutral pricing mechanism that is transparent, independent of any specific project 
and not directly linked to any domestic/regional gas market. This would ensure that 
the Uniform Price does not alter the basis risk inherent in most established grids. 
This is because the flow of LNG into liquid natural gas markets adjusts the basis 
differentials743. For illustration, assume the Uniform Formula is based on Henry Hub 
natural gas price. An LNG vessel imported into the US east coast, for instance, 
would automatically adjust the basis differentials, Henry Hub gas price and 
simultaneously the Uniform LNG Price.  
 
The proposed uniform pricing formula (or any other) can not be a mechanism for 
standardizing LNG pricing and simultaneously be a mechanism for influencing744 
the market. It would be completely ineffective for Exporters to influence the various 
pricing mechanisms in the Atlantic Basin with one and the same Pricing Formula. 
Differences in pricing patterns across the importing markets would make Uniform 
                                                 
741 Gas has two price components: Production cost component borne by producers and substitution cost by 
the consumers. 
742 No global reference price for LNG exists and so the current pricing regime is not open but negotiated 
secretly and shrouded in mutual suspicion. Essentially, it should be one that is linked indirectly to importing 
markets but not linked directly to competing fuels (coal, electricity, nuclear, solar or biofuels). More 
specifically, an LNG Hub determined price (either Dubai’s LNG Hub (DUB) or Qatar’s International 
Mercantile Exchange or any other) may suffice. 
743 On a pipeline network, this can be defined generally as the geographic pricing relationships among 
different points. 
744 Determining a higher market price for LNG 
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Pricing ineffective as there would be various loopholes and price incentives for 
exporters to cheat. A more transparent and standard LNG pricing regime or 
benchmark is a necessary condition745 for the cooperative sharing of trade 
information by exporters and collusive market determination.  
  
 Formula should be simple:  
Given a transparent pricing regime, the Uniform Formula should be simple enough 
to make profit sharing either unnecessary or straight-forward. This is because it 
would enable exporters to determine the absolute/relative benefits of collusion and 
therefore, make trade-offs if and when necessary. There would, also be no need for 
large-scale cheating among exporters if the PSM element of the Formula (μ) is 
standardised. The vital questions demanding answers are: By what mechanism 
would ‘r’ be set? What level of ‘r’ (and ‘1-r’) would, simultaneously, satisfy exporters 
and also be an incentive for importers to divert cargoes to high price markets.  
  
 Inelasticity of LNG Demand and Low Storage Capacity:  
The availability of higher-priced substitute-fuels increases dependence on LNG 
when natural gas storage capacity is low. Conversely, low-priced alternative fuels 
could hamper LNG imports (and UP) even if gas storage is low in that market.  
  
The above conditions define some scenarios in which uniform pricing could be 
feasible? The next subsection simulates the Volume Control Mechanism.  
4.3.2 Volume Control 
A supply-restricting scenario is captured here in the model. This work presumes 
that export volumes could be controlled by cutting LNG production based on each 
Exporter’s existing Sales Contracts (and uncontracted volumes).746 Production 
levels are, therefore, curtailed by equal percentage to ensure that each country’s 
contracted volume is constrained. So, the demand elasticity index in each importing 
market and the reduction in production are used to determine specific increase in 
LNG price. One thousand iterations are then run on varying export quotas (from 1% 
                                                 
745 There are divergent opinions that a traded LNG contract with transparent price would be a challenge to 
exporters. This author, however, disagrees with the argument because traded LNG contracts permit 
speculative and secondary trading activities. 
746 Depending on the prevailing (target) price; conditions in LNG (other energy) markets and oil price, quotas 
are subsequently adjusted or reallocated, as more liquefaction capacity is added. 
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to 5%) to determine the outcomes747 in relation to Price, Revenue and Market 
Share. 
 
This conception of VC is adopted for clarity and ease of application in the model. 
The approach is also based on the industry practice that allows part of the 
contracted capacity to vary. As is the practice in real life, a fixed part (usually 
between 1 and 10%) of the contracted liquefaction capacity may be varied at the 
discretion of the exporting country. Exporters now include clauses that enable such 
optional volumes and flexible diversion in the sales contracts.748 Besides, increasing 
proportion of liquefaction capacity across the globe is uncontracted or self-
contracted. For instance, in 2005, only 188.81Bcm of the 243Bcm global 
liquefaction capacity was traded. Table 4.4 shows the 2006 figures and the 2015 
projections for each exporting country.   
 
Table 4.4 Exporters’ uncontracted liquefaction capacity749  
EXPORTERS 
2006 
LIQUEFACTION 
CAPACITY(mtpa)  
UNCONTRACTED 
CAPACITY (%) 
2015 
LIQUEFACTION 
CAPACITY (mtpa) 
UNCONTRACTED 
CAPACITY (%) 
ALGERIA 21.95 4.10 25.95 69.63 
EGYPT 12.20 14.75 20.80 39.18 
LIBYA 2.30 52.17 N/A N/A 
NIGERIA 17.05 11.44 73.95 66.26 
QATAR 25.50 12.86 77.00 ALL 
TRINIDAD 15.40 37.34 20.60 53.16 
 Source: Petroleum Economist  
 
4.3.2.1 Scenario Specific Assumptions/Inputs 
 Exporters’ Revenue Function (
 
5
1
6
1
))((
e i
eiei QP ) is still the primary function  
 Previous elasticity (ψi) assumptions still hold but they are not adjusted by the 
percentage of LNG supplied to each market, to determine the corresponding 
effect of a change in LNG price750  
                                                 
747 Only simulation outcomes for the 1% reduction in exports are reported here. 
748 The Australian North West Shelf (NWS) project’s contracts were recently renewed along this line. 
749 Extracted by author from Petroleum Economist Limited, The Future of LNG, (2007 Edition), based on 
LNG trade movements through future contracts in place by end 2006. 
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 No sudden change in average seasonal storage level 
 Increase in domestic or alternative natural gas supply insignificant or 
unavailable751  
 Constrained LNG supply is equivalent to sudden decrease in natural gas 
supply due to excess demand for LNG752 and vice versa. Therefore, a 
positive change in demand753 (δ) would generate a price increase (ΔP) equal 
to the quotient 





 i
δ
  
 Hence, 







i
δ
P  is the desired increase in Price expected from an LNG 
supply gap ((δ) measured in terms of available754 natural gas supply) 
 All existing contract volumes are reduced by δ%  
 Maximum exportable quota for each Country is (1- δ)% 
 LNG is the marginal supply to the importing markets: therefore balances any 
difference between demand and supply at time t;  
 
4.3.2.2 Simulation Outcome755 
The simulation reveals, with over 90% chance, increase in the price of LNG756 
payable by the importers to exporting countries. Similar to the UP case, the output 
distributions are spread across a small range relative to their probabilities. The 
graphs also indicate that the probability distributions are fairly concentrated rather 
than uniform. Figure 4.5 captures the percentage change in Natural Gas price due 
to 1% reduction in LNG exports from each of the six exporting countries, given the 
price elasticity assumptions,757 from a static perspective.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
750 It is assumed that any reduction in LNG Exports automatically reduces natural gas supply by the volume. 
The natural gas elasticity indices are, therefore, used directly to determine the corresponding effect of a 
change in LNG supply (see formula for ΔP above). 
751 Such an assumption could overstate the effects of LNG supply restriction but, in a 2013 scenario, it is 
valid given the long lead (response) time of natural gas (or pipeline) projects. Furthermore, most of the 
consuming countries (including the US and UK) may not have sufficient gas deposits.  
752 This is because natural gas prices in most competitive markets respond to demand increases. 
753 Conversely, an equivalent decrease in Supply. 
754 This includes both domestic production and pipeline supply. 
755 See Simulation Summary; @Risk Summary Reports and Output Graphs, in the Appendix 2, as guide to 
understanding of this sub-section. 
756 Supply reduction raise natural gas price in the importing market and this consequently increases the 
netback for LNG from that Market.  
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Initially, there is no change in market share due to the equal reduction in export 
volume. Subsequently, if demand does not fall, then the volume of spot LNG and/or 
pipeline gas export could increase.758 The graph indicates that, given the 
assumptions, the US is the least affected by the constrained LNG supply problem 
simulated, while, Italy is be the worst affected after Spain.759 
 
Figure 4.5 Percentage Change in Natural Gas Price due to 1% reduction in LNG 
exports from each of the 6 exporting countries 
0.00%
0.20%
0.40%
0.60%
0.80%
1.00%
1.20%
1.40%
1.60%
FRANCE ITALY SPAIN UK U.S.A
 
  
In the short-run, to the extent that demand does not change, each exporter’s 
revenue increases proportionately by the price rise. The above result is similar to 
that obtained by the EMF’s Study in their constrained LNG scenario. In their cases, 
however, constrains were placed on regasification terminals (capacity) while 
European importers were grouped together. Their result760 did not capture the size 
of each exporter’s restriction nor was the volume of import restriction in individual 
importing markets.  
 
A probable demand-side response to this scenario is captured, from a long run 
perspective, through the assumed elasticity indices. Because the price increase is 
                                                                                                                                                                  
757 Indicating demand-side response to the sudden uniform price change 
758 Likely changes in spot LNG (or pipeline gas) supply is not simulated here but it is very relevant if 
demand remains constant/increases. What is more significant, however, is that most of the exporting 
countries considered here participate in spot LNG trade.   
759 This could be due to the poor liquidity in these markets and the lack of pipeline connection to other 
European markets. These markets are extensively described in Chapter 2 and the results contextualized in 
Chapter 5. 
760 See Figures 4.1 and 4.2, as well as, subsection 4.1.2 (Literature Review). 
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more than the demand elasticity, generally, all exporters recorded positive change 
in revenue. Figure 4.6 above shows the corresponding percentage increase, in 
average monthly revenue, for respective exporters due to the reduction in LNG 
exports.761 Specifically, Egypt gains more, while Trinidad gains the least relatively. 
 
Figure 4.6 Percentage Change in Monthly Revenue for the exporting countries 
due to 1% reduction in LNG exports  
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The model would not yield a similar result if quotas are not applied equally among 
exporters. If different quotas are to be considered, then the allocation has to be 
effective and specific enough762 such that each exporter gains sufficiently763 from 
the decrease in export. In such a scenario, though not simulated here, some 
exporters could loose/gain market share in the long term supply market. But, as 
importers respond to the supply-side shock, demand (and price) for spot LNG 
imports could increase as well - to the benefit of exporters (ultimately).  
  
4.3.2.3 Theoretical Explanation of Outcome 
The simulation process - a thousand iterations – indicates individual and collective 
increase in the revenue of exporting countries. Specifically, each exporter’s price 
changes and revenue increases by (ΔP * Qe).  
                                                 
761 The probability distributions for these outcomes - indicating their spread and significance - could be seen 
in Appendix 2 ((a) to (e)).  
762 Because different pricing formulas are used for selling to different markets both transparently and 
secretly. 
763 Price increase should be high enough to generate higher revenue despite the reduction in export. 
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The Group’s revenue also increases by )(*)( 
6
1
e
e
Q

P      
Where:    ΔP = Pt (1+%ΔP) (i.e. Change in Unit Price);  
%ΔP is the percentage change in price due to δ% change in AMCV  
Pt is the Contracted Price; Qe is the new AMCV due to δ 
Theoretically, a sustained LNG supply restriction would shift the long run natural 
gas price path upward, ceteris paribus. To the extent that the sudden shift in price 
path (upward) becomes permanent in the importing markets, LNG supply 
manipulation would affect price. Economic theory, therefore, supports the results, if 
the assumption that 







i
δ
P  is true; and to the extent that gas is a less costly764 
fuel; appliance (capital) stock is fixed; storage capacity is constant; and end-users 
are indifferent to the new price but concerned about supply security. In the 
alternative, however, the higher long-run price path could be a motivation for fringe 
producers to produce/invest more; better fuel-efficiency and consequently change in 
supply/demand.  
 
It is sometimes argued that LNG imports are small765 and that it is a price taker. But, 
since prices are marginally determined,766 imports (or restrained imports) generate 
disproportionate impacts on domestic natural gas prices.767 This implies that 
constrained LNG exports can either result in higher netback value or spot price for 
LNG and in both cases exporters benefit. So, Volume Control would be feasible in 
the following scenarios: 
  
 Accurate Elasticity Indices:  
The elasticity estimates768 for each market ought to be accurate enough to 
determine the long-term price. There seems to be no literature on the price elasticity 
of LNG demand. This could be traceable to the fact that LNG has been a price 
taker. A second reason is because it does not have a unique reference price.  
                                                 
764 Vis-à-vis substitute fuels and the cost of Carbon Emission Permits 
765 Relative to the volume of gas consumed in the major Atlantic importing markets (hence a price taker). 
766 According to economic theory, the long run price of natural gas, in any market, is determined by the 
interaction or intersection of the marginal supply source (curve) with demand (in that market and others). 
767 As well as, imported LNG price both in the short term (Spot market) and in the long run. 
768 The long-run, own price elasticities for natural gas for OECD Importers could lie between –0.774 and 
0.075 according to Liu, G., in Estimating Energy Demand Elasticities for OECD Countries. Discussion 
Papers Statistics, Norway, 2004.  
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 A sort of scarcity (real or imaginary) 
Exporters would need some tightness to effectively manipulate the market or 
determine price. This means that for prices in the Atlantic Basin to be affected by 
constrained exports consumers must perceive the supply reduction as an 
impending scarcity.769 The perceived scarcity should be sufficient to either increase 
domestic pipeline gas prices or spot LNG price and consequently LNG netbacks.770 
In other words, LNG ought to be the marginal source of natural gas supply in the 
importing market. If otherwise, exporters would have to ensure that the volume of 
LNG withheld from each market is significant relative to the size of the importing 
market. The next vital question is: to what extent could the price (or revenue) 
increase compensate for the associated costs of constraining exports?  
  
 Cost of holding capacity must be low relative to price gains:  
The economic question of compensation for spare capacity is, theoretically and 
practically, fundamental to the feasibility of any volume control mechanism. 
Theoretically, the cost of keeping liquefaction capacity idle is a disincentive to 
supply restriction. However, higher netbacks (or spot prices) could be an incentive 
to withhold some volumes for better yielding long/short term transactions.  
 
The comparison of spare capacity cost against expected benefits was not 
considered in the model for simplicity and clarity. Nevertheless, the net benefit of 
holding spare capacity could be determined by matching the foregone revenue771 
against the expected revenue (from the new price and volume). Another realistic but 
more complex772 approach, arguably, is to compare the net present value of all 
future expected revenue with the foregone revenue. There are also unquantifiable 
costs of restricting exports. 
 
                                                 
769 Either in the importing market, other importing markets or LNG market 
770 An underlying presumption to this assertion is that is that natural gas stock is either too low or there is 
insufficient storage capacity. 
771 That is the product of ‘current netback’ and ‘withheld capacity’. 
772 The expected netback value, from different price forecasts for each importing market, would be 
determined for each exporter. 
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In practice, however, liquefaction plants rarely run up to their nameplate capacity.773 
So, a key consideration, for exporters would be to meet project finance repayment 
obligation. Moreover, if market share and cartel profit is to depend on such a 
nebulous concept as ‘capacity’ there may be more incentive to try to find ways to 
increase it by debottlenecking - real or imagined. Therefore, VC makes economic 
sense, only to the extent that the margin from such high-yield transactions exceeds 
the opportunity costs of holding spare capacity after fulfilling project finance 
obligations (if any).   
   
 Management of risks with financial instruments: 
The above discourse highlights the costs of contracting LNG on the basis of 
projected prices (formulas) in today’s trading environment. Therefore, contracts 
would have to be very flexible with respect to price, volume and destination for VC 
to be feasible. This would require LNG project financiers to use financial 
instruments to manage their risks as the market evolves. 
 
 Low Transport Cost or LNG Trading Hub/Exchange:  
It is highly probable that importers would resort to spot cargoes to replace restricted 
LNG exports. As the number of spot deals increases, it would be easier for 
exporters to restrain LNG volumes - as a means of influencing price (and the 
market). The emergence of a liquid trading hub, therefore, would easily facilitate VC 
in both Contract and Spot markets for LNG. For instance, VC could impact Spot 
LNG just as OPEC actions affect oil price through speculators in the oil market.  
 
Given the proportion of transport cost in LNG Price, a low shipping cost regime 
would also enhance the prospects of VC. The reason being that negotiable rent is 
reduced when the transport cost per unit of LNG over a nautical mile is high. This is 
especially so if the transactions are destination ex-ship (d.e.s). Moreover, reduction 
in LNG transport costs increases the probability of finding short-term/spot trading 
partners.774  
 
                                                 
773 Cyclical or seasonal shocks create idle capacity sometimes even though productive capacity (for 
revenue/profit) is the aim of project financiers and investors.  
774 Brito, D.L. and Hartley P.R., Expectations and the evolving World Gas Market; last paragraph, p.23, The 
Energy Journal, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2007. 
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4.3.3 Uniform Pricing (UP) or Volume Control (VC) 
Exogenous price determination may be possible if exporting countries exploit the 
substitution cost of end users rather than competing to be the least cost producer. 
The best means of achieving the latter is also an important issue. In certain 
conditions, it appears easier to influence price by a Uniform Pricing Formula while in 
others Volume Control is easier. Accordingly, an attempt is made to compare both 
mechanisms in the following paragraphs - giving further insight into their feasibility.  
 
Provided LNG is the only marginal source of supply in most markets, export 
restrictions would affect the price of both pipeline gas and LNG. Exporters only 
need to ensure that a significant775 volume is restricted globally. Therefore, with 
respect to the various pricing patterns used in the Atlantic, the Volume Control 
mechanism would be easier to apply. Large volumes of withheld LNG, however, 
imply lower exports with its revenue and contractual implications for exporters. 
Some exporters may then resort to cheating which is very difficult to detect or 
penalise. In this context, UP seems a less challenging option. Either of the 
mechanisms, however, can arguably be adopted without breaching contracts and 
the outcome is still valid even if spot transactions become predominant.776 
  
It is remarkable that the UP and VC scenarios yielded different results777 although 
the same elasticity indices were applied. Because it is not a theoretical expectation, 
there has to be a practical explanation of this outcome - both mechanisms do have 
different transmission paths. Specifically, VCM is a means778 to an end, while UPM 
is an end in itself – higher LNG price generated from the new formula.779 Besides, 
LNG doubles as marginal gas supply in some markets780 and main gas supply in 
others. As a result of the above reasons, the effect of a change in pricing formula 
(principle) is not symmetrical to a decrease in contracted capacity.  
 
 
                                                 
775 With respect to opportunity costs and the proportion of LNG in each gas market. 
776 Percentage of LNG traded globally on Spot basis has grown rapidly (but seasonally in the US and UK) 
from 1% in 1996, 8% in 2002, 11.6% in 2004 to about 17% in 2006. 
777 In terms of, change in market share and revenue. 
778 VC is an outright exogenous supply-side shock but its effect could be suppressed by other determinants of 
natural gas price in an importing market. 
779 Albeit the Formula has to be adopted in long term LNG contracts - imposed or negotiated.  
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4.4 CONCLUSION 
The question of feasibility has been modelled in a simple and clear manner. 
Considering all the issues relating to the research together would have been very 
complicated. Given demand, to some extent, Uniform Pricing or Volume control is 
statistically feasible and Exporters could influence trade. But, the exercise reveals 
that a demand-led market781 is a necessary condition for either mechanism to be 
feasible. 
 
Despite the above conclusion, the scenarios conducive for either mechanism do 
raise pertinent practical issues for consideration. It is necessary to know the extent 
to which the above conditions, for the feasibility of UP/VC, are realistic and/or 
sustainable. Given the effect of gas storage infrastructure on a country’s LNG 
(natural gas) demand, for instance, the outcome of the simulation exercise could 
differ if storage capacity is allowed to vary. Second, if such scenarios are attainable 
and either mechanism is feasible, what could be the effects on trade? The next 
Chapter considers these and other questions. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
780 In such markets, LNG is a price taker. 
781 Even if, it occurs seasonally, provided it empowers exporters. 
 
 
    CHAPTER FIVE 
CONTEXTUAL APPLICATION OF SIMULATION RESULTS 
 
5.1.1 Introduction 
The simulation exercise, in Chapter Four, generated possible outcomes of uniform 
pricing and volume control mechanisms. The chapter also compared both scenarios 
and emphasized the need for a profit splitting formula with which cartel-gains could 
be allocated. It is necessary to evaluate the results within the context of each 
exporting country. This chapter is an attempt to answer the following sub-questions:  
 What conceivable permutations of uniform pricing (UP) and/or volume control 
(VC) are realistic? 
 What are the key considerations for adopting uniform pricing or volume 
control?  
 What are the implications782 of uniform pricing or volume control for each 
exporter?  
 
The chapter is divided into four sections. It begins with a review of some literature 
on cartel formation. As a foundation for the analytical framework, the literature 
review captures the reasoning behind cartels;783 conditions for being effective and 
the principles that underlie the kind of volume/price “games” they play. Based on 
the criteria defined in section 5.1.2, section 5.2 analyzes the simulation results for 
both scenarios from each exporter’s perspective. In addition to the criteria, the 
exposition also draws from the peculiar circumstances of each country as described 
in Chapters Two and Three to reveal the basic motivations or considerations for 
parties involved in the cartel game. 
 
5.1.2 Analytical Framework 
Given that uniform pricing and volume control are potential instruments of market 
determination, inferences shall be drawn from existing cartel literature to establish 
the analytical framework. Generally, a cartel may be defined as “a combination of 
producers or sellers that join together to control a product’s production or price.”784 
                                                 
782 Attempt is also made, in the chapter, to show the conceivable benefits or losses to exporters from uniform 
pricing or volume control. 
783 That is the factors that motivate current and prospective cartel members. 
784 Garner, B. A, (Ed.); Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th edition (Minnesota: West Group, 1999) 
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       Therefore, various producers or sellers in the form of private firms or governments 
or a mixture of both may form a cartel.785 From the economic literature, four 
characteristics of a cartel can be deduced. A cartel influences the market by: 
 Having a small number of sellers/producers with a significant share of the 
market; 
 Deterring entry of new producers at the fringe by various means; 
 Controlling available capacity (supply) and capacity expansion by assigning 
quotas to its members; 
 Taking steps (enforcing quotas) with the principal aim of controlling price; 
maximizing revenue; maintaining and/or increasing market share.786   
 
Table 5.1 Some successful international natural resource cartels787 
Commodity 
 
Quota Minimum 
Price 
Action to 
defend 
Prices 
Maximum 
Market  
Share (%) 
Price 
Increase 
Diamond 
Coffee 
Bauxite 
Tin 
Rubber 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
90.0 
95.0 
81.0 
86.0 
80.0 
10 Fold 
  6 Fold 
  2 Fold 
  2.5 Fold 
  5 Fold     
 
Markets for various internationally traded commodities788 have been cartelized at 
different times. Some were unsuccessful while others (uranium, bauxite and 
diamond) have enjoyed varying degrees of success.789 In a historical study by 
Eckbo790, the efforts of such cartels were reviewed and only nineteen, out of the 
fifty-one cartels investigated, were successful.791 Huettner and Alhajji792 also 
compared few of these cartels with OPEC and the extent of their success is shown 
in table 5.1.  
                                                 
785 Desta, M. G., OPEC, the WTO, Regionalism and Unilateralism, in 3 Journal of World Trade, Vol. 37, 
(2003) 
786 Alhajji A.F. and Huettner D. OPEC and other Commodity cartels: a comparison. Page 1153, Paragraph 5, 
28 Energy Policy,  (2000) 
787 Table and its content were extracted from Alhajji, A. and Huettner, D., OPEC and other commodity 
cartels: a comparison, in Vol. 28, Energy Policy, 2000. 
788 At one time or the other, in the history of global commerce, ranging from coffee, metals to minerals. 
789 Besanko, D; et’al; Economics of Strategy, 3rd Ed; Last Paragraph, Example 6.4, Page 213, (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, 2004).  
790 Eckbo, P., OPEC and the Experience of some non-petroleum international cartels, MIT Energy Lab 
working paper, June 1975 as quoted in Pindyck, R., The cartelization of world commodity markets, in Vol. 
69, No. 2, The American Economic Review, May 1979.  
791 They succeeded in making price higher than it would have been – the main objective of UP and VC here. 
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       Drawing from Eckbo’s effort, Pindyck evaluated the reasons behind cartel 
successes. According to Pindyck, there are two preconditions for a successful 
cartel. One of the conditions put forward by Pindyck is “the potential for monopoly 
profit”. He asserts that this issue is fundamental and becomes very serious if cartel 
prices do not differ significantly from competitive prices. Within this context, the 
outcome of Chapter Four apparently shows the potential for cartel profit in LNG 
trade.793 
 
A second issue, highlighted by Pindyck, relates to the basic organisational and 
stability problems of cartels. That is, an accord on price and production levels,794 as 
well as, a means of sharing the profits, while deterring cheats.795 This set of 
conditions is similar to initial studies by Mikdashi796 and Bergsten.797 While it may 
seem that the tendency for monopoly profit is sufficient to alleviate the organisation 
problems,798 this may not be the case for LNG.  
 
One reason is because LNG is still being traded regionally and lacks a transparent 
pricing regime. Furthermore, like Fog had argued, determination of price and 
quantity is complicated by the existence of substitutes799 in the importing markets; 
different constraints800 faced by producers; and their perspectives of demand 
relative to existing supply.801   
                                                                                                                                                                  
792 Alhajji, A. and Huettner, D., OPEC and other commodity cartels: a comparison, in Vol. 28, Energy 
Policy, 2000. 
793 One may even argue that some of such monopoly profit is already being earned by LNG exporters in the 
spot market. The next chapter explicitly describes the current market situation. 
794 Pindyck, R., The cartelization of world commodity markets. Vol. 69, No. 2, The American Economic 
Review, May 1979. 
795 The need to detect and/or deter cheating, however, would depend on the Cartel’s modus operandi and the 
nature of the industry.  
796 Mikdashi, Z. Collusion could work, No. 14, Foreign Policy, spring, 1974. 
797 Bergsten, C., The threat is real, No. 14, Foreign Policy, spring, 1974. 
798 Like Pindyck assumed and suggested that the costs of maintaining a cartel would be more tolerable when 
the expected monopoly rent is high.  
799 Substitutes affect the elasticity of demand. The existence of substitutes is an important consideration for 
each LNG importer due to the peculiarity of each importing country. It fundamentally affects each exporter’s 
perception of the market and potential cartel/monopoly gains. This is one of the reasons for the application of 
different elasticity indices in Chapter 4.  
800 This may differ across producers from reserve levels to domestic demand and revenue needs. 
801 Fog, B., How are Cartel prices determined? Vol. 5, Journal of Industrial Economics, November 1976. 
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       In an exercise to show the inadequacy of cartel theory to explain OPEC behaviour, 
Alhajji and Huettner802 derived six cartel features from the economic literature. 
Namely, quota system; monitoring system; punishment mechanism; side payments 
or buffer stocks and large market share.803 In concluding, they opined that the 
dominant producer role is another factor that significantly contributes to the success 
of a producers’ group in raising price. Given the similarities of oil and LNG this is a 
factor worth considering extensively – is a swing producer essential for the success 
of uniform pricing or volume control?  
 
Comprehensively analyzing the benefits of a supply-side action would be very 
complex within the context of an evolving LNG industry. Therefore, it is necessary 
to evaluate the simulation results804 so as to determine the costs, to each exporting 
country, of raising and maintaining a higher cartel price for LNG. Agreeing more 
with Alhajji, Heuttner and Fog than Pindyck and Hnyilicza,805 the following criteria 
would facilitate such a country-specific discourse: 
 
o In terms of revenue, market share and price differential, is each country 
better-off or worse-off given its: 
 Existing and potential liquefaction capacity  
 Dependence on export revenue or discount rate806 
 Current and forecasted energy (gas) demand levels  
 
Demand considerations (domestic and external) are pivotal to each country’s 
exportable volume, as well as, the strategy of a dominant player (discussed in 
sections 5.1.2.3 and 5.3). This is an important issue, although often ignored. For 
instance, Osborne807 proposed that retaliation, by other cartel members, whenever 
                                                 
802 Alhajji, A. and Huettner, D., OPEC and other commodity cartels: a comparison, in Vol. 28, Energy 
Policy, 2000. 
803 These characteristics are similar to those in Pindyck, R., The cartelization of world commodity markets. 
Vol. 69, No. 2, The American Economic Review, May 1979. 
804 See summarised result in Table 5.3 and Figure 5.2 on pages 215 and 230 respectively. 
805 Hnyilicza, E., and Pindyck, R., Pricing policies for a Two-Part Exhaustible Resource Cartel: The Case of 
OPEC, Volume 8, European Economic Review, August, 1976. In their model of OPEC, these issues were 
considered as “simple differences in objectives” that are easily reconcilable. For LNG they could be more 
challenging. In a later article, however, Pindyck suggested, and rightly so, that resource “depletion problems 
may critically affect intertemporal pricing and production decisions”.  
806 Discount rate, here, defines a country’s willingness to forego present gains for higher prices in the future. 
807 Osborne, D., Cartel Problems, in Vol. 66, No. 5, The American Economic Review, December, 1976. 
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       one member cheats would deter cheating. Contesting Osborne’s resolution of cartel 
problems, Mills and Elzinga opined that arbitrage opportunities distort cartel 
members’ perception of the market, leading to multiple “joint profit-maximizing 
points”.808  
 
Besides, Osborne did not consider supply lead times relative to demand levels, as 
well as, the exhaustible nature of minerals. Demand levels significantly affect 
exporters’ perception of the market and also their ability to agree on a cartel price 
and volume. Moreover, retaliation - which Osborne proposed – is a function of 
existing and/or potential demand. 
 
5.1.2.1 Resource abundance  
This includes proven reserves of petroleum resources which a country has. 
Generally, the larger the existing gas reserves, the more interested an exporting 
country would be in a cartel. Specifically, a country that currently exports LNG and 
has large gas reserves would make less profit in a competitive supply situation than 
when the market is cartelized. In other words, higher reserves enhance the potential 
cartel rent relative to potential profits809 without collusion. It is, therefore, arguable 
that a gas-rich LNG exporting country (like Algeria or Russia) would be keener 
about influencing the market than a country with little reserves. Conversely, a 
relatively new LNG exporter with small reserves would be either cautious or 
indifferent about a cartel.  
 
This is because there are two issues inherent in the benefits, derivable by fringe 
producers, from cartel pricing. Those with low reserve status may be interested in 
maximizing their short-term gains and therefore encourage oversupply – with the 
consequent pressure on cartel rent. But, those with large gas reserves (like 
Venezuela) could also loose in the long run if they act likewise or indifferently.810 
Within this context, it would be important for a prospective LNG cartel to consider 
the possible reaction from other gas producers. This issue would not be covered 
                                                 
808 Mills, D. and Elzinga, K., Cartel Problems: Comment, in Vol. 68 No. 5, The American Economic 
Review, December, 1978 
809 In the long run, competitive prices become lower and consequently discounted normal profits.  
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       here but it is an area that deserves further research. Nevertheless, the probable 
effects811 of uniform pricing or volume control are considered alongside other 
market trends in Chapter Six.  
 
Table 5.2 Petroleum Resource Rating812 
 High Oil Low Oil 
High Gas Nigeria Qatar 
Low Gas Libya Algeria; Egypt; Trinidad & Tobago 
 
A broad categorisation of resource abundance, applicable in this book is shown in 
Table 5.2 above. The high oil-high gas countries are assumed to have an 
opportunistic attitude while low oil-low gas exporters are cautious in their approach.  
 
5.1.2.2 Diversified pricing versus uniform pricing  
In order to, protect revenues, LNG exporters seek diverse sales portfolio with 
different price regimes and markets.813 Each exporting country needs to reconcile 
its diverse pricing (or sales portfolio) with uniform pricing (volume control). In other 
words, why should an exporting country that applies diverse pricing principles to 
optimize its LNG sales and hedge against risk join others to fix price? Even with 
necessary enforcement814 mechanism, such a country would only cooperate if it is 
certain to earn815 significantly more from price fixing than from its current pricing 
regime.  
 
5.1.2.3 Price Leader or Swing Producer 
Economic literature816 emphasizes the dominant-producer role of Saudi Arabia817 as 
pivotal to the success of OPEC. Some key factors that determine the price strategy 
                                                                                                                                                                  
810 Certainly, competition from piped natural gas and other LNG exporters could alter cartel strategy, but, the 
actual impact of fringe producers on potential cartel gains is dependent on how demand changes and 
producers’ response to capitalize on demand lags.  
811 Effects on: new LNG/pipeline projects; markets outside the Atlantic Basin; other (fringe and emerging) 
LNG and piped gas producers; Contracts and Project Finance. 
812 This rating ignores existing production capacity and is based on the average proven reserves held by 
OPEC and the Gas exporting Countries Forum. Egypt and Trinidad are non-OPEC countries. 
813 Ball, J. and Roberts, P., LNG as a new force in global energy security. Paper presented at LNG15, 2007. 
814 Typical problem associated with price fixing. 
815 Economically (and maybe politically) in the short-run and long-run 
816 Some of the literature includes: Stevens, P., National oil companies and international oil companies in the 
Middle East: Under the shadow of government and the resource nationalism cycle, Vol. 1, No. 1, Journal of 
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       of a cartel leader are politics (policy),818 demographics, economy and energy 
demand. Fattouh;819 Stevens; Alhajji and Huettner; as well as, Doran820 emphasize 
the varying effects of these factors at different times in the history of OPEC. 
Subsequently, these same factors would be used to address the issue of an LNG 
price leader.   
 
5.1.2.4 Extra rent earned  
The collective gains, from UP or VC, may be complex to estimate, but it is easier to 
measure the extra rent achievable by each exporter. Given inelastic demand, the 
extra rent accruable to an exporter, due to a collusive action, may be derived from 
the following equation developed by John Nash and Antoine-Augustin Cournot821:  
(Price - MC) / Price = HHI / ε 
     







HHI
iceMCice PrPr  
Where: MC = Marginal Cost 
Hirschmann-Herfindahl Index (HHI) = ΣMs²  
Ms² = Square of market share (Ms) 
ε = Price elasticity of demand 
 
An exporter’s extra rent (price differential to marginal costs822) is, therefore, directly 
related to the new price, HHI and inversely proportional to the price elasticity of 
                                                                                                                                                                  
World energy Law and Business, 2008; Adelman, M., The real oil problem, in Regulation, spring 2004; 
Adelman, M, and Lynch, M; Markets for Petroleum, Encyclopedia of Energy, Volume 3, 2004; Claes, D., 
The Politics of Oil-Producer Cooperation, 2001; Alhajji, A. and Huettner, D., OPEC and other commodity 
cartels: a comparison, in Vol. 28, Energy Policy, 2000; Danielsen, A.L. The Evolution of OPEC, (1982); 
Griffin J.M. & Teece D.J (Eds), Introduction in OPEC Behaviour and World Oil Prices, 1982  
817 The nature of Saudi Arabia’s role in OPEC has been termed variously in the literature as ‘price maker’, 
swing producer, ‘punisher’ of erring members, and ‘fixed volume supplier’. 
818 Saudi’s continued influence is hinged on its five-pillar oil policy. For more on the policy, see Naimi A., 
Saudi Oil policy in a Globalised and Dynamic Market, Presentation at the 15th World Petroleum Congress, 
China, 1997. 
819 Fattouh, B., OPEC Pricing Power: The need for a new perspective, OEF, WPM 31, March 2007. Relying 
on some other literature, Fattouh suggests the need for additional research to comprehensively ascertain 
Saudi Arabia’s role. Perhaps, the outcome of such an exercise would highlight the transient nature of a cartel 
leader’s strategy as the market evolves. 
820 Doran, C., OPEC Structure and Cohesion: Exploring the Determinants of Cartel Policy. Vol. 42, No. 1, 
The Journal of Politics, February, 1980.  
821 J. Nash, Non-cooperative Games, 286-295 Annals of Mathematics, Vol. 54, no. 2 (Sept. 1951). 
822 In addition to the differential rent, part of the consumer surplus also goes to the Exporter due to the 
collusive action and the inherent capacity constraint in most energy markets. 
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       demand. Because price response, which determines the extra rent achievable, 
depends on elasticity, the simulation result would suffice.823  
 
Finally, it is important to note that some of these criteria may not apply in both 
scenarios. Neither do they have equal weights for the six exporters considering their 
peculiar circumstances. For instance, the criterion ‘Price Leader’ is more applicable 
to Algeria, Nigeria and Qatar than to the others. An R-factor analysis can be 
undertaken to allocate weights to such factors, in a manner similar to Doran’s 
work824 on OPEC member-countries. However, changing political-economic 
circumstances consistently alter the weights that can be allocated to each 
variable.825 Consequently, the systematic application of the analytical criteria, in 
each scenario, would be only to the extent necessary.   
 
5.2 Analysis of conceivable permutations  
Many permutations of uniform pricing and volume control by exporters are 
conceivable.826 In this Chapter, however, the author undertakes individual country 
analyses within two exclusive permutations - Uniform Pricing (UP) and Volume 
Control (VC) in the Atlantic Basin.   
 
5.2.1 Uniform Pricing (UP) in Atlantic Basin 
It is important to reiterate that uniform LNG pricing is a price-fixing agreement, by 
LNG exporters, to apply the same principle827 to determine the long term contract 
price payable by importers. In Chapter Three, a pricing regime was proposed and 
simulated as a cartel action in Chapter Four to generate the following result 
summary: 
Table 5.3    Comparison of extra rents earned from the application of U.P828 
                                                 
823 Given the “equal cost” assumption, as well as, a common HHI for the LNG market 
824 Doran, C., OPEC Structure and Cohesion: Exploring the Determinants of Cartel Policy. Vol. 42, No. 1, 
Journal of Politics, February, 1980 
825 For instance, Saudi Arabia’s perspective on crude oil pricing has varied overtime. 
826 Uniform Pricing (UP) in the Atlantic Basin; Volume Control (VC) in the Atlantic Basin; UP and VC in 
the Atlantic Basin; UP or VC in the Middle East or Middle and North Africa; or Asia Pacific; as well as, UP 
and VC in the Middle East or Middle and North Africa; or Asia Pacific. 
827 Indexation based on crude (WTI and Brent) prices (described earlier in sections 3.3 and 4.3.1) with the 
aim of obtaining higher prices. 
828 The changes in Monthly Revenues presented occurred in the elastic demand scenario. And so, it is 
different from the inelastic demand scenario (when importers do not respond to UP- induced changes in 
price) which is captured in Appendix 1. The reason is because, when demand becomes elastic, it activates in 
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% CHANGE IN EXPORT PRICE DUE TO U.P 
EXPORTERS 
 
% Δ IN  
REVENUE 
% Δ IN  
MKT 
SHARE FRANCE ITALY SPAIN UK U.S.A 
ALGERIA 8.48 -1.43% 48.62% 57.96% 57.96% 0.00% 37.79% 
EGYPT -16.16% -1.66% 44.81% 11.88% 11.88% 0.00 0.00 
LIBYA -23.89% -0.31% 0.00 0.00 68.67% 0.00 0.00 
NIGERIA -2.17% -0.45% 44.81% 54.27% 54.27% 0.00 3.69% 
QATAR 37.91% 4.37% 0.00 65.94% 65.94% 40.94% 56.21% 
TRINIDAD 2.92% -0.51% 0.00 0.00 50.00% 0.00 24.85% 
 
Given the above and in the light of the analytical criteria, what practical inferences 
may be drawn to support each exporter’s incentive or disincentive to collude? In 
other words, could the potential monopoly rent sufficiently motivate exporters to 
agree on a uniform price or volume control scheme? The answer would differ for 
each country. 
 
ALGERIA 
With respect to reserves, production capacity and market share, Algeria would be 
disposed to a collective pricing scheme. In line with its intention to maximize 
economic rent,829 the uniform pricing scenario yields a positive change in revenue 
and relative market share. Given the cautious approach expected, perhaps, 
Algeria’s low petroleum reserve status does not justify this assertion. It is important 
to note, however, that Algeria is not a new entrant and more gas discoveries are 
being registered.830  
 
Meanwhile, it may be recalled that Algeria had imposed higher LNG prices on its 
American buyers in the early nineteen eighties. Perceiving some concerns, the US 
Government exerted its influence and all contracts based on the new price were 
suspended – Algeria’s effort failed.831 However, the US government’s opposition to 
the contracts was not the only determining factor in the suspension of almost all 
                                                                                                                                                                  
a reduction in imports (markets shares – Column 3) and revenue for some exporters. These results are 
explained extensively in section 4.3.1.2. 
829 Giving credence to the above assertion, the Energy Minister recently expressed Algeria’s displeasure over 
the constraining effects, of long term contracts, on prices (and resource rent). 
830 The last four gas discoveries were registered on November 4, 2008 as announced in 
http://uk.zawya.com/Story.cfm/sidv51n45-3NC01/Algeria%20Registers%20Four%20Gas%20Discoveries/  
831 Davis, J.D; Blue Gold: The Political Economy of Natural Gas, Paragraph 3, Page 264, 1984.   
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       LNG deliveries to the US for more than a decade. Actually, US importers resisted 
the Algerian price (which was crude oil linked) because it was significantly higher 
than the price of other gas. Besides, deregulation happened in the US and the price 
of gas collapsed which meant that Algerian LNG was unsellable.832  
 
Another important reason why Algeria’s effort failed is because a very small volume 
of LNG cannot be priced independently from pipeline gas in a market where the 
latter dominates. This can only be done in markets where LNG dominates unless 
there is collusion by LNG exporters (or between pipeline gas and LNG exporters). 
While it is apparent that Algeria had a bitter experience then, it is actually possible 
that Algeria has drawn useful lessons applicable to uniform pricing.  
 
Besides the potential gains realizable, Algeria’s major challenge would be how to 
negotiate the uniform pricing regime into new contracts. Although Algeria has a 
reputation for bargaining sternly with its European gas customers, if the resultant 
change in price is too high demand could be destroyed.833 The simulated worst 
case scenario indicates such a fall in demand (contracted volume) following the 
adoption of uniform pricing and price rise of over 48%; 57%; 57% and 37% in 
France, Italy, Spain and US respectively. Despite the observed fall in demand, 
Algeria’s revenue still rises by about 8% (as Table 5.3 shows). 
 
Its recent successes with Spain834 and the European Commission835 
notwithstanding, it may still be difficult for Algeria (alongside other exporters836) to 
push through with a new price regime. Unless the new regime is perceived, by 
importers, as a consequence of their linkage to a globally competitive LNG 
market837 rather than a cartel-induced price change. This view is tenable since the 
marginal price of a globally traded commodity affects its price everywhere.  
                                                 
832 Details of the Sonatrach/Algeria’s price dispute with its US customers are recorded in section 2.2.1. 
833 Arguably, Algeria is the ‘lowest cost’ supplier of gas to the EU and its proximity to the market is an 
added advantage. 
834 Twenty percent (20%) staged increase of pipeline gas prices. 
835 Profit Splitting Mechanisms (PSMs) are now allowed on DES LNG sales to Europe. 
836 Figure 5.1, which shows the sources of Spanish gas supply, gives an indication of exporters’ market 
power. A historical view is captured in Table 2.7 and Figure 2.14. 
837 Although LNG is priced differently across regions, the size of Japan’s LNG imports, for instance, implies 
that its price also affects LNG prices in other markets. So, in a globally competitive market, the highest 
bidder indirectly sets the price. 
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Considering that Algeria is a key pipeline gas exporter to Europe, perhaps it could 
use its market share (export portfolio) as leverage for pushing through a new price 
regime. Arguably, Algeria is a less important exporter (of pipeline gas) than Norway 
and Russia but its LNG capacity could provide an edge. Therefore, a pertinent issue 
which arises is how would such an action impact on (be affected by) current and 
forecasted demand levels? 
 
On the issue of demand, it is worth emphasizing that domestic gas consumption in 
Algeria is increasing rapidly. And its new hydrocarbon law is preventing new 
reserves from being developed rapidly. Therefore, any demand response to the 
adoption of uniform pricing could be easily absorbed by the domestic market or sold 
in the spot market.838 But domestic gas prices in North Africa range between $0.75 
and $0.90 per mmBtu839 – about fifteen percent of the export price.840 Whether they 
are able to sell outside or not would depend on the prevailing spot price.841 If the 
Spot LNG price is lower than the cartel-based (Uniformly determined) price, then 
                                                 
838 Algeria has started reserving some liquefaction capacity with the intention of actively participating in 
short-term trading. 
839 Global Insight, The LNG market – globally now to 2025 and the implications for the UK, Report prepared 
for BERR, October 2007.  
840 For such loss in export revenue, there could be some political gains because some Algerians have argued 
for reduction in gas exports.  
841 Relative to the long term contracted LNG price (based Uniform Pricing Principles).   
Figure 5.1 Sources of gas supply to Spain (2007) 
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       sales in the spot market could undermine the UP regime – if buyers know they can 
avoid paying the UP, they simply buy spot.   
 
There are options for Algeria to hedge against risks, but its integrity would be 
affected if uniform pricing is perceived as a collective action to influence the market. 
This may not be peculiar to Algeria but the impact would be more severe given the 
European Commission’s stance on anti-competitive behaviour. Another reason is 
that Algeria exports gas mainly to Europe.  
 
EGYPT  
Egypt had proposed a new pricing formula842 that would aid producers in planning 
ahead; save consumers from price fluctuations and ensure stable revenue. The 
proposal was not accepted, but Egypt may still be interested in a beneficial price 
determination scheme that meets some of the above conditions. Although the 
pricing formula applied here meets some of Egypt’s criteria, the simulation exercise 
indicates a loss in market share and revenue (after the change in demand). In a 
‘lower-demand-elasticity’ scenario, the simulation yields an increase in revenue. 
From a long term perspective, changes in actual or forecasted consumption levels 
could make demand more elastic and uniform pricing unrealistic for Egypt. 
 
In terms of petroleum status, Egypt is neither a member of OPEC, nor exports oil 
due to declining production and dwindling reserves. While Egypt – a new entrant to 
LNG trade – is expected to adopt a cautious approach, this may not be the case. A 
fact, worth emphasizing, is that Egypt must have considered its proven reserves;843 
liquefaction capacity and spot market options, relative to the risk of loosing market 
share, before proposing a new price regime in 2004. Egypt exports gas by pipeline 
and has been active in the spot market.844 Accordingly, these factors would 
significantly influence Egypt’s disposition towards uniform pricing.  
 
                                                 
842 This was proposed to the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF). For more on this, see Wagbara, O. 
What are the prospects for a gas OPEC? International Gas, 2008 
843 As at year 2000, a third of its recoverable gas deposit was reserved for meeting domestic demand for the 
next 25 years; another third for future generation, while the balance and subsequent discoveries would be 
exported. It now has an export capacity of 12.2million t/year of LNG and could reach 20.8m t/y by 2010/11 
844 The spot market could be a hedge against any demand-side response.  
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       Egypt, like Algeria, would face the challenge of getting its main LNG buyers in 
France (Gas de France845), UK and Spain to accept the change in pricing. Success 
in this regard would depend on whether importers can simultaneously transfer price 
increases to end-users in France, Spain and the UK.846 Since the Egyptian 
government is willing to pay higher wellhead gas prices to BG Group,847 they could 
easily enforce new LNG pricing rules (in cooperation with other exporters). Besides 
GdF and BG Group (Centrica) are the main gas utilities in France and the UK 
respectively and they are integrating backward.  
 
Yes, the prices in existing gas sales contracts are being reviewed, but given Egypt’s 
potential domestic demand, its involvement in uniform pricing can not be justified.  
 
 LIBYA 
The second lowest cost gas supply available to Europe is through pipeline from 
Libya but its LNG history has been unstable. Libya’s LNG industry started in 1971 
and became stagnated due to lack of foreign investments. As a small but re-
emerging LNG player, the benefits of a uniform pricing formula (higher prices and 
more revenue) would seem attractive.  
 
The theoretical expectation, given Libya’s high oil-low gas rating, is one of 
indifference to market influence. Because Libya is initiating new projects and re-
establishing LNG trade relations, it would be cautious not to betray investors’ 
confidence or breach contract terms. Considering that sanctions have just been 
lifted, the expansion of gas production, export and consumption848 are goals that 
are dependent on investors’ perception of Libya. Besides the above capacity 
constraints, Libya needs all the revenue it can gather from oil and gas licensing 
rounds even before new discoveries are exploited. This is especially so, given 
various economic, socio-political and demographic challenges.  
                                                 
845 Egypt is GdF’s fifth largest supplier with about 10% of GdF’s gas supplies. 
846 So far, according to the UK’s Office for Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM), most Gas 
majors/retailers/marketers tend to increase prices when necessary but slumps in upstream gas prices are not 
passed on to end-users.   
847 Operating across the gas value chain, BG Group is the largest producer of natural gas in Egypt – 40% of 
domestic consumption and 10% of exports (1.5% of GDP as at 2007). 
848 Especially in the area of power generation where new gas-fired plants are being built and existing stations 
are being converted from oil to gas. Therefore, more oil is made available for exports. 
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If Libya cannot compete against major Atlantic Basin exporters, could it rather play 
along with them since they all sell to the same buyers? The theoretically 
expectation is for Egypt to do nothing since it is very risky. But practically, it could 
be beneficial to cooperate. Interestingly, the uniform pricing simulation generates 
almost equal changes in the price offered by Algeria and Libya to their Spanish 
customers. Comparatively, Libya is not worse-off in terms of extra rent earned and it 
needs all the revenue accruable from gas exports today. More so, Egypt and 
Algeria also export pipeline gas which provides vital export partnership 
opportunities for Libya.  
 
Concerning a possible 0.31% loss849 in market share, there are arguable 
justifications for Libya’s adoption of uniform pricing. First, it has huge oil revenue to 
rely on while taking the gamble of uniform pricing along with other exporters. 
Moreover, it would be risking only the small investments it has made so far without 
loosing significant market share like others. Third, Libya would only be renegotiating 
few contracts with mainly Spanish customers after Algeria provides a soft landing. 
In conclusion, therefore, the expected rise in export price to Spain (from 1 to 
68.67%) is a justifiable incentive that is realistic in a cartel context. Meanwhile, 
Libya is too small to take any significant action on its own - see Table 4.4 – and so it 
must be a follower not a leader? 
 
NIGERIA 
Theoretically, Nigeria’s natural gas policy ought to guide its export strategy. As 
such, Nigeria’s potential gain - in the UP scenario - is in tandem with its aim of 
maximizing revenue from gas.850 Because uniform pricing increases revenue by 
3.69%, it could be an incentive for Nigeria to adopt the mechanism. When viewed 
against Nigeria’s increased involvement in spot sales,851 a price regime which yields 
higher income and a possibility of generating spare capacity is attractive.  
 
                                                 
849 As a result of demand elasticity and other assumptions made in the worse case scenario. 
850 Kupolokun, F., Nigeria and the future global gas market, Presentation by the Group MD of Nigeria’s 
National Oil Company (NNPC), at the Baker Institute Energy Forum, Houston, Texas on 2nd May 2006. 
851 Next to Egypt (1st) and Qatar (2nd), Nigeria supplied over 17% of the global spot LNG volumes traded in 
2008 according to data available in GIIGNL, The LNG industry, 2008. 
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       This is because Nigeria trades through spot and long-term contracts. Since, spot 
LNG prices are volatile852 perhaps Nigeria is hedging risks (associated with 
volatility) against more stable long term contract prices. For instance, in NLNG’s 
marketing strategy, spot transactions provide avenues for disposing of excess 
production and extending the reach of NLNG globally.853 One could argue, 
therefore, that it makes economic sense to determine long term prices through 
uniform pricing – for additional stability. But, going by its reserves status, Nigeria 
ought to be cautious about applying any cartel mechanism. The challenge of 
curtailing gas flaring further complicates issues. If flared gas is commercialised, it 
would enhance Nigeria’s petroleum status and disposition towards uniform pricing. 
The latter assertion holds because the utilisation of flared gas requires a gathering 
and transmission system - grid. Such infrastructure, which is non-existent today, 
has dual-effect – it increases Nigeria’s gas utilization capacity, as well as, the 
opportunity cost of exported gas854 (especially LNG).  
 
Nigeria would, nevertheless, need an Algerian first-move855 for the regime change 
to be smooth and effective in Europe. Although Nigeria’s LNG export capacity could 
be more than Algeria’s by 2013, it has less market power between now and then. 
Moreover, Algeria benefits more from the change in revenue (due to uniform 
pricing) than Nigeria. This is because Algeria is ahead of other LNG producers in 
terms of exports to Europe. Similarly, Trinidad and Tobago would have to break the 
LNG pricing ice in North America for others to follow - thereby making it easy for 
Nigeria to incorporate the uniform pricing regime into LNG sales contracts.   
Nigeria’s domestic gas demand is expected to increase but there are fundamental 
challenges856 to be overcome. Since the worse case scenario indicates a 2.17% fall 
in revenue and 0.45% loss of market share, the spare gas could also be sold to 
consumers internally. Although at a lower price but in furtherance of domestic gas 
                                                 
852 When compared to the price in a long term LNG contract which has a base component. 
853 NLNG, Marketing: Spot 
854 With a robust and vigorous domestic gas market (even if upstream only), the cost (price) OF feedstock for 
LNG projects increases. 
855 The role of a price leader has to be taken and played for any cartel to succeed. 
856 Five major issues are: Fiscal regime for gas; institutional and infrastructural capacity; pricing; financing 
and regulatory framework. 
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       utilization objectives.857 Meanwhile, Nigeria’s planned exports through the Trans-
Sahara Gas Pipeline,858 offers another opportunity for exporting any extra gas. But 
this may not happen soon, even though its prospects seem realistic - as highlighted 
in section 2.3.6. Moreover, Nigeria is not yet a major exporter of pipeline and could 
be disadvantaged859 if it opts for the Uniform Pricing Formula.  
 
QATAR 
Qatar’s GDP has become the fastest growing in the Middle East due to increasing 
revenue from LNG and its high resource rating.860 Income from natural gas is 
expected to exceed crude oil revenues in the next five years. Qatar anticipates that 
by 2012, the US, Europe and Asia would each be consuming a third of its LNG. 
Within this context,861 a new price regime which generates higher revenue and 
expands market share862 is attractive from Qatar’s perspective.863  
 
In market terms,864 it is justifiable for Qatar to consider colluding – especially if 
uniform pricing is considered a market-stabilizing mechanism. For Qatar, LNG 
market stability takes precedence over price transparency.865 Recent attempts to 
establish electronic platforms for LNG auctions attest to the fact that Qatar would 
not sacrifice stability for competitive LNG pricing. Due to the competitive nature of 
most gas-importing markets an oil-parity LNG pricing system is unsustainable.  
 
Uniform Pricing offers Qatar the opportunity to increase its market power since the 
emergence of new gas suppliers could alter existing market shares.866 Moreover, 
                                                 
857 Nigeria’s Gas Master Plan seeks to “optimize Nigeria’s share in the high value export market”. In 
accordance with this plan, spare gas could also be sold in the spot market at a higher price over and above 
the costs of holding spare capacity. The vital issue is yet to be addressed is the price at which gas would be 
sold domestically. 
858 This on-going pipeline project would enable Nigeria export pipeline gas to Europe through Algeria. 
859 When compared to Algeria, Libya and Egypt that have the option and capacity to export by pipeline. 
While pipeline exports would not be subject to the Uniform Price, they could serve as hedge against 
unexpected demand-side responses. For instance, Algeria continued exporting gas by pipeline even after 
LNG contracts to the US were suspending. 
860 Because of its reserves and production capacity Qatar is now generally regarded reliable supplier. 
861 High gas and low oil reserves. 
862 In a worse case scenario, increases of 37.91% and 4.37% respectively were generated in the simulation.  
863 As previously highlighted in Section 2.3.5 and further discussed in Section 5.3.1 below. 
864 See Table 2.9 where Qatar’s 77mt are an imminent reality in contrast to Nigeria’s capacity. 
865 An extensive discussion of Qatar’s current pricing strategy is presented in Chapter 6. 
866 In the worst case scenario, Qatar could still earn relatively more revenue (up to 37.9%) and market share 
of over 4%. 
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       Uniform Pricing could serve to protect current investments as demand is threatened 
by climate change. In a cartel situation, increased supply, from fringe producers, 
alters the price elasticity of demand and could curtail cartel influence (potential 
profit).867 Besides, Qatar needs the higher earnings from Uniform Pricing to balance 
the lower revenue from LNG sales to Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States. The 
simulation result supports these assertions as Qatar comparatively earns more rent 
and market share from the adoption of uniform pricing. 
 
It is important, however, to emphasize that Qatar had persuaded European and 
American legislators to encourage producers through regulatory support for more 
LNG infrastructure.868 As the leading producer of LNG, Qatar may be reluctant to 
lead any anti-competitive effort to control LNG trade and strive to maintain its 
reputation as a dependable supplier. This view is tenable although Qatar Petroleum 
hosts the Liaison Office of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF). Perhaps, 
without Qatari agreement, no initiative of this kind can work.   
 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 
Relative to other exporters, Trinidad’s revenue increased even when American and 
Spanish importers respond to the change in price. The simulation indicates that 
uniform pricing could be beneficial for Trinidad and Tobago. And it seems that only 
an infinitesimal part of Trinidad’s long term export market could be lost. Like 
Nigeria, Trinidad and Tobago is a vital player in the spot LNG market where it 
exercises various exports options. If they blazed a trail869 by starting the Atlantic 
LNG project without contracting 100% of the liquefaction capacity, then adopting a 
new pricing regime for contracted LNG may not be too challenging for them. 
 
Comparatively, after Qatar and Algeria, Trinidad and Tobago stands to gain most 
from uniform pricing. Consequently, government can achieve its aim of maximizing 
gas revenues from different avenues870 and sustaining economic growth through 
                                                 
867 The extent to which this is plausible depends on the growth rate of gas demand in each importing market. 
868 Mr. Suwaidi of Qatar Petroleum as quoted in the Middle East Economic Survey (MEES) 5 November, 
2007. 
869 Trinidad and Tobago has a history of achieving set goals and is a key supplier of LNG to US markets. 
870 This includes LNG exports; investments across the LNG value chain; domestic gas sales; and 
Petrochemical industry. This could also explain its membership and eventual Presidency of the Gas 
Exporting Countries Forum in 2005. 
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       diversification of the economy. Based on these objectives, more than 50% of the 
existing gas reserves are committed to LNG exports.  
 
To the extent that Trinidad and Tobago depends a lot on revenue from 
hydrocarbons, it would be sceptical about provoking LNG contract pricing issues – 
not with its major importers in the US.871 Moreover, in North America, Trinidad’s 
LNG export is a price taker and long term contracts (prices) do not significantly 
affect domestic gas prices. The reasoning is that Henry Hub-indexed price formula 
helps North American LNG buyers to sell imported volumes and avoid stranded 
costs.872 Besides, Trinidad’s robust and expanding economy is putting more 
pressure on the relatively stagnant gas revenue. 
 
Trinidad and Tobago can partake in a supply-side pricing shock only if the resultant 
price is lower than or equal to oil price parity. For Trinidad and Tobago, an 
explanation could be that uniform pricing enables US LNG import prices to trail 
crude oil price just like natural gas prices do over the long run. Considering its 
moderate gas reserves, the simulation confirms the theoretical expectation873 that 
Trinidad and Tobago is unlikely to adopt uniform pricing. This is especially so 
because proven gas reserves could run out by 2020.874  
 
5.2.2 Volume Control in the Atlantic Basin 
Volume Control implies equal percentage reduction in annual contracted capacity, 
by LNG exporters, with the aim of determining long term prices - aimed at obtaining 
higher prices. Figure 5.2 is a summary of the outcomes generated from the ABLTM. 
 
Figure 5.2 Change in Revenue (%) due to 1% change in Annual Contracted 
Volume of LNG   
                                                 
871 Except in collaboration with a larger LNG exporter or a group of exporters 
872 Huitric, R., LNG Pricing: Impact of Globalization and High Prices on Long Term Contract Negotiations, 
Paper presented LNG 15 in Doha, Qatar.  
873 A country with low/diminishing reserves is cautious and less likely to participate in a cartel. 
874 B.P., Statistical Review of World Energy, 2008. 
Chapter Five: Contextual Application of Simulation Results 
 
 
 
 
 160 
 
       
 
0.00%
0.05%
0.10%
0.15%
0.20%
0.25%
0.30%
0.35%
0.40%
ALGERIA EGYPT LIBYA NIGERIA QATAR TRINIDAD
 
The following discourse applies the theoretical framework to the result and analyzes 
each exporter’s perspective of volume control as a cartel mechanism for price 
determination 
 
ALGERIA 
Algeria would be cautious about restricting LNG supplies considering its proven gas 
reserves. Yes, its revenue increase is more than that of Nigeria and Trinidad.875 
However, Algeria would be reluctant to dent its reputation as Europe’s most reliable 
exporter. An increase in revenue of 0.27% for every 1% reduction in Annual 
Contracted Volume (ACV), from the simulation exercise, seems good. Yet, Algeria’s 
new preference for mid-term and short term contracts876 makes the outcome less 
significant. While the immediate benefits of having mainly short term contracts is 
apparent, the long run implications for Algeria would depend on the oil price and the 
level of gas price volatility in the importing markets. 
 
In terms of market share, volume control is economically irrational for Algeria. This 
is because Sonatrach877 has gained downstream access to markets in Continental 
Europe. For instance, Sonatrach entered the Portuguese gas and power generation 
markets through a joint venture with EDP-Energias de Portugal - Sonatrach gets 
25% ownership of three Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) plants - one of the 
                                                 
875 Just after the reduction in Annual Contracted Volume (ACV). 
876 Algeria is adopting a shorter term trading strategy for its natural gas through Sonatrach. The short term 
(Master) agreements contain neither price formulas nor obligation to buy.  
877 Algerian National Petroleum Company. 
Chapter Five: Contextual Application of Simulation Results 
 
 
 
 
 161 
 
       plants would be located in Spain.878 When completed, the Medgaz and Sardinia 
pipeline projects to Spain-France and Italy respectively would also enable 
Sonatrach to market879 gas directly in these countries.880 These are opportunities 
for Sonatrach to self-contract LNG or pipeline gas to its downstream 
subsidiaries/partners and also become an aggregator.881 In this context, why should 
Algeria withhold LNG supplies if it has opportunities to earn more rent downstream?  
 
Given Algeria’s petroleum status, the increasing domestic demand for gas is 
arguably a justification for reducing exportable capacity. The extra supply of gas 
could be sold domestically882 but a stronger argument against Algeria’s participation 
in volume control is its heavy reliance on petroleum revenue. 
 
EGYPT 
The Egyptian government recently announced the suspension of the new export 
contracts,883 from its share of gas production, until 2010.884 As stated in section 
2.3.2, this restricts Egypt’s share of gas production to only the domestic market 
while suspending new exports transactions either through pipeline or as LNG. It 
may seem, therefore, that Egypt can forego present incomes for higher prices in 
future, but this is not the case. First, the moratorium does not affect exports by 
IOCs885 and LNG is still a vital source of revenue. So, the need for more revenue 
could sufficiently hamper Egypt’s adoption of volume control.886 
 
Second, the policy seems indirectly aimed at reducing pipeline gas exports 
(especially to Egypt’s neighbours) rather than LNG. Third, a unilateral self-imposed 
                                                 
878 Alexander’s Gas and Oil Connections, EDP and Sonatrach form power generation and gas joint venture, 
Vol. 12, No.8, April 24, 2008.  
879 Sonatrach will be a major shareholder and operator of Medgaz. Although it has been licensed to distribute 
gas in Spain, it could also sell through its affiliates in London, Spain, as well as, Sonatrach Gas Italia.   
880 Alexander’s Gas and Oil Connections; Sonatrach to start marketing gas in southern Europe, Vol. 13, 
No.10, June 3, 2008  
881 Aggregators are LNG venture partners (IOCs and IGCs) who provide trade flexibility through self 
contracting. Common in the Atlantic Basin, they contract with their subsidiaries to retail gas downstream (in 
the US or UK) but subsequently become arbitrage agents across the Atlantic or to the Pacific Basin. 
882 At a lesser price - between $0.75 and $0.90 per mmBtu. 
883 Independently - without a cartel quota. 
884 According to Sameh Fahmy (Egyptian Petroeluem Minister) as quoted in Quinlan, M., Plenty more from 
Africa. Petroleum Economist, November, 2008. 
885 Like the plan by BP and Eni to build a 5Million tons per annum LNG Train 2. 
886 Although, Egypt gets the highest percentage increase in revenue, from the simulation exercise 
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       export embargo is distinct from a multilateral cartel-induced reduction in exportable 
LNG volume. Because the consequence of each exporter’s action has mutual 
implications for others, this issue is very important given the size of Egypt’s gas 
reserves.  
 
Government’s willingness to hike the wellhead price of gas could perhaps 
encourage exploration activities by IOCs since only the government’s share of gas 
production is affected by the export embargo. On the contrary, because only a third 
of every find is available for export,887 the amount of investments in exploration and 
production could fall. While gas supply for LNG and pipeline exports may be 
affected, the actual impact on long term LNG contract prices is uncertain. It is 
apparent, therefore, that the above domestic policies would be unfavourable in a 
volume control situation. 
 
Given the moratorium on exportation of state-owned gas production, it would seem 
easy for Egypt to adopt the volume control mechanism with other exporters. But, it 
is important to note that Egypt does not have a lot of gas reserves and exploration 
activities are being hindered by domestic policies. To the extent that Egypt relies 
heavily on LNG export revenue, it is unlikely to participate in volume control.888  
 
LIBYA 
Libya could be reluctant889 to adopt any mechanism which constrains its export 
capacity because it is a new entrant and has a relatively insignificant market share. 
To guarantee their revenue and protect investments, Libya would be keen to 
maintain good relations with importers. This assertion is tenable despite the 
simulation result – which indicates that Libya benefits most after Egypt, with a 
potential 0.32% increase in revenue from a 1% reduction in ACV.  
 
                                                 
887 It may be recall from Chapter Two, Egypt's gas policy stipulates that a third of the resource would be used 
domestically; another third for be kept for future generation and a final third be applied to export. 
888 Unless the significant increase in revenue (as shown in Figure 5.2) can be guaranteed in reality. 
889 Based on economic theory, a new entrant to an industry would be risk averse and cautious about 
protecting its current and potential market share. 
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       Moreover, new gas discoveries can not be guaranteed890 even as the government 
is encouraging exploration activities by IOCs. Since the exploitation of Libya’s gas 
resources and development of its gas sector is hinged on LNG exports, volume 
control would be counter-productive. This is especially so considering Libya’s low 
petroleum status and existing production capacity. Its oil revenue has been high 
but, it is an insufficient cushion for the implementation of volume control due to 
pressing domestic needs. 
 
Perhaps, a cartel of North African or Middle East and North African (MENA) LNG 
exporters would include Libya but if volume control is the operational mechanism 
then Libya would not participate. As a new entrant, Libya is yet to play in the spot 
market but could consider withholding contracted capacity if spot transactions offer 
higher prices.   
 
NIGERIA  
On revenue terms, Nigeria benefits the least (after Trinidad) from the adoption of 
volume control mechanism, according to the simulation results. One reason for this 
is Nigeria’s long term contracts891 to US – where domestic gas production is price 
elastic.892 The case is, however, different in the Spanish and Italian markets 
because supply is tight - see sections 2.2.2.2 and 2.2.2.3. Due to a combination of 
the above factors, Nigeria’s revenue increases by 0.18% when the ACV is reduced 
by 1% in the model. Therefore, Nigeria’s involvement in volume control is not 
plausible from a theoretical standpoint – unless Nigeria focuses more on European 
markets.893 
 
Given Nigeria’s participation in spot trade,894 a mechanism which reduces supply to 
earn higher revenue would probably be attractive. This assertion is hinged on the 
current investments in gas exploitation and the following facts: First, Nigeria has 
                                                 
890 Given Libya’s proven reserves and the interest of IOCs, this may not be a fundamental issue. 
891 Nigeria’s LNG exports to the US are indexed to Henry Hub gas prices. 
892 Sections 2.2.1 and 3.1.2.5 discuss the evolution of the US market and pricing respectively. 
893 In the medium term, this would be difficult due to existing contracts (by Nigeria and more important 
Algeria). 
894 Kupolokun, F., Nigeria and the future global gas market, Presentation by the Group MD of Nigeria’s 
National Oil Company (NNPC), at the Baker Institute Energy Forum, Houston, Texas on 2nd May 2006. 
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       many gas projects895 but insufficient gas production capacity. Moreover, the 
institutional framework for utilizing flared gas is either inadequate or mismanaged. 
Another reason is that by reducing its ACV Nigeria would have more gas for other 
projects or LNG to be traded in the spot market at a higher price.     
 
Nigeria’s dependence on petroleum export revenue, however, could be a militating 
factor against the adoption of such an export restricting mechanism. A cautious 
approach would seem rational since higher prices are realised from spot 
transactions896 and long term contracts guarantee revenue. Risking a steady flow of 
income for an uncertain increase in revenue, based on a cartel-induced reduction of 
ACV, could be destabilising for Nigeria. Besides, the security of existing LNG plants 
is threatened by the prolonged Niger Delta crisis which has also hindered Nigeria’s 
ability to meet its OPEC production quota.  
 
Meanwhile, apart from its membership of OPEC, there is no evidence that Nigeria 
can meet the economic condition for adopting volume control - forego present gains 
for higher rent in future. Rather, most of its extra-budgetary earnings (from oil price 
hikes) are spent897 amidst the crises in the Niger Delta. Within this context, 
therefore, Nigeria would cautiously avoid volume control as a mechanism for LNG 
price determination. 
 
QATAR 
Qataris are arguing for the gradual exploitation of gas resources for the benefit of 
future generations as most Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) states are facing real 
or potential gas shortages.898 For instance, Kuwait and Dubai have added Qatari 
LNG to their energy mix, while UAE and Oman are experiencing domestic gas 
shortages.899 Arguably, this is a reason for the moratorium on new gas export 
projects and could justify Qatar’s adoption of the volume control mechanism. 
                                                 
895 Some on-going and proposed projects include NLNG Train 7 project; Brass LNG; Olokola (OK) LNG; 
Trans-Sahara pipeline; West African Gas Pipeline Project and other domestic gas utilization projects to 
generate power. 
896 This would not be the case in an over-supplied market. 
897 An insignificant proportion is sometimes added to the country’s foreign reserve. 
898 Dargun, J., Trouble in Paradise – The Widening Gulf Gas Deficit, Vol. 51, No.39, MEES, September, 
2008 at http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/oped/v51n39-5OD01.htm  
899 Ibid 
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       Interestingly, Qatar’s LNG revenue900 increases by 0.28% for a 1% reduction in 
ACV in the simulation.  
 
Figure 5.3 Qatar’s LNG liquefaction capacity to 2012901 
 
 
When the model’s result is considered in the light of Qatar’s resource rating, an 
opportunistic approach to volume control is logical based on economic theory. 
However, given Figure 5.3, Qatar would be very keen to protect its investments; 
potential export proceeds and trade relations with importers. But what could be 
learnt from the existing moratorium? 
 
Perhaps, the moratorium on new LNG projects is about a very small state which 
simply does not need any more money. But, it is also an indication of good reserve 
management and Qatar’s ability to forego present income for future gains. 
Nevertheless, Qatar is not likely to withhold contracted volumes902 because it has 
enormous gas reserves underlying its investments. Therefore, Qatar stands to gain 
more by keeping LNG markets liquid and stable to guarantee future demand - 
simultaneously earning revenues from current exports. 
 
Besides, there are fears about future gas supplies for new LNG projects after 2012 
because only four projects were approved903 during the last three years (from end 
                                                 
900 Revenue from long term contracts as applied in the model. 
901 The graph captures incremental capacity from 2007. Source: Flower, A., Risk and Responsibility: The 
New realities of energy supply, Presentation at Chatham House (Middle East 2008) on February 4, 2008 at 
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/11067_0208flow.pdf  
902 Unless, the aim is to export same to neighbours at reasonable but lower prices for non-economic gains. 
903 Final Investment Decision (FID) taken.  
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       2005 to date). Any effort, therefore, to constraint supplies (further tightening the 
market) would be untimely, giving rise to insecurity of supply or demand. 
Consequently, instead of venturing into a mechanism that could be detrimental to its 
LNG future, Qatar would rather consolidate its grip on the LNG industry904 by 
expanding905 its market share. Such a cautious approach towards volume control is 
practical and rational from Qatar’s point of view. 
 
Trinidad and Tobago (TT) 
Trinidad and Tobago would need to reconcile the volume control mechanism with 
its intentions to join the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or US-
Central American Free Trade Agreement (US-CAFTA).906 The model reflects a 
0.18% in crease in revenue but, the above policy issue is important as government 
considers investing907 down the LNG supply chain.  
 
In 2005, Trinidad and Tobago created a Stabilization Fund for LNG export 
proceeds, while also investing in the expansion of its petrochemical industry.908 
Could this be an indication that it can forego present income for future benefits 
through volume control? Yes, but there are other considerable implications, of 
volume control, for the domestic economy because LNG is the country’s main 
revenue earner. In view of government’s campaign for more foreign investments 
across the economy, it is reasonable to argue that volume control would hamper 
investments in gas exploration.  
 
Another factor what emphasizing is the proportion of US gas supplied by Trinidad 
and Tobago. Trinidad and Tobago supplied 58% of USA’s LNG imports in 2007 
(see Figure 5.4). In the context of the US market (about 16.7% of its natural gas 
consumption in 2007 was imported gas) Trinidad’s export volume is relatively small 
(about 2%909 of US Gas consumption). Although US Energy Information 
                                                 
904 The benefits of being a price leader could be a strong incentive to resist.   
905 Qatar can achieve this by selling to more upstream markets and through downward vertical integration. 
906 The potential benefits of bilateral/regional trade agreements are outside the scope of this work - are not 
discussed any further. 
907 In LNG vessels and regasification terminals, through its National Gas Company 
908 Wagbara, O., Why does Trinidad and Tobago need a different Fiscal Regime for Gas?  
I.E.L.T.R, December 2005. 
909 In 2007, Source: USA EIA; http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/ng/ng_move_impc_s1_a.htm  
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       Administration projects that LNG imports would overtake pipeline imports,910 most 
of the incremental supply would come from other exporters911 rather than Trinidad.  
 
Figure 5.4 Sources of US LNG imports (2007)912 
 
 
Consequently, a reduction in Trinidad’s ACV of LNG may be insufficient to generate 
the expected price/revenue increase for Trinidad and Tobago in the US. Rather, it 
would affect basis differential between Henry Hub and individual hubs, as well as, 
among regional hubs. It is worth noting, however, that irrespective of the source, 
increases or decreases in LNG supply alter regional price trends. Perhaps, it 
justifies the need for a price conspiracy by exporters.  
 
Besides, Trinidad and Tobago is not particularly rich in petroleum resources (as 
indicated in table 5.2). So, even with the cooperation of other producers, it stands to 
gain almost nothing from future LNG price increases. Since it is relatively 
disadvantaged and would be the worst-affected by any changes in US demand or 
fringe supply, a theoretical conclusion is that Trinidad would avoid volume control.  
 
5.3 Winners, Losers and Price Leader 
Fully interpreting the long-term outcome913 of the simulation result is more complex. 
On the demand side some relative gains resulting from the change in price are 
probable and notable. Perhaps, following from the above discourse, a natural 
alliance of like-minded countries could emerge. Given tables 5.2 and 5.3, is it 
                                                 
910 EIA, What is liquefied natural gas (LNG) and how is it becoming an energy source for the United States?  
911 These are mainly Equatorial Guinea; Qatar; Norway and Yemen. 
912 EIA at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energy_in_brief/liquefied_natural_gas_lng.cfm  
913 Absolute and relative changes in the revenue and market share of each exporter. 
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       conceivable that winners and losers could adopt similar strategies despite 
differences in reserves, market share and changes in potential revenue?  
 
In this context, a few possibilities for compensating losers are conceivable. Holding 
other price determinants constant, exporters could divert cargoes to markets with 
supply gaps given their relative price advantage - when other markets offer higher 
price. So the closest loosing exporter to the higher-priced market makes a sale. 
Another possibility is that a loosing LNG exporter (like Libya/Egypt) could take on 
the pipeline gas export obligation of a winning pipeline-LNG exporter (like 
Algeria).914 Such an arrangement would seem like a delivery swap (between Algeria 
and Libya) but without a compensating export opportunity from Libya to Algeria. 
While, a detailed consideration of these and other options for compensating losers 
(from UPM or VCM) is important, such an exercise is outside the scope of this work.  
 
A more relevant issue, however, is the need for a price leader to balance the 
opportunistic attitude of gas-rich exporters with the cautious posture of new entrants 
- with low reserves. Is there a natural candidate and would it be willing to take this 
position? Who could be the leader and why? Could the emergence of such a leader 
make it easier for LNG exporters to develop a market control mechanism? 
 
5.3.1 Is there a natural Leader? 
Both Algeria and Qatar naturally have the capacity to emerge as controlling leader. 
Algeria is a major exporter of oil and LNG, as well as, pipeline gas to Europe but its 
gas reserve is dwindling. Although, Nigeria also has the capacity,915 it may not 
command the support of Algeria and Qatar given Table 5.3 and because of its 
unstable polity916. The point here is that whoever is leader will need to have the 
agreement, or at least not the opposition, of these two countries. Why? 
 
Qatar has the largest liquefaction and shipping capacity (but does not export oil). 
Moreover, Qatar is strategically positioned in the Middle East – equidistant from the 
Atlantic and Pacific Basins. In other words, Qatar is the exporter with genuine and 
                                                 
914 This suggestion presupposes that both countries have adequate infrastructure and capacity to export 
pipeline and Liquefied Natural Gas. 
915 Based on the data presented in Tables 2.1 and 4.4 
916 Recall Nigeria’s peculiar energy needs and geopolitical challenges as described in section 2.3.6. 
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       immediate access to, and arbitrage between, Atlantic and Pacific Basins. Others 
have this possibility, but with Qatar’s resource base and its established liquefaction 
capacity, Qatar is the key player in any game of this kind. Although Algeria first 
attempted a unilateral price increase, Qatar was the first to place a moratorium on 
new projects. It is difficult to ascertain a country’s willingness to lead a cartel but the 
determinants of Saudi Arabia’s influence could suffice.   
 
Existing literature reveals that there are broadly two schools of thoughts on Saudi 
Arabia’s pricing power. While Adelman917 asserts that no nation can single-
handedly harm importers’ interest, most economists agree that Saudi Arabia’s 
reserves and spare capacity gives it the capability to lead918 OPEC. Despite the 
divergence in opinions, Saudi Arabia’s pricing strategy has varied over the years919 
 
However, its production decisions and market power are inherently linked to the 
following: existing spare capacity; energy and revenue needs;920 as well as, internal 
security and regional political considerations.921 For instance, it has been argued 
that the Saudi government favoured (and still favours) moderate prices as indirect 
payment for US protection against aggressive neighbours.922 Perhaps there are 
parallels here with Qatar in the gas market.  
 
5.3.2 Who and Why? 
On the strength of its reserves and liquefaction infrastructure, one could argue that 
Qatar has more prospects of emerging a natural leader than Algeria. Qatar is 
politically stable internally but could be susceptible to the same ideological 
                                                 
917 Adelman, M., The real oil problem, in Regulation, spring 2004. 
918 This does not imply an exercise of exclusive power in disregard of other OPEC members’ preferences. 
Arguments about the dominant role of Saudi Arabia were expressed in: Mabro, R. OPEC and the price of oil. 
Vol. 13, No. 2, 1992; Doran, C., OPEC Structure and Cohesion: Exploring the Determinants of Cartel 
Policy. Vol. 42, No. 1, Journal of Politics, February, 1980; Mabro, R., Political and financial aspects of the 
oil game, in Erickson, E. and Waverman, L., (Eds.) The Energy Question: an international failure of policy, 
(1974). 
919 No political or economic theory alone consistently explains the changes in Saudi’s policies. 
920 This is a function of demographics and global economic growth. 
921 A comprehensive political analysis is presented in Al-Yousef, N., Economic Models of OPEC Behaviour 
and the Role of Saudi Arabia, University of Surrey, Surrey Energy Economics Discussion Paper Series, No. 
94, 1998 at http://www.econ.surrey.ac.uk/Research/WorkingPapers/seed94.pdf  
922 Stevens, P., National oil companies and international oil companies in the Middle East: Under the 
shadow of government and the resource nationalism cycle, Vol. 1, No. 1, Journal of World energy Law and 
Business, 2008.    
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       pressures, as Saudi Arabia, within and out with the cartel.923 Its foreign exchange 
reserve is sufficient cushion for sponsoring LNG capacity expansion, while meeting 
domestic revenue needs.  
 
To effectively determine price Qatar must not reconcile the differences in discount 
rates among members. Rather, like Saudi Arabia, it has to be a reliable exporter of 
LNG and defend higher prices only to the extent bearable by the global economy. 
Whether such a small state could be the political leader of such an LNG initiative is 
another question – outside the scope of this work. 
 
5.3.3 How to Lead 
The challenge for Qatar,924 therefore, is how it can make uniform pricing more 
pragmatic from the buyer’s perspective.925 A way to make uniform pricing 
sustainable, in long term LNG contracts, is to ensure that some economic rent is 
transferable to buyers (IOCs, IGCs or Utilities). In addition, such LNG buyers should 
also be able to pass on higher prices to end-users. One could argue that as gas 
reserves gradually dwindle and production cost rise926 oil parity could be imposed927 
in the Atlantic Basin. Thereby making the market conducive for the adoption of 
uniform pricing based on oil parity with Qatar as leader.928 
 
It is important to reiterate that with the exception of Spain, Atlantic Basin importers 
are largely pipeline gas markets with LNG at the margins and pipeline gas sets the 
price. Apparently, this could change over time because of the imminent 
globalization of gas trade through LNG and the positive demand outlook described 
in Chapter Two. Besides, downstream gas prices are already being affected by spot 
LNG prices, during winter periods, in the US and UK.929 If this trend continues, 
                                                 
923 Given diverse regional demand (across the globe), this is one area where, Qatar needs to take pipeline gas 
exporters into consideration.    
924 Due to Qatar’s close links with the West, it would not want its actions to be seen as anti-competitive. 
925 Every pricing formula is acceptable to LNG buyers, provided it offers them opportunity to hedge their 
market position through buying or reselling and also make money when the cargo arrives. 
926 But the US has large shale gas reserves and the global economic crises could cripple production cost. 
927 It would be termed an imposition because the US has its own price dynamics based on domestic gas, 
while Europe also has different dynamics.   
928 Beyond Qatar’s gas reserves, liquefaction capacity and financial capability, its willingness to lead an LNG 
cartel is a political decision and its justification requires more rigorous analysis outside the scope of this 
work. 
929 Pipeline gas does not set the price of LNG all the time.  
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       perhaps, it could result in a defined relationship between long term LNG and 
downstream gas prices.  
 
Box 5.3 LNG price discovery as gas markets change during winter930 
Oversupplied Market 
* Spot trading reveals price < LT931 contracts 
* Breaks oil-price link with low prices  
Tight Market  
* Spot trading reveals price > LT contracts 
* Breaks oil-price link with high prices 
 
The above argument would also depend on LNG demand in the emerging and 
developing economies across the globe. Meanwhile, it is equally possible that 
pipeline gas will continue to dominate in many countries. This line of argument may 
not hold water due to future economic uncertainties and the geopolitics of pipeline 
gas supply in the Atlantic Basin.  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
Generally, there is sufficient evidence that petroleum-rich countries which are risk 
averse would be more disposed to uniform pricing. Uniform pricing, as a 
mechanism for price determination, is feasible to the extent that the major exporters 
(Qatar, Algeria and Nigeria) participate. It is important to note that the extent of its 
feasibility would depend on its definition or formula.  
Theoretically, based on the conditions outlined in section 4.3.3, it would be more 
difficult to formulate an acceptable pricing formula for exporters than a volume 
control mechanism. One reason is because the question of how to value long term 
gas exports has remained unresolved. The “Single Basing Point”, previously used 
to determine oil prices, is a good example of a failed uniform pricing regime. In 
practice, however, it is not the case due to the peculiarities of LNG trade. 
Accordingly the following would constrain the adoption of VC:  
 High cost of storing natural gas in tankers, pipeline or as LNG in Vessels;  
 Technical challenges of constraining gas production or liquefaction  
 Exporters have peculiar gas needs for domestic and export markets;  
                                                 
930 A similar result could be expected from regular spot LNG auctions – as posited in Frisch, M., LNG 
market may soon see emergence of regular auctions for spot cargoes, LNG Journal, April, 2008. 
931 LT refers to negotiated long term contract price. 
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        Different LNG investments; contracts and projects finance obligations of 
exporters 
 
So, it would be easy to agree a “crude oil parity” formula,932 but much more difficult 
to get countries with different needs to agree on volumes. Besides, it is highly 
unlikely that each exporting country can reduce the ACV of all long term LNG 
contracts to generate an increase in price. Furthermore, petroleum rich countries 
would be less disposed to volume control if existing investments are high. An 
explanation for the contrasts in theoretical and practical outcomes could be the 
evolving nature of international resource markets (and cartels).933 
 
Yes, a global reference price could emerge for the indexation of LNG, but apart 
from tradition, supply tightness934 strengthens the gas-oil price link. Conversely, 
excess gas supply (weak demand for LNG) weakens the price link. As such, one 
major factor which could enhance interest in or feasibility of uniform pricing is the 
falling price of oil or gas. At a given level, LNG price is destructive to demand935 and 
could become an incentive for vigorous development of alternative fuels. Though 
feasible, the long-run effectiveness of uniform pricing (cartel mechanism) could be 
constrained by end-users’ ability to substitute gas with alternatives. Moreover, the 
question of how a uniform pricing regime would be implemented is worth 
considering because long term contracts expire at different periods for different 
exporters.  
 
Meanwhile, increasing domestic demand is threatening exports as some LNG 
exporters have either suspended or restricted new export projects to a future date. 
Algeria and Egypt are committed to building a reputation for themselves. New 
comer, Libya would rather establish itself in the LNG industry936 by building a good 
                                                 
932 Not necessarily as proposed here but based on the same principle(s) – crude oil price parity based on 
energy content. 
933 Just like several economic theories and statistical models have attempted (but failed to) to explain or 
predict OPEC behaviour at different times. 
934 The tight supply situation was particularly strong in 2007-08, but given the economic crises, 2009-10 
market condition could be different or too early to predict. 
935 It is important to note, however, that the LNG demand curve (like for oil) is responsive to economic 
growth. 
936 Conversely, the attraction to emulate or collude with its North African neighbours (Algeria and Egypt) 
may be irresistible. 
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       customer base and meeting its project finance obligations. Given Qatar’s existing 
capacity, huge investments and expected returns, volume control is a difficult sell. 
But Qatar could play a key role in determining LNG price through the uniform 
pricing regime.937  
 
Conclusively, it is uncertain that a reduction in Annual Contracted LNG Volume 
would generate significant increase in long term contract prices for each exporter 
(within each importing market). Rather, such a collective reduction in ACV would 
have the combined effect of propelling the price of LNG in the spot market. While 
this would be beneficial to spot LNG traders, its implication for long term LNG trade 
is infinitesimal. Only if spot LNG price becomes the basis for contract price 
indexation, would volume control be a feasible mechanism for influencing LNG 
trade. But, how realistic is the emergence of a spot LNG price in the Atlantic Basin, 
Pacific Basin or global market? So far, spot trade remains the mechanism for 
balancing the market.938 
 
A more predictable outcome could be obtained from uniform pricing – where Qatar 
and Algeria would be pivotal - rather than go on such an adventure. However, some 
issues on the realism of price control in the Atlantic Basin would have to be 
addressed. A major question in the case of an Atlantic-based uniform pricing 
behaviour is the ability of exporters to defend the pricing principles (targets) set by 
the cartel. Once a collusive system/action is put in place its sustainability 
becomes a vital issue. Yes, there are potential benefits for some exporters but can 
the participating countries (in such behaviour) ensure sustainability939 of their 
actions? Besides, the collective gain through collusion does not seem enormous940 
and some other exporters could loose significantly941.  
 
One also wonders how UP control would work in North America considering that 
Henry Hub is an autonomous gas to gas price-setting mechanism. Moreover, LNG 
                                                 
937 Since its supplies could go anywhere - the US; Asia or Europe. 
938 It would be interesting, however, to know the extent to which spot LNG trade could be affected by VC or 
UP. This issue is briefly considered in Chapter Six. 
939 In the face of market structures and regulatory frameworks how would UP stand the test of time? 
940 That is as incentive to the exporters to collude - unless other non-economic or long term benefits are 
considered. 
941 In the event of a demand-side response, as the worse-case scenario indicates. 
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       is not the only available future supply source.942 So, the likelihood that LNG 
exporters would significantly control Henry Hub and NBP prices, through UP, is very 
slim. Unless oil price becomes very low and LNG exporters apply UP to undercut 
the cost of developing shale gas.943 For European countries that are substantially 
dependent on pipeline gas supplies,944 unless pipeline gas becomes unavailable for 
long periods, marginal quantities of LNG would not consistently set prices.945 
However, a combination of UP and VC could be adopted by North African exporting 
countries to defend UP. Perhaps this would be effective in Spain and possibly 
France – markets which are substantially dependent on imported LNG.946  
 
In the above sense, it is conceivable947 that volume control and uniform pricing 
would be effective mechanisms for price determination in Asia-Pacific. This 
assertion is reinforced by the fact that most LNG contracts (within the region) are 
indexed to the Japanese Crude Cocktail (JCC). One can logically assume that JCC 
is the uniform price mechanism in the Pacific Basin. And, it is instructive to note 
that:  
 this situation is not and was not due to the setting up of a cartel 
 Neither can one assert that it is the consequence of a collective decision by 
producers 
 Rather, it happened for other reasons: Possibly because the markets into which 
LNG is sold are similar - no pipeline gas948 and the eagerness to ensure stable 
supply relative to changing demand. 
 
Maybe, uniform pricing does not necessarily need an exporters’ cartel. Or, due to 
the nature of Pacific gas markets and high price949 offered for LNG nothing much 
would be gained from cartelization in the region.950 Considering the potential 
                                                 
942 2-3 years ago LNG seemed the only alternative but now more unconventional gas and renewable energy 
supply is anticipated. Whether these expectations would materialize in the current climate is another issue.   
943 Shale gas production is likely to determine Henry Hub prices for the next few years. 
944 Spain and France are excluded. 
945 This does not imply that marginal quantities of LNG do not or would not influence domestic gas prices. 
946 Recall the peculiarities of the gas markets in these countries as described in Section 2.2. 
947 Considering the volume of contracted LNG it imports but, subject to further investigation. 
948 As discussed in sections 2.2 and 3.2.3. 
949 Indexed to crude oil price, and a premium relative to prices in the Atlantic Basin 
950 Perhaps, as the market changes the need to defend high prices (through a cartel) in the Pacific could arise. 
However, these assertions would require additional research to be substantiated. 
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       challenges of imposing UP in the Atlantic Basin, one can logically conclude that a 
successful and sustained implementation is slim or conditional.951 Furthermore, it is 
dependent on LNG achieving a stronger influence on domestic gas prices. But, is it 
actually possible to separate the two geographical and commercial aspects of the 
market.  
 
Against the above, Chapter Six captures the direction in which LNG trade is moving 
and how that relates to the theoretical discourse of the book. It briefly expounds on 
some potential implications of uniform pricing for LNG trade (spot trade; contracting 
and project finance). 
                                                 
951 It is dependent on LNG achieving greater share of gas markets. 
 
 
 CHAPTER SIX 
GLOBALISING LNG TRADE AND THE PRINCIPLES OF UNIFORM 
PRICING AND VOLUME CONTROL 
  
6.1 Initial case for an Atlantic Basin LNG World 
At the beginning of this book, the focus was to consider an organization and a 
price/volume mechanism relevant to Atlantic Basin LNG because the consideration 
of a global organization/mechanism would be too complicated. It seemed justifiable, 
then, to assume that gas markets in Atlantic Basin would potentially determine 
global LNG trade.952 The assumption was based on: the liquidity of gas markets in 
North America and Europe; diversified exporters in the region, as well as, Europe’s 
high dependence on LNG.  
 
Since 2007, it is increasingly evident that LNG is becoming – and many would claim 
has already become – a global market. In 2008, a very substantial amount of LNG 
(around 30%) which appeared to be committed to Atlantic Basin from Atlantic 
exporters – and labeled in this book as “Atlantic Basin LNG” - disappeared to the 
Pacific chasing higher prices.953 Some cases and corresponding market effects are 
first presented. 
 
6.2 LNG is a global commodity 
6.2.1 LNG trade has begun to globalize 
New LNG export contracts indicate that exporters have inserted clauses allowing 
them to divert LNG to higher price customers if importers refuse to match price 
terms being offered elsewhere. Meanwhile, Middle East and North African 
producers (especially Algeria, Egypt and Qatar) have diverted a lot of (hitherto) 
Atlantic Basin cargoes to Asia-Pacific markets.  
 
Similarly, Qatar has become a pricing bridge between the Atlantic and Pacific 
Basins due its geographical location and ability to deliver cargoes based on their 
relative netbacks. Through cargo migration, Qatar secures more rent, when pipeline 
gas prices are lower than LNG prices in the Atlantic Basin, by allocating additional 
                                                 
952 The irreversible trend towards globalization of gas trade, through LNG, lies in the Atlantic Basin. 
953 Some evidence of the migration of cargoes is presented in Section 6.2 overleaf. 
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       cargoes to Asia-Pacific buyers. It therefore, combines flexibility with stability 
(demand security). Due to tight supply in 2007-08, this comparative pricing 
phenomenon954 has resulted in the emergence of global spot price for LNG955 and 
long term price linkages.  
 
As a global LNG market has emerged the Atlantic Basin and the Pacific Basin can 
no longer be considered separate entities. Rather, it is necessary that the 
assumption of an ‘Atlantic Basin LNG world’ be relaxed to see how the principles of 
uniform pricing or volume control fits with globalizing LNG trade. The aim is not to 
resolve what will happen in the LNG market, but essentially, to show the direction in 
which the market is moving and how it may be related to the topic of the book. 
 
6.2.2 Uniform Pricing Mechanism (UPM) in a global LNG market 
Several factors – increased LNG Demand in the Pacific Basin and competition for 
supplies among buyers in 2007 – are responsible for the developments described 
above. As Atlantic markets progressively loose cargoes and exporters suspend 
LNG projects there are notable commercial implications for LNG trade – both 
buyers and sellers. Up until the second quarter of 2007, HH price seemed an 
efficient spot market price for LNG in the US and Spain (sometimes).  
 
The initial relationship was disconnected due to market tightness especially 
between 2007 and 2008. Qatar also contributed in breaking the ‘HH-Spot LNG 
Price’ link by negotiating its spot transactions at significant premiums above the 
Henry Hub.956 At other times, the higher of HH and NBP is used and a premium 
applied. Qatar, invariably, hedges more volatile hub-indexed pricing in the Atlantic 
Basin against more robust oil-based pricing in the Pacific Basin.957 The strength of 
this dislocation and the extent to which it affects global spot (and long-term) LNG 
trade may be too early to predict (correctly).  
 
                                                 
954 With some perceived effects on medium and long term transactions. 
955 Harris, F. and Law, G., Seller’s market for LNG set to last, A Perspective from Wood Mackenzie. 
956 Fesharaki, F., Asian, global LNG Markets in transition are defining future, Vol. 4, Issue 3, LNG 
Observer, July 01, 2007. 
957 Wagbara, O., To what extent is a liquid LNG Hub, in the Middle East, feasible? I.E.L.R. Issue 3, 2008  
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       What is pertinent, however, is that the approach958 is common among LNG 
exporters. Second, the development of a traded index for LNG seems to have been 
avoided because the lack of transparency is beneficial to sellers. Moreover, rather 
than try to create any type of volume/price influence mechanism specific to the to 
the Atlantic Basin for themselves, it seems that exporters have moved their LNG to 
higher price markets (and will probably move it back as relative prices change).  
 
Whatever the case, could these new arbitrage clauses and trading modes be 
considered a form of Uniform Price or Volume Control Mechanism? If not, to what 
extent could the proposed mechanisms fit into a global LNG market? These 
questions are pertinent and therefore are given further consideration below.  
 
6.2.3 Could the use of diversion rights and “higher price” clauses be 
considered a form of uniform pricing mechanism?  
A simple answer to the above question is ‘yes’ and ‘no’.  
Yes, the use of diversion rights and “higher price” clauses could be considered a 
uniform price mechanism959. First, it generates higher prices for LNG exporters that 
apply it. Although the prevalent strategy does not involve an explicit agreement by 
exporters to manipulate the market, the outcome indicates some degree of covert 
understanding by exporters. Second, and more important, the approach – which is 
hinged on the natural tendency to test the limits of an import market against oil 
parity960 - is similar to the principles of Uniform Pricing proposed here. 
 
However, in diversion and “higher price” clauses, reference is made to higher 
price(s) obtainable in any other market. Therefore, to the extent that such arbitrage 
clauses do not entail explicit pricing formula, indexed to crude oil price, it is 
arguable that they can not be considered a kind of Uniform Pricing Mechanism961. 
Besides, post-2008, some LNG cargoes switched from Asia to Europe, not 
completely for price reasons but because of the recession/lack of demand.  
  
                                                 
958 That is, LNG cargo diversion through the use of diversion rights and “higher price” clauses to optimize 
revenue. 
959 Though not in the manner proposed here. 
960 Huitric, R., LNG Pricing: Impact of Globalization and High Prices on Long Term Contract Negotiations, 
Paper presented LNG 15 in Doha, Qatar.  
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       Moreover, if sufficient undeveloped gas reserves exist in an importing market, a 
formula-based LNG price regime that is equal to or higher than oil parity is 
unsustainable. This is because, in a competitive gas world (depending on the 
prevailing oil price), domestic gas production is triggered even before962 gas prices 
reach oil parity. In the US,963 for instance, conventional and unconventional gas 
reserves are exploited to compete with LNG imports at certain price levels.  
 
6.2.4 To what extent would the UPM (as proposed) fit into a globalizing LNG 
market?  
This question can be rephrased to capture the key components of a globalizing 
LNG market – price arbitrage and freedom to transact at any price or place.  
 
- Can price arbitrage be considered a UPM? 
Arbitrage can not be considered a UPM, but rather could be described as “creating 
optionality” for three fundamental reasons. In the first instance, price arbitrage is a 
spot market strategy that is mainly useful from an individual perspective and 
effective in a competitive market. In addition, price arbitrage is the mechanism that 
links markets together, as sellers compete for markets and buyers compete for 
supply in a global market place.964 In the equilibrating process, highly complex price 
setting relationships are created across energy (Gas, Oil, Electricity and Coal) 
markets, as well as, emissions trading markets. Moreover, price arbitrage relies on 
the difference in prices or pricing regimes across importing markets and allows 
importers a share of arbitrage rent through profit splitting mechanisms965.   
 
In contrast, UPM, as proposed here, is the uniform adoption of LNG pricing formula, 
referenced to competitively determined oil price, in long term contracts (see 
sections 3.3.2 and 4.3.1). It could fit into a competitive global LNG market, if it is 
adopted in most LNG transactions. In this sense, only LNG exporters can benefit 
                                                                                                                                                                  
961 In the strict sense, as defined in Chapter One of this book. 
962 Considering the time it takes to complete such gas projects. 
963 However, the US is untypical as there is no other country in the world which imports gas where there is so 
much undeveloped gas resource. 
964 In the equilibrating process, highly complex price setting relationships are created across energy (Gas, 
Oil, Electricity and Coal) markets, as well as, emissions trading markets. 
965 Or any other agreed commercial arrangement, between buyer and seller, which encourages cargo 
diversion (depending on where the importing company is domiciled). 
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       from oil-parity induced price increases but it would interfere with existing price 
interrelationships (within and across markets).  
 
Nevertheless, it is would be more effective when applied regionally,966 depending 
on availability of gas domestically and the nature of the importing market – 
competitive, managed or regulated. Like in the Pacific Basin, for Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan, LNG import is the only source of gas supply. For these markets, it will be 
much easier for exporters to exert considerable price/volume pressure – and as 
described above, there is some evidence to suggest that they are already doing so 
with crude oil parity as a uniform price mechanism. But, its introduction was not at 
the instance or initiative of LNG exporters – as stated earlier in section 5.4. 
  
So for price arbitrage to be considered a UPM, in a global LNG market, it requires a 
global price marker967 and must allow exporters to predominantly earn diversion 
rent. A likely example is the emergence of an exchange-based LNG price index, 
uniformly adopted968 by LNG exporters for short and long term transactions. Without 
speculating on the future, one can argue that JCC is being applied as a UPM 
regionally in the Pacific Basin969 and exporters are using it as bargaining chip for 
influencing global LNG trade.  
 
Interestingly, such trans-regional arbitrage does not simultaneously generate higher 
prices for exporters in all markets970 but provides indirect control. Notably, it agrees 
with the model result that uniform pricing is feasible but invalidates its direct 
adoption in the Atlantic Basin (as hypothesized). So, in a global LNG market, the 
application of UPM in the Atlantic is less likely without a cartel. Similarly, the 
                                                 
966 Depending on the availability of gas domestically and nature of the market – competitive, managed or 
regulated.  
967 Or a defined price relationship - like that which exists between WTI and Brent crudes.  
968 On the condition that it guarantees higher prices and remains under the influence of exporters (probably 
through a Volume Control Mechanism). 
969 The history of LNG markets and pricing in the Pacific is captured in sections 2.2 and 3.2.3(a) 
respectively, but this research has not investigated whether JCC was a producer or an importer-led 
mechanism - it is an interesting subject. 
970 Market participants in the UK and continental European have reported that spot prices fall slightly every 
time the arrival of a vessel at the Isle of Grain is announced. 
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       continued application of JCC as a UPM in the Pacific could become less 
sustainable without a cartel.971 
 
- Does an arbitrage-based UPM need agreement from an organization of gas 
exporting countries (Gas-OPEC/GECF)? 
In the event that exporters are allowed to earn or keep a greater portion of arbitrage 
rent, it is conceivable that an arbitrage-based UPM can be applied without a 
collective agreement by gas exporting countries.972 While such may enhance 
competitive LNG trade, it would be more difficult for exporters to implement.973  
However, given that PSMs – key instruments for rent sharing – are considered 
illegal and anti-competitive in some jurisdictions, a coordinated effort under an 
organization would be more secure and effective.  
 
6.3 A Volume Control Mechanism (VCM) in a globalizing LNG market 
Exporting countries have begun to impose unilateral volume limits on exports 
(Qatari and Egyptian moratoria; greater emphasis on domestic gas utilization in 
Nigeria and Algeria, while Trinidad needs to find new gas). So far, there is no 
evidence to indicate that these actions/decisions were collectively agreed by 
exporters. As the LNG trade becomes globalised, however, it would be interesting 
to know the extent to which restrictions on exports in individual countries could lead 
to/substitute for a VCM (as proposed).  
 
It is important to emphasize that VCM, as conceived here, is aimed at furthering the 
course of globalization and arbitrage-based uniform pricing.974 To a large extent, the 
eventual culmination of individual export restrictions into a VCM is unlikely because 
new export projects are either on-going or being proposed. However, such a 
scenario would depend on the prevailing crude oil price and the level of gas 
demand in the Atlantic and Pacific Basins. At relatively low oil price and high gas 
demand, domestic exploitation of convention/unconventional gas reserves becomes 
                                                 
971 Especially, if a downward trend in LNG demand occurs.  
972 In such circumstance, a pertinent question, however, is whether LNG exporters would be allowed 
unhindered access to liquid gas markets. 
973 That is, muscle more rent from the International Oil and Gas Companies. The reason is because IOGCs 
are adopting an integrated approach in their LNG trade and are better equipped/informed for arbitrage. 
974 Through the systematic reduction in contracted capacity (to increase the spot LNG price) while increasing 
uncontracted liquefaction capacity for arbitrage.  
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       uneconomical relative to LNG importation. Consequently, export restriction by 
individual countries becomes beneficial to other exporters.975  
  
6.4 Could this new LNG world see an evolution towards a combination of 
UPM and VCM? 
Based on the simulation, if uniform pricing or volume restriction is applied alone, it 
could generate consequences that would require a balancing act to sustain trade. 
So, depending on the target level/nature of market influence, both mechanisms 
could be adopted simultaneously to defend or determine the market price.976  
 
Judging from market trend, there could be two scenarios in which the new LNG 
world would see an evolution towards a combination of UPM and VCM. The first 
scenario could be provoked by policy efforts towards alternative fuels and energy 
independence,977 despite a low (falling) price of crude oil. Such policies and related 
incentives could affect LNG demand and price in some markets. A second scenario 
is if Atlantic Basin importers continually undercut LNG exporters by diverting lower-
priced LNG cargoes978 to the Pacific Basin at prices lower than oil-parity.   
 
In either circumstance, the current pricing strategy used by exporters would be 
affected. For instance, Fesharaki argues that “shale gas has put a ceiling on US 
gas prices” and suggests a change in Qatari LNG pricing policy.979 Amidst the 
global financial crisis, one would expect the LNG market to soften considerably, 
putting pressure on prices980 - a catalyst for better co-ordination of gas flows in 
order to maintain prices and potentially leading to delays in new gas projects. In 
other words, exporters could rely on some form of VCM or UPM981 to reduce the 
effects of alternative supplies982 on LNG - thereby retaining diversion rights, “higher 
                                                 
975 Relative to the country that withholds exports.  
976 The need arises, therefore, for further research and simulation of this scenario. 
977 Especially in the United States of America (which has large amount of unconventional gas reserves). 
978 Through self-contracting, International Oil and Gas Companies sell LNG to their subsidiaries based on 
lower indices (HH or NBP).   
979 Fesharaki, F., as quoted in FACTS sees LNG pricing shift requiring Qatar policy change, at 
http://zawya.com/printstory.cfm?storyid=v51n45-2EF03&l=132500081110  
980 The sharp drop in gas prices recorded in 2009 is a classic example of such a scenario. 
981 Not necessarily as proposed here. 
982 For instance, if LNG price is kept low enough then it would make the production of shale gas 
uneconomical and find a market in the US. 
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       price” clauses and defending the link to crude prices. But, is there a theoretical 
basis for this conclusion? Yes.  
 
In a competitive buyer market, Dahl posits that, a monopolistic LNG cartel or “seller 
should sell up to the point where marginal revenue equals marginal cost.”983 When 
LNG exporters have market power, their Marginal Revenue is below the demand 
(curve) for LNG in most importing countries/markets.984 In the importing markets, 
the Marginal Revenue Product of LNG (MRPLNG)985 defines the demand for LNG. 
 
Figure 6.4 VCM-induced shifts in Demand and MRPLNG 
 
 
So, for exporters to consistently earn higher prices, they must restrain supply to 
shift the MRPLNG (demand) curve upward to the right (as Figure 6.4 indicates). To 
sustain a UPM, the same process would also be required at different intervals, 
depending on prevailing market situation. Likewise, in a recession (demand is low 
or shifts leftward)986, if price reduction does not occur in the importing markets, 
exporters would need to support demand or price through a VCM.  
 
                                                 
983 Dahl, C.A., International Energy Markets, p.243, para.1, 2004. 
984 This is because LNG has a derived demand which is a function of the demand for its end product/service. 
985 Which is mainly Natural Gas, Petrochemicals or Electricity (depending on the market) 
986 Tietenberg, T, Environmental Natural Resource Economics, 7th Edition, 2006. 
Demand curve for Natural Gas     
VCM-induced shift in Demand 
leads to a corresponding shift 
in MRPLNG 
Price  
Volume  
MRPLNG = LNG Demand  
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       In a market where exporters auction987 new and uncontracted volumes, any supply 
restricting scheme would make competition for long-term supplies a norm. This, 
however, could become disadvantageous in some import markets and the ultimate 
implication for LNG trade would depend on how long such markets can survive the 
seasonal/perennial hunger for LNG volumes. Then, an alternative source of gas or 
energy supply becomes the next pertinent question.  
 
It may seem irrelevant988 but, it is important that the potential implication of Uniform 
Pricing on LNG trade is addressed here. This is because the extent to which an 
exogenous influence mechanism could fit into a globalizing LNG market is better 
appreciated through its potential impacts on LNG trade. Avoiding the temptation to 
speculate, the subsequent discourse989 captures the possible effects of UPM (as 
proposed) on three key elements of LNG trade – Spot trade; Contracting and 
Project Finance.990   
 
6.4.1 How could UPM (as proposed) affect spot LNG trade? 
Overtime, sustained and increasing spot trade could develop into a price trend 
(forward curve) for LNG. Although the real price991 of LNG remains an illusion992, 
such transactions could yield a solution as buyers compete for cargoes. As a long 
term contract item, the proposed UPM could hamper spot LNG trade if:  
 
o a defined relationship does not emerge between the spot LNG price and 
crude oil price; and/or  
o the number of spot transactions drops significantly.  
 
                                                 
987 Offer their LNG to the highest bidder directly or indirectly through the IOGCs. 
988 This work was based on a hypothetical case and the simulation exercise did not find uniform pricing or 
volume control sustainably feasible. 
989 Some of the arguments presented below were also discussed in Wagbara, O., What are the potential 
implications, of exchange-based LNG auctions, for investments in liquefaction capacity? 28th IAEE/USAEE 
North America Conference, New Orleans, 2008.  
990 As has been stated in subsection 6.4 above, the proposed Volume Control mechanism is designed to 
generate more revenue for exporters and ultimately increase competitive LNG trade. Its likely effects, is 
therefore, not captured. 
991 The real price (supply-demand price) gives an indication of the satisfaction which consumers derive from 
consuming a commodity, service or its end-product.  
992 Even as the price of long term gas supply is difficult to determine. 
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       6.4.2 How could UPM (as proposed) affect LNG Contracting? 
Many energy economists had anticipated that long term contracts and oil-based 
LNG pricing would be history, but “LNG has not followed this script”.993 Rather, 
contracting has remained an integral part of LNG projects and trade. A general 
explanation for this is that someone has to take responsibility for servicing the 
project debt.994 It is important to note, however, that many regasification terminals – 
starting with India’s Hazira and Dahbol, but now including large numbers of 
European terminals – have been built without gas supply contracts.995  
 
UPM would reduce the amount of time and cost involved in negotiating and 
renegotiating price formulas in long term LNG contracts because crude oil price is 
competitively determined. But, in a situation where UPM makes LNG too expensive 
or affects the sanctity of contracts, the most optimistic solution is a harmonious 
contract renegotiation. Such an agreeable exercise is hard to come by. Rather 
contract are renegotiated either through arbitration or mediation. 
 
6.4.3 How could UPM (as proposed) affect LNG Project Finance? 
LNG trade has not only become sophisticated with self-contracting, cargo 
diversions and profit splitting mechanisms, but pricing is more complex. The 
situation has changed risk profiles along the chain and lenders are now 
apprehensive that the prevailing trade model involves less secure off-take 
contracts.996 In addition, financial derivatives have lost their attraction – after the 
collapse of Enron - as useful tools for providing price certainty in the long term. 
Unfortunately, rising project costs, since 2005, is worsening financiers’ unease 
about escalating budgets.  
 
Hub-based gas price indexation could generate more transparent LNG prices, but 
the fact is that financial risk protection is a concern for sponsors and financiers even 
in competitive markets.997 Besides, financiers consider destination flexibility as 
                                                 
993 Jensen, J., Comments on Gas Demand, Contracts and Prices, Oxford Energy Forum, May 2008. 
994 This relates to the capital intensive nature of liquefaction projects. 
995 Rather, they are underpinned by throughput (use or pay) contracts. 
996 Due to the existence of LNG Aggregators: a new role being played by International Oil and Gas 
Companies (IOGCs).  
997 Either in fully-liberalised gas markets or an LNG Hub: See Jensen, J., Comments on Gas Demand, 
Contracts and Prices, Oxford Energy Forum, May 2008. 
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       potentially more risky when it is advantageous to a party other than the borrower. In 
this circumstance, a UPM based on oil parity would seem more reliable and could 
enhance LNG project finance options. Over time we could also see a reduction in 
the cost of borrowing for LNG projects as financial institutions compete among 
themselves. 
 
The financing structure of most LNG projects empowers projects sponsors. In other 
words, “banks and other financing organisations have a significant influence on the 
pricing terms under which new LNG projects are developed”998. So, the collective 
adoption of UPM by LNG exporters, within a cartel framework, could threaten 
financiers’ confidence.999 Unless financiers retain the right to, at least, determine the 
contracted base price for LNG, UPM would hinder the availability of project funds.  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
The above interpretation tells only part of the story. This is because the effect of 
LNG prices or supply on natural gas prices1000 in importing markets is very complex 
and can only be answered by running very sophisticated natural gas 
supply/demand/price models that adjust for the changing logistics of gas supply. So 
far, it has been demonstrated that the LNG world is bigger than the Atlantic Basin. 
And, the wider world is already having an impact in the sense that Atlantic Basin 
exporters are using the Pacific as a substantial outlet for achieving higher prices – 
from oil price indexation. Attempt was made to reconcile the globalizing LNG market 
with the principles of uniform pricing and volume control considered in this work. 
                                                 
998 CIEP., LNG Impacts on North West Europe, Summary of Gas Market Seminar, 3 February, 2006. 
999 Between 2004 and 2006 LNG projects secured some of the largest financing deals (even at relatively low 
margins) due to the high confidence financiers and investors had in the commodity - LNG. 
1000 Not just actual prices but also expectation of future prices and demand. 
 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
7.1 The Question 
The literature review1001 revealed that so far no research on the application of 
uniform pricing in international gas trade has been undertaken. Although, there 
are many gas trade models,1002 none has been designed to specifically consider 
the sustainability and effects of an LNG exporters’ cartel. So, this work attempted 
to fill the above gaps, while adopting simulation technique and scenario analysis 
(explained in section 4.1.4).  
 
On the premise of a hypothetical exporters’ group, this work considered whether 
the economics of LNG permits price-setting in the Atlantic Basin. The theory and 
practice of uniform pricing (as a cartel mechanism) was investigated within the 
gas industry. To set the scene, the history and nature of pricing in international 
gas trade was described. The discourse in Chapter Two shows good prospects for 
LNG in the region1003 - in the light of declining domestic production, inadequate 
storage capacity and uncertain pipeline imports.  
 
Chapter Three captured the lopsided interaction between domestic gas markets 
and LNG pricing. It also demonstrated the underlying and persistent battle 
(between importing and exporting countries) for the control and character of 
pricing in international gas trade.1004 One reason is that most LNG price regimes 
constrain the maximization of producer rent (as illustrated with Figure 3.3).  
 
Another significant discovery, from Chapter Three, is that the continued indexation 
of LNG to multiple price indices across regions is certainly not compatible1005 with 
the globalization of LNG trade. In addition, seasonal and structural changes in 
LNG market dynamics push risks upstream and create huge incentives for price 
                                                 
1001 Literatures were in section 1.6, as well as, in Chapters Three and Four  
1002 See Volume 30, Special Issue (on gas modeling) Energy Journal, 2009. 
1003 During the period up to 2008, but the 2009 global economic crisis may have altered demand trends – the 
full extent of this still remains uncertain.  
1004 This is due to the theoretical and practical challenges of determining the future price of gas.  
1005 Just like fixed destination contracts is ill-suited to the dynamic world of arbitrage. 
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determination. So, the author proposed a pricing principle and formula to test the 
feasibility of uniform pricing – a cartel mechanism for price determination.  
 
For simulation,1006 a set of exporting and importing countries were chosen, from 
the Atlantic Basin, in a thorough and systematic process with some intuitive sense 
of representation (in section 2.3). The ABLTM captured the basics of LNG trade 
and pricing across gas markets in the Atlantic Basin.1007 By fitting the historical 
data and iterating the objective function with the same SEED number, probability 
distributions of changes in revenue and price were generated (see Appendix). 
From these distributions of outcomes, the most probable scenario for each 
exporter was extracted. Subsequently, using a theoretical framework,1008 the 
probable outcomes for each exporter was contextualized in Chapter Five.  
 
Three key outcomes were obtained from the simulation exercise:  
 It uniquely shows the conditions within which the concept of uniform pricing 
could be applied in Atlantic Basin LNG trade.  
 Imposing a Uniform Pricing regime in the region would be difficult due to the 
marginal role played by LNG in most markets. While this makes sustainability 
difficult, it also makes collusion essential - to defend prices and resource rent.  
 By comparing the outcomes of UP and VC mechanisms, the exercise has 
offered a deeper understanding of the factors that could determine LNG price 
in future.  
 
It is noteworthy that the quantitative results obtained are not abstract but 
theoretically explainable (as presented in 4.3.2.3). Interestingly, the result of the 
exercise is tenable irrespective of the justification for collusion or the case made 
for a new price regime. Perhaps, it would be useful to prove that, in a liquid spot 
LNG market, individual exporting countries would earn more revenue than in the 
UP and/or VC scenarios.    
 
                                                 
1006 Two mechanisms – Uniform Pricing and Volume Control - were proposed and modeled within the 
Atlantic Basin.   
1007 See detailed explanation of the data, simulation process and results in Chapter Four: sections 4.1.4 and 
4.2.2; as well as, Table 4.1 and Figure 4.4.  
1008 The framework was vigorously derived from classic cartel theory in Chapter Five. 
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Meanwhile, Chapter Five highlighted the hard choices and implications of both 
mechanisms for each exporting country. From the discourse therein, it is clear that 
the outcome of the volume control mechanism is beyond the exclusive control of 
exporters. Most LNG importing countries in the Atlantic Basin will have little 
difficulty in substituting LNG with domestically produced or imported pipeline gas. 
So, a collective reduction in Annual Contracted LNG Volume would not 
significantly increase long term contract prices for exporters - unless a global spot 
LNG price emerges and is used for long term contract indexation.1009  
 
Until now, no constructive effort has been made to determine the primary 
concerns or incentives for LNG exporting countries to collude. It is apparent from 
this exercise that, to effectively1010 apply VC mechanism, the key considerations 
for any LNG exporting country (or group of countries) should be: 
 What is the nature of its export market? 
 What domestic pricing regime is prevalent in that/those markets? 
 What proportion of the market does it supply? 
 What is the LNG sales portfolio of that/those exporting countries?   
 What is the long term/spot LNG supply mix1011 of the importing countries?   
 What other potential sources of supply are available to the importing market? 
 What determines the long-term price of Gas (LNG)1012 in each market and at 
different seasons? If crude oil, then what is the price of oil? 
Contrary to theoretical expectation, the above considerations indicate that Volume 
Control would be practically more challenging. Moreover, gas storage cost is high 
and exporters have different gas needs; LNG investments; contracts and projects 
finance obligations.1013  
 
On the other hand, it would more practicable for LNG exporters to agree a “crude 
oil parity” or “energy content” pricing principle. As such, they could exert direct UP 
influence on markets where LNG comprises a significant part of the gas supply 
                                                 
1009 However, this is a very optimistic expectation. 
1010 With a significant and sustainable increase in long term LNG price. 
1011 Considering that some countries import more spot cargoes than others, this would determine the 
individual and collective response of importers to a reduction in ACV. 
1012 This question has remained the object of international arbitration and contract renegotiation. 
1013 It may be recalled that the potentials of each mechanism and conditions for their adoption were presented 
in Sections 4.3.3 and 5.4. 
Chapter Seven: Concluding Remarks 
 
 
 
190 
and indirectly on other markets. But, there may be a difference between choosing 
a UP which “works” in the current market conditions, and trying to impose a UP 
which could effectively exclude LNG from the US or some European markets. 
Perhaps, UP could be extended to only a few, rather than all, importing countries 
in the Atlantic Basin. Or is that why a cartel is necessary? But, how effective 
would a cartel driven Uniform Pricing or Volume Control regime be in a global 
LNG market?   
 
7.2 Limitations of the Study 
7.2.1 Approach of the Book 
Incorporating spot LNG contracts into the model would have made the results 
more comprehensive. Another probable alternative would have been to contrast 
the gains of a cartelised long term contracts market with competitive spot LNG 
trade. For clarity and thoroughness, this effort considered pricing in long term LNG 
contracts only. Due to data constraints and small number of spot deals it was not 
practicable to capture spot LNG trade in the simulation. Besides, there is no 
defined relationship between short term and long term LNG trade. To make up for 
this limitation, the analysis in Chapters Five and Six highlights the implications, of 
UP/VC mechanism, for spot LNG trade.  
 
In the course of this work, legal issues imminent from the influence mechanisms 
were not considered. Rather they were assumed to be non-existent. This was 
deliberate in order to stay focused on the economics of gas (especially LNG) 
pricing and geopolitical cartel behaviour. Given the findings of this work, it would 
be interesting to approach the underlying questions from an international 
economic law perspective or the economics of contracting. 
 
The issue of whether another approach could have been better, ultimately, 
depends on the research question. If, for instance, the book was focused on how 
the proposed mechanisms could be implemented, then a legal perspective could 
be appropriate. The robust approach used here is very insightful and appropriate. 
Besides, the framework used here could be adopted to investigate the feasibility in 
a global market for emissions permits. In other words, could a standard pricing 
regime enhance the global tradability of carbon permits?  
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7.2.2 Scope of the Study 
In 2005, it seemed that an investigation of market influence mechanisms in a less-
than-definite global LNG market would be inconclusive. However, if one were to 
start the research again - given the experience of 2007-08 and the globalization of 
LNG trade - one would certainly include the Pacific Basin in the scope. One vital 
reason is because of the very large share of LNG in the gas demand of many 
Pacific Basin importers - UP or VC are very likely to be extremely effective.1014 
Without such elaborate analysis, the research outcome could seem partial. 
Perhaps, this is one limitation of the work, but also an indication that no one can 
know the future. To bridge this gap, Chapter Six reconciles the regional outcome 
with the real world.  
 
7.3 General Conclusion  
It appears that it is statistically feasible for exporters to adopt a uniform LNG 
pricing or volume control mechanism. Theoretically, Volume control would be 
easier to collectively restrict the production of a commodity to provoke a price 
increase… It would be practically easier for exporters to agree on a pricing 
principle than collectively restricting LNG production. But, the extent to which 
either scheme could be used sustainably to determine LNG price, however, 
depends on demand.1015 More so, in a soft LNG market with low gas prices. The 
reason is that LNG prices drop drastically when gas demand is low in countries 
where market-based pricing apply. In this regard, both mechanisms are vulnerable 
in a soft Atlantic Basin market situation.  
 
However, such a market situation, if global, could also motivate exporters to take 
steps to defend LNG price. Judging from the underlying assumptions of the 
model, adopting either a uniform pricing or volume control regime for LNG in the 
Atlantic Basin would need close and consistent monitoring of oil prices; gas 
storage levels; cost and capacity levels along the LNG value chain; as well as; the 
number and nature of spot transactions.  
 
                                                 
1014 Besides, with time, it is almost certain that a defined relationship would result from the interaction of 
regional LNG (gas) prices. 
 
1015 That is demand (or supply gap) provoking increase in the proportion of LNG in the total gas supply 
within importing markets. 
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For exporters to influence Atlantic Basin LNG trade with either mechanism, the 
rationale for profit-sharing has to be determined.1016 And in both scenarios, the 
distribution of the profits among the exporters would be very complex. Second, 
any uniform LNG pricing regime must consider the ‘basis risks’ within competitive 
national and regional gas grids.  
 
So, until the above underlying questions are resolved, uniform pricing for LNG, in 
the Atlantic Basin is not feasible in the medium term. Moreover, the complexities 
of contract price negotiations and the importance of long term contracts1017 could 
make uniform pricing, as a mechanism for market influence, impracticable. And 
LNG trade could become more diverse in the region - in terms of any “standard” 
pricing formula and in trade patterns. The application of uniform pricing or volume 
control mechanism is, however, conceivable in spot LNG trade1018 and in the 
Pacific Basin where LNG is the only source of gas supply. While, a price-fixing 
agreement may not enhance LNG’s reach into many markets, it would give 
exporters a stronger negotiating edge.  
 
7.4 Further Research 
This innovative effort has contributed to the body of knowledge1019 by applying the 
principles of uniform pricing in international gas trade. Beside its originality, the 
book comprehensively addressed specific questions with results that could be 
adopted to explain other trends in LNG trade. In addition, it has justified the need 
for more research in some areas highlighted below. 
  
                                                 
1016 By reaping profit on the basis of quotas or sharing equally or by a combination of both. 
1017 This explains exporters’ refusal to participate in regular auctions of LNG cargoes and subsequently 
uniformly adopt the exchange-generated price in other transactions. 
1018 And if adopted could change spot LNG price determination globally. 
1019 The following peer-reviewed publications/presentations have resulted from this work and are major 
additions to existing literature: (a) Wagbara, O., What are the potential implications, of exchange-based LNG 
auctions, for investments in liquefaction capacity? Paper presented at the 28th IAEE/USAEE North American 
Conference, New Orleans, 2008; (b) Wagbara, O., To what extent is a liquid LNG Hub, in the Middle East, 
feasible? Issue 3, International Energy Law Review, 2008; (c) Wagbara, O., To what extent could an LNG 
export organization, operating a uniform pricing or volume control mechanism, influence LNG trade in the 
Atlantic Basin? Paper presented at the 27th IAEE/USAEE North America Conference, Houston, Texas, 2007; 
(d) Wagbara, O., How would the Gas Exporting Countries Forum influence gas trade? Energy Policy 
Journal, Volume 35, Issue 2, February 2007, Pages 1224-1237; (e) Wagbara, O., Atlantic LNG trade: What 
are the implications of the Russian-Ukraine-EU trade row? Volume 14, No.3, USAEE Dialogue, November 
2006. 
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Simulation results in this work could be improved by adding spot transactions in 
the model across the Pacific and Atlantic Basins. In future, simulations could be 
undertaken, though more challenging, to comprehensively analyze Uniform 
Pricing in a global LNG market which includes Asia-Pacific exporters and 
importers. Despite prevalent constraint in liquefaction capacity, determining the 
extent to which competitive fringe supply1020 could reduce the benefits of UP or 
VC would be a worthwhile extension of this book.  
  
The question of how LNG prices interact with and affect the basis differentials 
and/or price level within importing markets requires thorough investigation. Little 
or no research has been done in this area, especially with respect to the UK, US 
and Continental Europe. Such an exercise could also use specific demand 
elasticity indices, from relevant sectors of the importing economies,1021 to 
precisely capture demand-side response to each mechanism. 
 
This book analyzed the principles of uniform pricing and volume control in LNG 
trade. But, the exercise only looked in detail at the Atlantic Basin - mostly during 
the period of supply tightness up to 2008. One has not been able to look 
comprehensively at the Atlantic and Pacific Basins over a sufficiently long period 
of time during the globalization of the LNG market. So researchers now have the 
opportunity: 
o to look at the Pacific Basin in the same detail in relation to 
the possibility of UP and VC 
o to examine how, in a surplus market scenario, opportunities 
for UP and VC will change and 
o to look in more detail to see whether there are countries or  
subsets of countries from both Atlantic and Pacific Basins (like Japan, Korea, 
Taiwan and Spain) in which UP and VC could work - even if it could not 
necessarily be extended to all importing countries. 
 
Despite the issues for further research identified above, this work has achieved its 
stated objectives. Also, it has presented a set of analytical model and framework 
                                                 
1020 Higher export volumes and/or price-cutting behaviour. 
1021 By decomposing gas demand into the following: Households; Power Generation and Petrochemical 
Companies. 
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that incorporates the economics of long term LNG pricing; monthly export volumes 
and pipeline gas markets (for elasticity). Moreover, the suggested mechanisms 
provide the basis for explaining the current pricing and trading strategy of 
exporters in the emerging global LNG market.1022 Besides, it would prove useful 
for a better systematic study of the LNG industry in future. 
                                                 
1022 For instance, in Chapter Six, it uniquely applies the Uniform Pricing proposition to interprete probable 
collusion in the emerging global LNG market. 
 
 
APPENDIX 
This Appendix is a guide to help readers understand the book and simulation (results) 
better. As described in Chapter Four,1023 Atlantic Basin LNG Trade (ABLT) is modeled 
here as a static representation of long-term LNG contracts captured on a monthly scale. 
Given the mechanisms simulated (UP and VC), the Appendix is divided into three sections 
- to capture the results, as well as, present the data used in the exercise. There is an 
introduction in each section, but generally, Appendix 1 contains results of the UP scenario, 
Appendix 2 shows the VC scenario outcomes and Appendix 3 describes the dataset used.  
 
1. Change in Monthly Revenues of exporters in the Uniform Pricing Scenario 
Following the collective adoption of the Uniform Pricing Proposition (Formula) in the 
Model, this section of the Appendix shows the initial changes in each Exporter’s monthly 
revenue - as probability distributions. The changes in revenue, presented here, occurred in 
the inelastic demand scenario – that is importers are yet to respond to the UP-induced 
changes in price.1024 So, as cross-referenced in section 4.3.1.2, there are six probability 
distributions – one for each exporter. The respective mean values are applied to the 
elasticity indices (in Appendix 3.4) to generate the results in Table 4.3 - page 186  
 
 
1a) 
 
                                                 
1023 See section 4.2 – Model Framework, page 173. 
1024 However, the situation is different when demand becomes elastic (resulting in a reduction in imports - 
Annual Contracted Volumes). The result of the elastic demand scenario (using the elasticity indices 
described in Appendix 3 below) is shown in Tables 4.3 and 5.3 with the respective reductions in market 
share.  
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1b) 
 
 
 
1c) 
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1d) 
 
 
1e) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Appendix and Bibliography 
 
 
198 
1f) 
 
 
 
 
1. Change in Monthly Revenues of exporters in the Volume Control Scenario 
Like Appendix 1, this section shows the outcomes of the VC scenario - cross referenced in 
section 4.3.2.2 on page 194. The mean values of these probability distributions – one for 
each exporter - are applied to specific elasticity indices (Appendix 3.4) and each country’s 
contracted volume is constrained by δ% to determine specific increase in LNG price 
(ΔP).1025   
2a) 
 
                                                 
1025 The Volume Control Scenario and its underlying assumptions are described extensively in section 4.3.2, 
page 192. Figures 4.5 and 4.6 summarize the outcomes. 
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2b) 
 
 
2c)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
The probability distribution for the change in Libya’s revenues yielded errors for Skewness 
and Kurtosis. This error could be traced to the number of inputs (contracts) iterated for 
Libya in this scenario. As could be seen in Appendix 3.1, Libyan LNG is contracted only to 
Spain – on long term basis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Distribution for (Libya) % Change in Monthly 
Rev. (VC)/H24 
  
Values in 10^ 3 
Values in 10^-3 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
14 
               
3  
3.3 3.375 3.45 3.525 3.6 
@RISK Trial Version 
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5 1 37
 5%  90% 5% 
 3.1136   3.4457  
Mean=3.21061E-03   
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2d) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2e) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Distribution for (Nigeria) % Change in Monthly 
Rev. (VC)/H25 
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2g) 
 
 
 
3. STATISTICAL APPENDIX 
Given the above set of results, it is important that one presents the data used and explain 
the source. The following sub-sections are aimed at achieving both the former and the 
latter. The contracts data, crude oil prices and other confidential LNG price data used in 
this book were sourced from a reputable organization in the LNG industry – Gas 
Strategies.1026 To further enhance their robustness, the LNG contracts used here were 
contrasted with data held by another reputable firm of consulting energy economists - 
Jensen Associates Incorporated (managed by Prof. James T. Jensen).1027 The contracts 
were verified because they form an integral part of the simulation exercise – in all the 
scenarios. LNG contract prices could not be verified due to the confidential nature of price 
data.1028  
 
3.1 CONTRACTS VOLUMES1029 
The Contract data below was used to compute the Annual Contracted Volumes (ACV) of 
LNG in the Model. These contracts are within the scope of the research1030 – exact 
contract dates have been excluded for confidential reasons. In the ABLTM, ACVs are 
averaged into monthly volumes to generate average monthly revenues for each exporter. 
A limitation of using such averages is that it ignores seasonal variations in gas demand. 
However, the six-month average applied evens out seasonal price fluctuations and so any 
underlying effects on price/revenue are ignored in the simulation exercise. 
 
                                                 
1026 Gas Strategies Online: www.GasStrategiesOnline.com 
1027 http://www.jai-energy.com/  
1028 This is in sharp contrast with Crude Oil prices and exchange rate data that could be sourced easily from 
the trade press. 
1029 Gas Strategies Online: www.GasStrategiesOnline.com 
1030 The ABLTM covers contracts between 2005 and 2013. 
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3.1a LNG Contract Data 
Exporter Location Country Importer Country Volume 
(mtpa) 
Volume 
(Bcm) 
Algeria              
Sonatrach     GDF France 0.39 0.53 
Sonatrach     GDF France 0.77 1.06 
Sonatrach     GDF France 2.56 3.50 
Sonatrach     Gas Natural Spain 2.77 3.80 
Sonatrach     Cepsa Spain 0.73 1.00 
Sonatrach     Iberdrola Spain 0.73 1.00 
Sonatrach     Endesa Spain 0.73 1.00 
Sonatrach     Snam Italy 1.31 1.80 
Sonatrach     Tractebel LNG United States 0.88 1.20 
Sonatrach     Statoil USA 0.73 1.00 
Sonatrach     Sempra USA 1.83 2.50 
  France Spain Italy USA     
Algeria’s Total (mtpa) 3.72 4.96 1.31 3.43 13.42 18.39 
Egypt             
Egypt LNG     Gaz de France France 3.60 4.93 
Egypt LNG Train 2     BG USA/Italy 3.60 4.93 
SEGAS     Union Fenosa Spain 2.41 3.30 
SEGAS     BG   0.76 1.04 
SEGAS     Petronas(ALTCO)   0.76 1.04 
SEGAS     BP   1.06 1.45 
Egypt’s Total (mtpa) 3.60 4.99 3.60 0 12.19 16.70 
Libya             
Brega Pet. Mkt.     Gas Natural Spain 0.73 1.00 
Libya’s Total   Spain     0.73 1.00 
Nigeria             
Nigeria LNG T1 & T2     Enel France 2.56 3.50 
Nigeria LNG T1 & T2     Gaz de France France 0.70 0.50 
Nigeria LNG T6     Endesa Spain 0.73 1.00 
Nigeria LNG T6     Shell Western Spain/US/Mex 3.00 4.11 
Nigeria LNG T1 & T2     Gas Natural Spain 1.17 1.60 
Nigeria LNG T4 & T5     Iberdrola Spain 1.10 1.50 
Nigeria LNG T3     Gas Natural Spain 1.97 2.70 
Nigeria LNG T4 & T5     Shell Western US/Mexico 1.10 1.50 
Nigeria LNG T4 & T5     Total Gas & Power EU/USA 0.22 0.30 
Nigeria LNG T4 & T5     BG USA 2.50 3.50 
Nigeria LNG T6     Total Gas & Power EU/USA 0.88 1.20 
Nigeria LNG T7     BG USA 2.25 3.08 
Nigeria LNG T7     Eni USA 1.37 1.88 
Nigeria LNG T7     Total  USA/Mexico 1.37 1.88 
Nigeria LNG T7     Shell Western   2.00 2.74 
Nigeria LNG T7     Occidental Energy   1.00 1.37 
Brass LNG     BG Gas Marketing  USA 2.00 2.74 
Brass LNG     BP Italy 2.00 2.74 
  France Spain Italy USA     
Nigeria’s Total (mtpa) 3.26 7.97 2.00 14.69 27.91 37.84 
Trinidad             
Atlantic LNG     Tractebel LNG USA 1.75 2.40 
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Atlantic LNG     Tractebel LNG USA 0.22 0.30 
Atlantic LNG     BG USA 1.50 2.06 
Atlantic LNG     BG USA 1.61 2.20 
Atlantic LNG     BG USA 0.80 1.10 
Atlantic LNG     Gas Natural Spain/USA 0.73 1.00 
Atlantic LNG     Repsol  Spain/USA 0.66 0.90 
Atlantic LNG     Repsol  Spain 1.68 2.30 
Atlantic LNG     Gas de Euskadi  Spain/USA 0.73 1.00 
  France Spain Italy USA     
Trinidad’s Total 0.00 3.80 0.00 5.88 9.68 13.26 
Qatar             
Qatargas     Gas Natural Spain 0.70 0.96 
Qatargas     Gas Natural Spain 0.70 0.96 
Qatargas     BP Spain 0.75 1.03 
Qatargas     Gas Natural Spain 1.46 2.00 
RasGas     ENI Spain  0.88 1.20 
RasGas train 2     Endesa Spain 0.80 1.10 
RasGas (II) Train 4     Edison Italy 4.60 6.30 
Ras Gas (II) Train 6 & 7     ExxonMobil USA 15.60 21.37 
      ExxonMobil UK 7.80 10.69 
      Total UK 5.20 7.12 
      QP/ExxonMobil UK 2.60 3.56 
  U.K Spain Italy USA     
Qatar’s Total 15.60 5.29 4.60 15.60 41.09 56.29 
Gas Strategies Online: www.GasStrategiesOnline.com 
 
3.2 CRUDE OIL (BRENT AND WTI) PRICES AND EXCHANGE RATE 
Crude oil prices were used to generate the Uniform Prices applied in the UPM Scenario. 
As such, the historical crude oil price data is presented below. Also, presented in the table 
are monthly exchange rate data which were used to covert NBP price from p/th to 
$/mmBtu (100,000 Btu = 1 Therm).  
Date 
Brent 
FOB 
($/bbl) 
WTI 
Midland 
($/bbl) 
Exchange 
Rate ($/£) 
Jan-96 17.93  18.80  1.5305  
Feb-96 17.98  19.09  1.5365  
Mar-96 19.95  21.33  1.5273  
Apr-96 20.93  23.51  1.5153  
May-96 19.10  21.24  1.5148  
Jun-96 18.43  20.45  1.5418  
Jul-96 19.64  21.32  1.5540  
Aug-96 20.56  21.93  1.5506  
Sep-96 22.64  24.00  1.5596  
Oct-96 24.16  24.90  1.5861  
Nov-96 22.69  23.72  1.6626  
Dec-96 23.92  25.41  1.6651  
Jan-97 23.45  25.13  1.6586  
Feb-97 20.82  22.19  1.6246  
Mar-97 19.06  20.96  1.6094  
Apr-97 17.46  19.75  1.6296  
May-97 19.07  20.91  1.6333  
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Jun-97 17.58  19.28  1.6448  
Jul-97 18.52  19.63  1.6703  
Aug-97 18.64  19.93  1.6035  
Sep-97 18.44  19.78  1.6017  
Oct-97 19.89  21.27  1.6330  
Nov-97 19.15  20.18  1.6891  
Dec-97 17.10  18.30  1.6603  
Jan-98 15.12  16.69  1.6356  
Feb-98 13.95  16.07  1.6408  
Mar-98 13.06  15.10  1.6621  
Apr-98 13.45  15.32  1.6730  
May-98 14.44  14.93  1.6378  
Jun-98 12.05  13.69  1.6509  
Jul-98 12.04  14.12  1.6438  
Aug-98 11.95  13.39  1.6339  
Sep-98 13.39  14.97  1.6823  
Oct-98 12.64  14.42  1.6951  
Nov-98 10.96  12.95  1.6619  
Dec-98 9.88  11.29  1.6706  
Jan-99 11.13  12.48  1.6515  
Feb-99 10.23  12.00  1.6277  
Mar-99 12.50  14.66  1.6219  
Apr-99 15.33  17.34  1.6098  
May-99 15.22  17.74  1.6148  
Jun-99 15.82  17.90  1.5949  
Jul-99 19.03  20.08  1.5747  
Aug-99 20.31  21.27  1.6063  
Sep-99 22.45  23.88  1.6244  
Oct-99 22.01  22.69  1.6573  
Nov-99 24.55  24.88  1.6213  
Dec-99 25.57  26.11  1.6146  
Jan-00 25.55  27.26  1.6394  
Feb-00 27.89  29.39  1.5999  
Mar-00 27.26  29.86  1.5805  
Apr-00 22.59  25.78  1.5834  
May-00 27.63  28.80  1.5087  
Jun-00 29.80  31.88  1.5089  
Jul-00 28.49  29.71  1.5088  
Aug-00 30.11  31.33  1.4902  
Sep-00 32.73  33.89  1.4356  
Oct-00 30.91  33.02  1.4511  
Nov-00 32.58  34.40  1.4256  
Dec-00 25.26  28.35  1.4639  
Jan-01 25.66  29.56  1.4778  
Feb-01 27.45  29.56  1.4530  
Mar-01 24.42  27.18  1.4454  
Apr-01 25.71  27.40  1.4353  
May-01 28.51  28.61  1.4264  
Jun-01 27.83  27.57  1.4014  
Jul-01 24.58  26.43  1.4139  
Aug-01 25.74  27.40  1.4368  
Sep-01 25.57  26.08  1.4634  
Oct-01 20.49  22.08  1.4517  
      Appendix and Bibliography 
 
 
205 
Nov-01 18.98  19.59  1.4358  
Dec-01 18.68  19.27  1.4390  
Jan-02 19.48  19.68  1.4319  
Feb-02 20.22  20.66  1.4230  
Mar-02 23.73  24.35  1.4240  
Apr-02 25.66  26.26  1.4435  
May-02 25.33  26.74  1.4597  
Jun-02 24.13  25.33  1.4863  
Jul-02 25.81  26.71  1.5547  
Aug-02 26.66  28.06  1.5378  
Sep-02 28.38  29.56  1.5561  
Oct-02 27.58  28.73  1.5574  
Nov-02 24.10  25.98  1.5723  
Dec-02 28.67  29.35  1.5855  
Jan-03 31.32  32.84  1.6169  
Feb-03 32.67  35.50  1.6084  
Mar-03 30.54  33.34  1.5836  
Apr-03 24.85  28.03  1.5740  
May-03 25.72  27.84  1.6223  
Jun-03 27.51  30.29  1.6605  
Jul-03 28.35  30.36  1.6223  
Aug-03 29.79  31.23  1.5941  
Sep-03 27.08  27.99  1.6131  
Oct-03 29.65  30.13  1.6787  
Nov-03 28.73  30.74  1.6900  
Dec-03 29.87  31.91  1.7518  
Jan-04 31.23  33.90  1.8233  
Feb-04 30.83  34.03  1.8673  
Mar-04 33.79  36.51  1.8266  
Apr-04 33.25  36.44  1.8021  
May-04 37.80  40.05  1.7868  
Jun-04 35.04  37.88  1.8275  
Jul-04 38.32  40.65  1.8428  
Aug-04 43.04  44.68  1.8203  
Sep-04 43.25  45.74  1.7921  
Oct-04 49.64  53.09  1.8065  
Nov-04 42.84  48.14  1.8603  
Dec-04 39.53  42.94  1.9278  
Jan-05 44.23  46.46  1.8777  
Feb-05 45.37  47.58  1.8870  
Mar-05 52.91  54.11  1.9058  
Apr-05 51.82  52.79  1.8960  
May-05 48.56  50.01  1.8542  
Jun-05 54.39  56.45  1.8178  
Jul-05 57.58  58.90  1.7509  
Aug-05 64.12  65.27  1.7946  
Sep-05 62.91  65.82  1.8081  
Oct-05 58.61  62.06  1.7640  
Nov-05 55.17  58.39  1.7341  
Dec-05 56.91  59.62  1.7455  
Jan-06 63.05  65.49  1.7678  
Feb-06 60.12  61.52  1.7468  
Mar-06 62.09  62.84  1.7435  
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Apr-06 70.35  69.56  1.7696  
May-06 69.83  70.96  1.8680  
Jun-06 68.69  70.83  1.8429  
Jul-06 73.66  74.44  1.8448  
Aug-06 73.11  73.21  1.8946  
Sep-06 61.71  63.95  1.8847  
Oct-06 57.79  58.79  1.8756  
Nov-06 58.92  59.09  1.9119  
Dec-06 62.32  62.37  1.9630  
Jan-07 53.68  54.44  1.9587  
Feb-07 57.43  59.20  1.9581  
Mar-07 62.15  60.62  1.9420  
Source: Gas Strategies Online: www.GasStrategiesOnline.com 
 
3.3 SHIPPING COST ASSUMPTIONS1031: 
A summary of transportation cost (in USD per MMBTU) to deliver 15.60mtpa of LNG from 
Qatar to the US, using a 215,000m3 capacity vessel is given below:1032  
 
Ship cost 0.76 /MMBtu 
Fuel cost 0.23 /MMBtu 
Boil off cost 0.13 /MMBtu 
Suez cost 0.15 /MMBtu 
Port cost 0.03 /MMBtu 
Total 1.30 /MMBtu 
Source: www.GasStrategiesOnline.com 
The above breakdown was useful in arriving at an assumed value for transportation in the 
U.P Formula: $1 per MMBtu because Qatar to the US is the longest distance which any of 
the chosen exporters can cover within the Model. 
 
3.4 ELASTICITY INDICES 
 
The price elasticity of final demand for natural gas, in each European market, is adjusted 
to determine the index for LNG: In the Volume Control Scenario, based on the work of 
Holz et’ al1033, each country’s index is increased/decreased by 0.05 (against the regional 
index: -0.7) depending on the share of natural gas in the importer’s energy mix (i.e. +0.05 
for relatively low gas consuming countries and vice versa).1034 Relying on Holz and 
Pavel1035 elasticity of US natural gas demand (-0.90) is used to determine the price 
elasticity of LNG demand. Unlike Holz and Pavel, however, U.S elasticity is adjusted by 
                                                 
1031 See shipping cost assumptions on page 174.  
1032 Source: Gas Strategies Online. Transport cost for specific volumes and to different destinations is 
available from the same source: www.GasStrategiesOnline.com  
1033 Holz, F. et’ al A Strategic Model of European Gas Supply (GASMOD), 2006 Discussion Papers of DIW 
Berlin 551, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research 
1034 Substitutes affect the elasticity of demand. Due to the peculiarity of each importing country different 
elasticity indices have to be applied. 
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0.1 in absolute value to account for the decrease in North American conventional 
gas production and increasing share of gas in the U.S energy mix. In the Uniform Pricing 
Scenario, the natural gas elasticity indices are further adjusted, by the percentage of LNG 
supplied to each market (to determine the corresponding effect of a change in LNG price). 
Appendix 3.4a shows the elasticity indices (ψ), while Appendix 3.4b shows the data used 
to generate them.  
 
 Appendix 3.4a Natural Gas Consumption (Bcm), LNG Trade1036 and Elasticity 
Indices  
 
Total LNG 
Imports 
(Bn cubic metres) 
Gas  
Consumption1037 
(Bn cubic metres) 
LNG as 
a % of 
N.G 
Natural 
Gas 
Elasticity 
LNG 
Elasticity 
USA 16.56 619.7 2.67% 0.90 0.02 
France 13.88 45.2 30.74% 0.75 0.23 
Italy 3.10 77.1 4.02% 0.70 0.03 
Spain 24.42 33.4 73.16% 0.75 0.55 
UK 3.56 90.8 3.92% 0.70 0.03 
 
Appendix 3.4b     Determination of Elasticity Indices for LNG  
   LNG Imports From  2006*  
To↓ 
Tri. & 
Tob. Qatar Algeria Egypt Libya Nigeria 
Total 
imports 
Gas 
Demand* 
% of 
LNG 
Natural 
Gas 
Elasticity 
LNG 
Elasticity 
USA 10.85  0.49 3.60  1.62 16.56 619.7 2.67% 0.90 0.02 
France   7.35 2.30  4.23 13.88 45.2 30.74% 0.75 0.23 
Italy   3.00 0.10   3.10 77.1 4.02% 0.70 0.03 
Spain 3.00 5.00 2.80 4.80 0.72 7.10 24.42 33.4 73.16% 0.75 0.55 
UK 0.60  2.00 0.96   3.56 90.8 3.92% 0.70 0.03 
TOTAL 
EXPORTS 16.25 31.09 24.68 14.97 0.72 17.58 61.52 * From BP Statistical Review 2007   
 Source: Cedigaz (provisional) 2007 (Billion cubic metres) 
 
In testing the feasibility of UP and VC, the above elasticity indices were used to generate 
the simulation results (presented in Tables 4.3 and 5.3; Figures 4.5 and 4.6, as well as, 
Appendix 1 and 2). 
 
3.5 CONVERSION 
The box below contains conversion measure/units applied in the book.   
1 tonne of LNG = 51.7 MMBtus 
1cubic feet Nat Gas = 0.028317 cubic metres Nat Gas 
(Price (p/therm) x Exch. Rate £-$) ÷ 10 = Price ($/MMBtu) 
1000 cubic feet = 1031 Btu 
1Mn tons of LNG = 1.38 Bcm of NG 
                                                                                                                                                                  
1035 Holz, F. and Pavel, F., Will there be enough for everybody? 
1036 Source: Cedigaz (provisional) 
1037 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2007  
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